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Abstract
This doctoral dissertation consists of three chapters on different aspects of labor markets, es-
pecially related to occupational choice, intergenerational transmission and structural change.
In the first chapter, I analyze how parents affect the occupational choice and employment
prospects of offspring. In the second chapter, I study the determinants of occupational per-
sistence across generations and its implication on the aggregate equilibrium and welfare.
In the third chapter, I investigate how income inequality affects the relationship between
structural change and growth.
In the first chapter, “Parental Links and Employment Prospects: Evidence from the
UK ” (joint with Iacopo Morchio), I study how parental links affect labor market choices
and employment prospects of individuals, exploiting monthly job histories from the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS, hereafter). I document two important facts: i) occupa-
tional choice is correlated across generations; and ii) the offspring’s job–finding probability
is correlated to the father’s employment, especially for those who find a job in their father’s
occupation. More specifically, I find that having an employed (rather than unemployed)
father increases the employment rate by about 8 p.p. and the monthly job–finding rate by
at least 50% (5–6 p.p.), whereas this does not hold for mothers. Furthermore, this correla-
tion is much larger for younger workers. One potential explanation for this finding is that
parental networks are an important source of information about job vacancies for workers.
To illustrate this mechanism, I develop a stylized model of intergenerational transmission of
networks in which agents with little or no experience in the labor market rely more heavily
on parental connections, in line with my results. A number of robustness checks also sug-
gest that the correlations that I find are indeed due to informational advantages rather then
human capital transmission, direct hiring or common shocks.
In the second chapter, “Like Father, Like Son: Occupational Choice, Intergenerational
Persistence and Misallocation” (joint with Iacopo Morchio), I study the determinants of oc-
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cupational persistence across generations. The key contribution is to develop a framework
with multiple sources of persistence and quantitatively assess their relative importance, in
order to shed light on the relationship between persistence and misallocation. When the
comparative advantage and the father’s occupation (where contacts are available) are not
perfectly aligned, some workers face a tradeoff between choosing the occupation in which
they are most productive (higher wages) and the one in which they can exploit their father’s
network (higher job–finding rates). This implies that in equilibrium some workers will decide
not to pursue their comparative advantage, generating productive mismatch in the economy,
and thus producing negative externalities on firm entry. I test and confirm the key predic-
tions of the model with panel data from the UK: occupational followers have, on average,
finding rates (at the monthly frequency) which are at least 40% higher, implying that their
unemployment spells are typically substantially shorter; also, I estimate a large wage dis-
count, in the region of 7–14 log points. Next, I extend the theory to a dynamic quantitative
model, that allows for preferences (non–pecuniary benefits for occupations) to be correlated
across generations, and also for occupational mobility and accumulation/depreciation of hu-
man and social capital over the life–cycle. A persistence decomposition exercise suggests
that the all transmission channels are relevant though by differing degrees, with the trans-
mission of parental networks being the strongest force, able to account for about 79% of
total persistence. When I shut down parental networks or the transmission of preferences,
welfare improves, due to the improved (more aligned with productive advantages) alloca-
tion of workers to occupations: output per worker goes up, and firms react posting more
vacancies per worker than before. Instead, when I shut down the transmission of abilities,
the reduction in persistence is accompanied by a reduction in welfare, driven by the worse
allocation of the workforce. Finally, the decomposition yields relevant implications for the
evaluation of labor market policies such as unemployment benefits, and of the detrimental
effects of search frictions on the sorting of workers.
In the third chapter, “Structural Transformation, Innovation and Growth: the role of
Income Distribution”, I document and rationalize a novel fact on structural transformation
and growth. Working with a sample of 41 countries for the period 1960–2010, I show that
outflows of labor from the agriculture sector are growth–enhancing only for economies with
relatively low levels of inequality. A decrease of 10% in the agriculture employment share is
associated with an increase in GDP per capita of 54.2% in low–inequality countries, while
the predicted increase for high–inequality countries is only 23.5%. In other words, despite
experiencing (even deep) structural transformations, several countries did not benefit much
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in terms of economic growth. Therefore, I develop a 2–sector endogenous growth model
with a non–degenerate income distribution, which allows me to study the interaction of
inequality, the employment shares and growth. In the model, income distribution shapes
aggregate demand, which in turn: i) shapes the employment structure of the economy; and
ii) generates incentives for investing in modern technology and hence enhancing the level of
TFP. In particular, a higher level of inequality generates an employment structure which
is less agriculture–intensive, besides having a detrimental effect on the innovation process.
The latter effect stems out of a demand structure that is not concentrated enough to in-
duce firms to adopt modern technologies in the modern sector (manufacturing and services).
The income distribution matters in this, as a more (less) equal distribution generates larger
(smaller) markets for each single good. I calibrate the model to the US economy and per-
form counterfactual experiments with respect to the degree of income inequality. I find that
high–inequality economies are characterized by a relatively smaller agriculture sector and
substantially worse growth prospects. For instance, doubling the income differentials among
rich and poor (from 2 to 4), decreases the equilibrium growth rate of the economy from 2.6
to 1.56%. An increase in inequality implies an increase in the total amount of labor devoted
to production, which disproportionately goes into the modern sector (rather than into the
agriculture one), as the use of less productive technologies by firms generates the need for
more labor (the ratio of agriculture to non–agriculture employment shares drops from 0.122
to 0.116). Instead, when I vary the weight of the different goods in household consumption,
a decrease in the size of the agriculture sector is accompanied by improvements in the growth
performance. Overall, the model lends a possible explanation of the empirical evidence out-
lined above.
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Chapter 1
Parental Links and Employment
Prospects: Evidence from the UK
1.1 Introduction
We explore how parental links affect labor market choices and employment prospects of
individuals; more specifically, we look at how the job finding and job separation rate are
affected by the fact that parents are employed rather than unemployed, and we investigate
patterns of occupational mobility across generations. We construct detailed monthly job
histories using information from the British Household Panel Survey and exploit information
on household structure and friends from the same dataset. In particular, we improve upon
the existing literature by linking each individual to his family members, and measuring how
the employment prospects of an individual are affected by the labor market status of his
relatives or his spouse. Finally, we compare the strength of family ties with that of other
relevant ties such as friends.
Our contribution is twofold: first, we document the extent of intergenerational occu-
pational mobility and we argue that using contemporaneous information on parental oc-
cupation, rather than retrospective information, is important for measuring such mobility.
Second, we establish that the father’s employment has an impact on the offspring job finding
probability, and we argue that such impact is due to parental networks being an important
determinant of employment prospects.
The importance of social networks in determining labor market outcomes has been rec-
ognized in the literature in the last decades1. Networks are a common way to alleviate
1Rees (1966) and Granovetter (1973a) were the first ones to investigate the important role played by social networks in labor
markets. Montgomery (1991a) proposed a simple model to capture the features of a labor market with personal connections.
More recently, Calvó-Armengol & Jackson (2004) studied the dynamic implications of networks, shedding new light on the
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information frictions, largely used by both workers2 and firms3.
Our work looks at the workers’ side, i.e. individual transitions from unemployment to
employment and viceversa. Several papers have tried to quantitatively assess how belonging
to a particular network affects labor market variables such as job finding, job separation
and wages4. One usual shortcoming of the data is that only indirect measures of networks
are available. Some researchers rely on estimates of social networks, in order to assess their
impact. As a consequence, the estimates produced by these studies are likely to be affected
by measurement error, due to the impossibility of exactly identifying the network members.
Our work studies social networks at a disaggregated scale and uses direct information on
social contacts, thus limiting the extent of measurement error.
The main focus of this work is on parental links. The exogenous nature of parental
links –individuals do not choose their parents– makes it easier to quantify their effects and
reduces problems of double causality. Fathers and mothers are also commonly recognized to
be strong ties in the network literature, and it is therefore interesting to analyze the extent
to which parents can influence the labor market choices and outcomes of their offspring.
Moreover, such influence is likely to affect the intergenerational persistence of social
and economic status. In this sense, the choice of the data is particularly appealing for our
analysis: among developed countries, the UK ranks relatively high in terms of socio-economic
persistence across generations5.
In order to motivate our econometric specification, we first postulate a stylized model
of intergenerational transmission of networks in the labor market. In the model, offspring
inherit a fraction of the father’s network, and then develop their own contacts while employed.
As they spend more and more time in employment, the correlation between their employment
status and the father’s one fades out over time. This motivates our empirical strategy based
on difference-in-differences estimation, employing a threshold age to distinguish between
treatment and control group. We also report the results of other linear probability models,
controlling for individual fixed effects. We show that the effect of parental links is larger
when the individual looks for a job in the same occupation of the father. Although one might
think that parental links play the most important role in helping the offspring to find his
very first job, we document that large and persistent differences in the job finding are related
to father’s labor market variables for a number of years, rather than only at the beginning
possible effects of policy.
2See for instance Holzer (1988) and Pellizzari (2010a).
3See for instance Ioannides & Loury (2004) and Topa (2011).
4See for instance Topa (2001a), Munshi (2003), Beaman (2012).
5The intergenerational earnings elasticity in UK is estimated to be about 0.5, one of the highest among developed countries,
again very similar to that of the US, which ranges from 0.5 to 0.6 depending on the estimation method (Corak (2006a)).
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of one’s career.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to analyze how parental links affect
transitions in and out of unemployment, rather than non-employment as other studies in
the literature. We are also the first to document the existence of a strong positive effect
of father’s employment on these transitions by exploiting direct information on such links.
We choose to look at employment and unemployment because the choice of participating to
the labor force can be influenced by parental background and employment, which in turn
would confound the effect of parental links on nonemployment to employment transitions.
By looking at unemployment vs. employment, we are selecting those individuals who are
participating to the labor force to begin with.
We document that in the UK occupations tend to be persistent across generations;
for instance, sons are from 26 % to 167 % (depending on the sector) more likely to end up
working in similar occupations as their fathers, with some exceptions. Similar considerations
apply to daughters and mothers.
We find that having an employed (rather than unemployed) father increases the employ-
ment rate by about 8 percentage points, with an effect on the job finding rate of at least 5
percentage points, compared to an average in-sample job finding rate of 11 %. Moreover, if an
individual searches for a job in the same sector in which his father is currently employed, the
effect on the job finding rate is magnified by a further 4 percentage points. Such results are
robust to alternative specifications and to several robustness checks. Overall, the evidence
is strongly consistent with our model of intergenerational networks. Moreover, by means of
a number of empirical tests we are able to rule out several other possible mechanisms that
could potentially generate our results. We do not find similar effects for mothers. For the
sake of comparison, an additional employed friend increases the job finding rate by 1 - 3
% depending on the estimation method, while the spouse’s employment status has a strong
association with the individual job finding rate (with a similar magnitude to the father’s
one).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 surveys the literature in
greater detail, emphasizing the differences between our work and the others. In Section
1.3 we introduce the data, along with some descriptive statistics of interest. In Section 1.4
we present a stylized model of intergenerational networks, in order to justify the empirical
models employed for the analysis (explained in Section 1.5). Results are shown in Section 6
and discussed in Section 7. We performs some robustness checks in Section 8 and conclude
in Section 9.
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1.2 Related Literature
Our paper relates to the extensive literature on intergenerational occupational and income
mobility. In particular, our work suggests two possible sources of income persistence across
generations. One is through higher chances of being employed, and the other one is through
occupational persistence. As long as wages differ across occupations, then the influence of
parental background on occupational choices can be potentially very important in explaining
income persistence. The literature on the persistence of income across generations dates
back to Becker & Tomes (1986). Solon (1992a) is one of the earliest assessments of the
measurement error issues affecting the estimation of intergenerational elasticities, finding
high values of persistence for the US. A comprehensive survey of the literature is provided
in Corak (2006a), who performs a cross-country study. Jäntti et al. (2006) also perform a
study of the intergenerational earnings mobility across several countries, while Björklund
et al. (2012) focuses on Sweden, with a particular emphasis on the top of the distribution.
On the link between occupational and income persistence across generations, see also Corak
& Piraino (2011a).
We offer direct evidence of the positive impact of family ties’ employment on labor mar-
ket transitions. Many empirical studies try to identify the effect of belonging to a particular
network on labor market outcomes. Several papers rely on indirect measures of networks. For
instance, Topa (2001a), Bayer et al. (2008) and Schmutte (2010) use geographical proximity
and group affiliation as proxies for social interactions. Beaman (2012) uses data on political
refugees resettled in the US and proxies for networks using nationality. Overall, these studies
find evidence of positive effects of social interactions on labor market outcomes. Similarly,
Khan & Lehrer (2013) use a random assignment to a unique intervention to identify the
impact of changes in the size of a social network. Access to the program successfully led to
gains in the number of weak ties but these changes did not translate into improved employ-
ment outcomes. Herault & Kalb (2009) look instead at parental links; using retrospective
parental information from Australian data, they find significant persistence in employment
across generations.
Our paper is more closely related to that strand of this literature that exploits direct iden-
tification of network members.
O’Regan & Quigley (1993) study the correlation of employment status of urban youth with
the employment status of their family members (parents and siblings) in the US, finding
strong and positive correlations. Further, they observe that the industry affiliation of the
network members is a good predictor of the industry affiliation of the individual. Magruder
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(2010) examines to which extent parents help children in finding jobs in South Africa. He
finds that fathers help sons (but not daughters), while mothers are not helpful in find-
ing jobs. Differently from these works, our analysis is dynamic and focuses on transitions
from unemployment to employment and viceversa, rather than on employment status versus
nonemployment. Also, our data allows us to employ different estimation techniques and to
compare parental effects to similar effects by other strong ties. Kramarz & Skans (2014a)
investigate parental networks at the firm-level. They analyze Swedish graduates, finding
that it is quite frequent that their first job is in the same plant where their parents work.
With respect to their paper, rather than focusing only on the entry in the labor market,
we follow individuals over their life-cycle, investigating whether the advantages derived from
their network persist over time.
Finally, Pistaferri (1999) uses Italian data and finds that informal networks use is associated
with higher job finding rates and lower wages. Similarly, Bentolila et al. (2010a) find that
individuals who use social contacts to find their job are characterized by higher job find-
ing rate (lower unemployment duration) and slightly lower wages. They suggest that the
trade-off between job finding rate and wage could still make individuals choose to enter the
same sector as their network members. Indeed, we document patterns of intergenerational
persistence in occupations; along with our regression results, this is consistent with a model
of occupational choice in the spirit of Bentolila et al. (2010a).
Closely related to our work is the study of Cappellari & Tatsiramos (2011), who also use
data from the BHPS and a similar methodology. Nonetheless, some relevant traits differen-
tiate the two works: first, we focus on parental links, instead of friendship ones; second, we
identify monthly transitions (rather than yearly); third, we look at transitions within the
labor force while they consider transitions from non-employment to employment; fourth, we
document how searching for a job in the same occupational sector magnifies the effects we
find.
Several studies in the literature have tackled the issue of understanding the effects of
social networks by means of a theoretical model. One of the first papers to include personal
contacts in a job search framework was Mortensen & Vishwanath (1994). In their model
the information about vacancies comes from two different sources: direct application to em-
ployers or indirect contact through friends. As a consequence, better connected individuals
have more chances to find a job. Similarly, Montgomery (1991a) finds that well connected
workers perform better in the labor market, both in terms of wages and of higher job finding
rates. Calvó-Armengol & Jackson (2004) also develop a model where workers can obtain
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information through an explicitly modeled network of social contacts. In their model, be-
longing to a network with less employed members implies worse employment prospects, and
this effect is persistent over time. Other models of networks and job search are in Fontaine
(2008) and Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2005), with a particular focus on networks’ dynamics.
More recently, Galenianos (2014a) embeds networks explicitly into a search and matching
model and finds that referral mechanisms have important macroeconomic implications.
A distinctive feature of all these works is that networks exhibit a positive effect on labor
market outcomes of individuals. These studies constitute the theoretical ground on which
we base the interpretation of our results.
1.3 The Data
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey, a representative sample from the
UK following individuals since 1991. The BHPS is a yearly survey taken by about 10,000
individuals per year and the last available wave for this study is 2008. The follow-up rate is
very high and the great majority (more than 90%) of individuals are interviewed also in the
subsequent year. Besides these, every year a certain number of new individuals enter the
sample. A total of 32,377 individuals are interviewed in the BHPS in the period 1991-2008.
Even though the survey is yearly, individuals report their job history in the last year, listing
all the employment (unemployment) spells along with several characteristics of each job.
This allows us to identify monthly transitions and build long time series for each individual,
up to 216 months. Details on how we construct job histories for individuals are included in
Appendix A.
We retrieve the employment status of individuals exploiting the job histories, distinguishing
between employees and self employed. The employment status of individuals is assigned at
the monthly frequency. Differently from other studies, we do not consider individuals who
are out of the labor force in our transitions. We define the job finding rate as the probability
of transiting from unemployment (rather than non-employment, as for instance in Cappellari
& Tatsiramos (2011)) to employment. The job separation rate is defined accordingly. We
restrict our sample to individuals aged between 16 and 656 and, as it is standard in the
literature, we drop armed forces and registered disabled. Eventually we are left with 27,278
individuals, for a total of 2,232,528 monthly observations.7
6That is, our intergenerational sample will include couples of parents and offspring if and only if both are in this age range.
7We also check whether our final sample is representative of the UK economy between 1991 and 2008. We compute the
in-sample unemployment rate and compare it with the harmonized unemployment rate according to OECD statistics (figure 10
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Along with a detailed job history, for each individual a large amount of information is
typically available, including sex, age, education, occupation, race, marital status, region of
residence and much more. More interestingly, the identification number of parents and spouse
is available, allowing us to connect individuals to their family members and follow them
together over time8. In addition to this, the data include information on the employment
status of the three closest friends and the occupation of the closest friend. This information
is collected only every second wave, starting in 1992. At the core of the analysis, we consider
the relationship between the employment status (and the occupation) of the parents and the
employment prospects of respondents. We also compare parental effects to similar effects
by spouse and friends. Since friends’ job histories are not reported, in order to keep the
monthly frequency we extend their employment status and occupation in the following 12
months after each observation. Furthermore, we use a simple procedure to attribute the
occupational sector to unemployed and to extend non-varying or spell-dependent variables,
as described in Appendix A. Especially for the occupation, the data contain many missing
values, both for respondents and connected individuals: we assume that these values are
missing at random and simply exclude the incomplete observations from the estimation,
when it is not possible to replace them according to the procedure described in Appendix
A. The final size of the estimating sample varies, depending on the dependent variable we
use in each regression9.
Table 7 (in Appendix 3.7) displays some descriptive statistics of interest for our analysis.
As we can see, the period 1991-2008 is characterized by a relatively low level of unemploy-
ment in the UK. More than 93% of the population in the labor market has a job, 12% of
which is self employed. The average monthly job finding rate, that is the probability of
transition from unemployment to employment, is slightly above 7%. Conversely, the average
job separation rate is relatively small (0.4%). This implies that in the period considered the
UK economy was characterized by a high level of security for those who had a job. On the
other hand, it was somewhat hard to find an occupation for those who were unemployed: on
average, the expected waiting time in unemployment was about one year. In other words,
the reason behind the low unemployment rate is the tightness of the monthly outflow from
employment rather than a large inflow from unemployment. Compared to other OECD
countries, the UK economy has an average performance in terms of search variables10. A
in the Appendix). The average unemployment rate of our sample replicates quite well the pattern of the OECD series.
8Unfortunately, it is possible to do so only for about 19% of the whole sample for fathers and 25% for mothers (those who
report the parental PID numbers).
9By construction, the job finding rate (job separation) is defined only over unemployment (employment) spells.
10For a cross-country comparison of estimates of the standard search variables see Hobijn and Sahin (2007). As shown by
other studies, the European economies perform much worse than the US to this extent. For instance, the job finding rate is
estimated to be about 30%-40% in the US (Shimer (2012)).
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comparison among genders shows that females in the labor force tend to have slightly better
outcomes than males. About 53% of our sample is female and the average individual is aged
39. We define four educational groups and nine occupational sectors, following the SOC
aggregation by major group, as established by the Employment Department Group and the
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys. We identify an occupational sector Oi,t for each
individual (parents included), for both unemployed and employed individuals. When em-
ployed, the occupational sector is defined in a straightforward manner. When unemployed,
the occupational sector is interpreted as the sector in which the individual seeks for a job,
and is assumed to be the one in which the individual eventually finds a job. For instance,
if an individual i starts being unemployed at time t, is unemployed for 10 months and then
finds a job in sector 3, we assume that the individual was indeed searching in sector 3 for
those 10 months: Oi,t = Oi,t+1 = ... = Oi,t+10 = 3. If we have no information on the occupa-
tion of arrival, for instance because the individual exits the sample or goes out of the labor
force, we use the occupation prior to the unemployment spell when available. The rationale
behind our choices and further details are explained in Appendix A11. The distribution of
workers across occupational sectors is shown in Table 1.1, along with several labor market
statistics of the sectors.
Table 1.1. Distribution of workers across sectors and sectoral labor market statistics. Source: BHPS (1991-2008)
Occupational Sector Abs. Freq. Rel. Freq. Unempl. Rate JF Rate JS Rate
Managers & Administrators 221396 14.88 2.08 10.15 0.25
Professional 147698 9.92 1.82 11.96 0.20
Associate Professional & Technical 174160 11.70 2.59 11.18 0.22
Clerical & Secretarial 235157 15.80 4.35 12.16 0.43
Craft & Related 178628 12.00 6.22 8.10 0.53
Personal & Protective Service 170551 11.46 6.72 8.03 0.52
Sales 108502 7.29 6.39 10.59 0.62
Plant & Machine 131936 8.86 7.82 8.95 0.67
Agriculture & Elementary 120345 8.09 9.66 7.55 0.73
Total 1488373 100.000 4.94 9.38 0.43
We see that labor market outcomes are not independent from sectors. While it is known
that high-skilled jobs are better paid, it seems like there are also relatively large differen-
tials in terms of unemployment rate (and search variables). One possible explanation is
a relative scarcity of high-skilled workers in the UK in those years, compared to the high
profitability of those sectors (managerial and professional). In the first three sectors the
unemployment rate ranges between 1.8% and 2.1%, with a job finding rate of 10-12% and
a job separation rate of about 0.2%. On the other hand, we also notice that restricting
11Our results are robust to alternative assumptions: we tried using only the future occupation, the past occupation or a
combination of the two.
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the sample to the observations for which the occupation is available induces some degree of
sample selection. The average job finding rate (unemployment rate) is indeed higher (lower)
than in the whole sample. This happens because originally all the individuals assigned to a
sector are employed, and our sector imputation only considers the next and the last labor
spell. Therefore, due to the large number of missing values for occupation, we lose many
observations of unemployed (typically, the long-term unemployed) when imputing the sector.
Unfortunately, without making any stronger assumptions than the ones we already make, it
is not possible to get rid of this issue. However, notice that the sample selection problem
only affects the unemployment rate and the job finding rate, as shown in Table 1.1.
1.3.1 Patterns of Occupational Mobility across Generations
While many studies on occupational mobility across generations rely on single observations
for the occupation of parents, the BHPS allows us to follow parents over time. In this way,
besides the answer to “What was your parents’ occupation when you were 14?”, our data
provides a better source of information on parents’ side.
First of all, we compare the distributions of parents and offspring across sectors. Table 1.2
shows the distribution of sons and daughters, parents when offspring (respondents) were 14
and parents who are followed over time. We immediately notice that a large degree of sex
segregation characterizes the distribution across sectors. Managerial and craft occupations
are typically covered by men, while secretarial and sales jobs are more intensively taken by
women. This phenomenon seems to be persistent over generations, given that no relevant
differences can be detected when comparing the distribution of offspring and parents to this
extent. Another interesting feature is the large structural change that characterized the UK
economy in the last decades. Sectors such as craft or machine occupation shrunk significantly
in relative terms, while managerial, professional and especially technical occupations employ
nowadays a larger share of the working force than before. For this reason, the distribution
of offspring is more directly comparable with the distribution of parents who are followed
over time, as in this way we are comparing occupational choices within the same economy.
In what follows, we argue that there exist important differences in occupational mobility
computed using retrospective information and using contemporaneous information, and that
these differences are crucial for understanding occupational mobility across generations. In
order to investigate the degree of occupational mobility across generations we build Markov
matrices, computing the transition probabilities from a sector to another. As parental oc-
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Table 1.2. Distribution of sons and parents across sectors, relative frequencies. Source: BHPS (1991-2008)
Offspring 1991-2008 Parents when offspring 14 Parents 1991-2008
Occupational Sector Sons Daughters Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers
Managers & Administrators 18.92 11.96 16.81 7.36 22.48 9.90
Professional 10.23 10.60 8.05 6.04 8.69 9.19
Associate Professional & Technical 10.83 13.35 4.05 7.61 7.11 9.19
Clerical & Secretarial 7.91 24.39 5.00 19.16 6.41 25.61
Craft & Related 21.12 2.12 27.44 5.40 22.43 2.20
Personal & Protective Service 5.90 16.55 5.11 14.90 4.70 18.06
Sales 4.60 9.81 3.71 11.66 4.36 10.87
Plant & Machine 13.41 3.29 18.26 7.84 18.35 3.82
Agriculture & Elementary 7.07 7.93 11.58 20.03 5.46 11.16
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
cupation, we use both the current one and the one as reported when offspring were 14. If
individuals rarely switch occupation over the life cycle, the two sources of information on
parental occupation will be highly correlated. Consistently with the degree of sex segrega-
tion that we found in the data, we report the tables for couples of the same gender: fathers
with sons, and mothers with daughters. For males, even though with some heterogeneity,
we note that there is a general level of persistence in the same sector as their father’s one
as reported when respondents were 14. Table 1.3 reveals that the persistence is particularly
high at the top (managerial and professional occupations) and at the bottom (plant and
machine occupations) of the distribution, with another peak for craft occupations. Instead,
when considering the contemporaneous occupation, persistence drops significantly at the top
while it strongly increases in the mid-sectors.
When considering women (in Table 1.4), similar considerations can be made: for in-
stance, the persistence with mother’s sector as reported when daughters were 14 is strikingly
high for managerial and professional occupations. Again, when we look at the contempo-
raneous occupation, the persistence at the top almost disappears while it becomes more
substantial in the middle and at the bottom of the distribution. Overall, women are very
attached to clerical and secretarial occupations: the probability of falling into that category
is very high regardless of parental background.
The large differentials in the patterns of persistency obtained by using retrospective instead
of current information on parental occupations implies the existence of a substantial degree
of occupational mobility of parents over their life cycle. Tables 8 and 9 (in the Appendix)
show that fathers and mothers have a sizeable probability of moving between occupations
during their worklife. Studies that focus only on retrospective information on parental oc-
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Table 1.3. Markov matrix of occupational mobility: fathers-sons, relative frequencies. Source: BHPS (1991-2008)
Son’s sector
Father’s sector
when son is 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 31.99 13.76 12.42 6.44 12.56 5.10 4.38 8.30 5.06
2 23.72 26.11 21.35 7.55 6.51 4.04 3.38 4.65 2.69
3 25.86 15.75 17.53 7.84 12.67 5.16 3.35 8.72 3.13
4 16.98 16.94 13.80 12.07 16.71 4.97 3.26 9.69 5.57
5 16.65 9.55 9.32 7.43 27.86 5.31 3.76 13.73 6.40
6 18.26 11.61 11.81 10.02 17.87 8.68 5.33 11.73 4.68
7 25.09 9.73 13.27 8.88 15.46 2.52 8.42 11.55 5.07
8 15.06 7.03 8.38 6.50 24.20 6.50 3.66 22.13 6.55
9 14.52 5.47 6.44 7.43 25.18 4.49 4.63 19.37 12.47
Father’s sector
contemporaneous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 13.46 7.51 13.11 11.80 22.34 6.94 10.26 5.49 9.09
2 10.77 13.32 19.95 16.82 13.02 5.97 10.71 4.46 4.98
3 9.22 7.92 19.74 18.96 15.47 5.18 8.36 10.00 5.16
4 13.65 7.85 16.44 16.03 17.37 3.82 8.18 10.20 6.46
5 7.99 1.64 8.78 10.95 40.49 5.39 7.32 10.28 7.16
6 12.20 1.76 11.69 18.40 17.66 16.93 6.87 6.64 7.86
7 7.76 6.47 14.77 13.22 21.95 8.95 9.95 11.89 5.03
8 8.95 2.26 6.70 8.50 30.91 7.89 5.51 20.89 8.39
9 6.16 4.61 13.16 12.31 23.45 5.35 5.65 8.18 21.13
Table 1.4. Markov matrix of occupational mobility: mothers-daughters, relative frequencies. Source: BHPS (1991-2008)
Daughter’s sector
Mother’s sector
when daughter is 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 18.77 12.38 15.46 20.77 1.94 15.32 9.03 1.06 5.26
2 13.96 30.97 17.75 19.36 0.58 9.26 4.83 0.56 2.73
3 14.72 12.54 21.03 21.81 1.28 15.51 6.20 1.95 4.96
4 13.78 16.87 16.28 29.64 1.74 11.70 5.51 1.09 3.40
5 12.44 8.30 10.85 22.72 2.92 16.39 11.65 4.39 10.33
6 10.86 8.15 13.39 23.85 2.03 20.11 9.43 2.57 9.60
7 12.79 8.55 11.93 29.41 1.71 14.61 11.92 3.15 5.92
8 10.32 5.02 8.97 26.61 2.76 17.93 10.25 6.98 11.15
9 8.89 6.29 13.21 21.58 1.98 20.26 11.50 4.18 12.12
Mother’s sector
contemporaneous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 16.74 13.52 9.61 21.04 0.58 19.90 10.83 1.27 6.51
2 13.50 15.91 17.27 25.06 1.93 11.80 10.59 0.53 3.41
3 10.01 9.99 14.89 25.73 1.30 23.05 9.59 1.35 4.08
4 10.75 7.51 10.45 37.10 0.87 18.49 11.01 0.44 3.37
5 6.00 9.25 0.89 23.13 9.65 19.29 24.80 3.74 3.25
6 8.07 7.17 10.85 25.41 1.19 24.59 16.28 1.15 5.29
7 5.60 3.25 6.02 31.47 2.74 23.57 18.31 5.30 3.74
8 6.54 0.94 4.79 23.47 5.87 24.61 13.01 10.92 9.84
9 14.12 5.04 9.23 30.27 1.03 19.23 13.98 2.78 4.31
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cupations cannot account for this important feature of the data.
In order to ease the interpretation of the statistics just shown, we construct likelihood ratios
dividing the probabilities shown in the diagonal of the matrix by the unconditional proba-
bility that a son (or daughter) belongs to each particular sector. This produces a synthetic
measure of the "effect" of parental occupational sector on individual choices. Table ?? shows
that, when compared to the actual job distributions, the attachment to parental sector is
indeed very large. On average, sons (daughters) are 76 % (191 %) more likely to be in
the father’s (mother’s) occupational sector than expected if the assignment of sector was
random.
Table 1.5. Likelihood ratios: each cell represents the probability that a son (daughter) belongs to a given occupational sector
conditional on father (mother) being in the same sector, divided by the unconditional probability of belonging to that sector.
Results are shown separately by gender (sons with fathers, and daughters with mothers). Source: BHPS (1991-2008)
Occupational sector Likelihood ratio
contemporaneous Males Females
Managers & Administrators 1.29 1.93
Professional 2.59 2.36
Associate Professional & Technical 1.63 1.72
Clerical & Secretarial 1.26 1.55
Craft & Related 1.55 7.26
Personal & Protective Service 1.58 1.44
Sales 1.34 1.73
Plant & Machine 1.94 7.07
Agriculture & Elementary 2.67 1.17
In the next subsection, in order to understand and interpret the patterns of occupational
persistence, we study whether parental labor market variables (such as their employment
status and their sectoral belonging) affects individuals’ labor market outcomes.
1.3.2 Employment Prospects across Generations
Before entering the regression-based analysis, we look at the relationship between labor mar-
ket performances across generations. In particular, we compute the average unemployment
rate and search variables of individuals conditional on the employment status of parents.
We also investigate whether these intergenerational correlations vary when individuals are
in the same occupational sector as their parents.
Table 1.6 reveals the existence of strong correlations across generations. Having em-
ployed (rather than unemployed) parents is associated with better labor market outcomes.
For instance, the average unemployment rate –which is 21% for those whose father is
unemployed– drops to 8% for those whose father is employed, decreasing further up to
less than 5% when the father is in the same sector as the offspring. Similar percentages
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Table 1.6. Employment prospects across generations: unemployment rate, JF and JS rate conditional on parental employment
status/occupation. Source: BHPS (1991-2008).
Father Mother
Variable Subsample Unemployed Employed SameSector Unemployed Employed
Same
Sector
All Sample 20.67 7.84 4.74 17.86 7.86 7.38
Unemployment Rate Males 24.14 9.11 5.02 20.83 9.18 8.02
Females 14.35 6.23 4.01 15.17 6.28 6.87
All Sample 4.85 11.02 15.23 7.45 11.05 12.89
Job Finding Rate Males 4.88 10.58 14.85 7.65 10.64 14.17
Females 4.86 11.82 16.13 7.20 11.79 11.68
All Sample 1.16 0.75 0.58 1.23 0.74 0.79
Job Separation Rate Males 1.34 0.85 0.58 1.42 0.84 0.94
Females 0.87 0.62 0.57 1.07 0.63 0.66
characterizes the mother’s employment status, with the difference that there does not seem
to exist any additional effect linked to sector belonging. The job finding rate more than
doubles on average (it increases from 4.9 to 11%) when the father is employed, while the
effect of the mother’s employment status is less pronounced but still large (from 7.4 to 11%).
Again, when the father is employed in the same sector, individuals experience an even higher
job finding rate on average (about 15%). Interestingly, the job finding rate of males appears
to be affected also by having the mother in the same sector. Finally, the job separation rate
is also correlated with parents’ employment status in the same direction. It is roughly 1.1%
for those with unemployed father and it drops to 0.75% for those whose father is employed.
Mother’s employment status has approximately the same effect on this conditional average.
An extra reduction in the job separation rate is found when the sector of the offspring coin-
cides with the one of the father, while no relevant differences with respect to the sector of
the mother.
Overall, significantly better labor market performances are found to be associated with the
employment status of the parents. Such advantages are larger when individuals are in the
same occupational sector as their father. The additional premium is about 40-50% the size
of the effect of having an employed father12.
We investigate whether the differences between these groups change over the life cycle. We
find that especially for the very young the difference is very large. Figure 1.1 shows that
having the father employed is associated with up to 20 to 30 percentage points more in the
average employment rate. This difference steadily declines over the life cycle and eventually
disappears. The higher employment rate13 can be generated by higher job finding rates,
12Remarkably, we do not find that these patterns are substantially different by gender.
13It is defined as 1− unemployment rate.
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lower job separation rates or a combination of the two. Figure 1.2 and 1.3 reveal that the
job finding rate is driving the bulk of the difference, yielding large and persistent variations
across groups. Conversely, the job separation is substantially lower for offspring of employed
fathers especially at early ages, whereas the gap greatly reduces later on in the life cycle.
Nevertheless, small differences in absolute value are actually large in relative terms and have
a strong impact on individual worklife.
Figure 1.1. Employment Rate (Employed 1, Unemployed 0) as a function of age: cross sectional averages. Source: BHPS.
The correlations found so far are interesting per se, even though they do not necessarily
represent any direct effects of parents on offspring’ labor market outcomes. Several other
correlations, for instance educational attainment, human capital accumulation or genetical
transmission, might well explain these differences in the conditional averages. Moreover, it
could also be the case that respondents’ outcomes affects parental ones, instead of the other
way around. In any case, the differences in the other observables across these groups (Table
10 in Appendix 3.7) are not large14. In Section 1.5 we outline our empirical strategy to
address these and other related issues, in order to try to establish a causal relationship and
estimate the effect of parental links on offspring’ employment prospects.
Before that, we now proceed to postulate a simple of model of intergenerational networks,
in order to motivate our empirical strategy and illustrate the source of variation we want to
exploit for the identification of a causal relationship.
14Not surprisingly, those who belong to the same sector as their father tend to be more often males. Also, they are slighlty
older, more educated, more often married and white.
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Figure 1.2. Job Finding Rate as a function of age: cross sectional averages. Source: BHPS. Ages 30-32 are cut because of
limited availability of observations.
Figure 1.3. Job Separation Rate as a function of age: cross sectional averages. Source: BHPS.
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1.4 A Simple Model of Intergenerational Networks
This model is a simple adaptation of Calvó-Armengol & Jackson (2004). Individuals look
for jobs when they are unemployed, and in order to do so they exploit their network of social
contacts. Employed parents help their unemployed offspring in that they let them use their
own social network.
Suppose the economy is populated by identical workers, indexed by worker i, family j and
age t. Every period, all workers of age T have an offspring of age 0. We assume that
individuals stop being connected with their parents when they have children, so that at each
point in time only two generations are connected15. In the first period of their lives (t = 0),
agents draw an initial network size nji,0 = 
j
i,0 from a normal distribution. From that moment
onwards, the total network of an offspring (t < T ) at time t is denoted by nˆji,t and it is given
by the following expression:
nˆji+1,t = βn
j
i,t+TS
j
i,t+T + n
j
i+1,t ∀t < T (1.1)
where i + 1 represent the offspring of father i within family j, nji,t denotes the natural
logarithm of work connections held by worker i in family j at time t and Sji,t+T denotes the
employment status of the father i at age t+ T .
Fathers’ total networks necessarily have to coincide with their personal networks:
nˆji,t = n
j
i,t ∀t ≥ T (1.2)
Workers can be in either of two states S ∈ {E,U}, employed or unemployed. When
employed, they lose their job with constant probability γ. Work connections positively affect
the probability of finding a job, as such connections allow workers to reduce informational
frictions. Hence we have that, when unemployed, the job finding probability f is:
f ji,t = 1− e−Nˆ
j
i,t (1.3)
where Nˆi,t = enˆi,t . We assume that the timing is as follows: first, shocks to the em-
ployment status (f and γ) take place; second, personal networks nji,t evolve stochastically
according to the following law of motion:
nji,t+1 =
α + (1− δE)n
j
i,t + 
j
i,t if S
j
i,t = E
(1− δU)nji,t + ji,t if Sji,t = U
(1.4)
15This assumption is made for simplicity and does not alter our results.
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Figure 1.4. Simulated correlation between fathers and offspring network (left) and employment status (right). α =
0.05, β = 0.5, δE = 0.03, δU = 0.03, γ = 0.05.
where ji,t ∼ N(0, σ). These equations encompass the idea that a worker gains use-
ful connections while working, and may randomly lose/gain more connections every period.
While not working, however, such connections depreciate every period because workers pro-
gressively lose contact with their former colleagues. In principle the rates of depreciation
{δE, δU} do not need to be equal, but the difference between them is not important for our
results.
It is clear that the correlation between labor market status of fathers and offspring is
highest for t = 0; at the initial period, connections of offspring are mainly defined by those of
their fathers because the former did not have the opportunity yet to form many useful work
connections. As time goes by, the careers of fathers and offspring evolve independently and
those that were common contacts at the beginning might be still useful contacts for one, but
lost touch with the other. As a consequence, the correlation between labor market status
fades out along with the correlation between parental and offspring’s networks.
Showing formally that the covariance between the employment status of fathers and offspring
dies out over time is not straightforward, because the correlation at one point depends on the
whole history of employment/unemployment of both the father and the offspring. However,
we provide simulation results to show that indeed such correlation fades out as workers get
older. These results are shown in Figure 1.4, in which we assign values to the parameters of
the model and report the results of our simulations.
Another way to see that differences induced by initial networks vanish over time is to
look at the probability of being employed over the life cycle, by different initial conditions.
Figure 1.5 shows how individuals with high, rather than low, initial networks have a higher
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Figure 1.5. Simulated paths of average employment status for individuals with high (red line) and low (blue line) initial
networks. α = 0.05, β = 0.5, δE = 0.03, δU = 0.03, γ = 0.05.
probability of being employed at the beginning of their careers; as time goes by, such differ-
ence goes to zero, as we observe in the data.
Shocks to the employment status of the father will have an impact on the employment
prospects of offspring mostly at the beginning of their career. This motivates our strategy of
looking at the difference in correlation of employment status between ages 20-30 and later
ages. As careers evolve independently, the correlation fades out and offspring after age 30
constitute a proper control group for identifying the effect of networks early on.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in understanding the partial correlation between individual employment
prospects16 and the employment status of their parents. First of all, we define an employment
status variable Ei,t using information on job histories. Ei,t is equal to 1 if individual i is
employed at time t, and 0 in case of unemployment. In all periods of different labor market
status (retired, in further education etc.), Ei,t is not defined.
Then we define the transition variables Jfi,t and Jsi,t, respectively the job finding and job
separation events for an individual. Jfi,t is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if individual
i moves from unemployment to employment at time t (that is, Ei,t−1 = 0, Ei,t = 1), and 0
if the individual remains unemployed (Ei,t−1 = Ei,t = 0). In all periods of employment or
labor market status different from unemployment, Jfi,t is not defined. Conversely, Jsi,t takes
16As of now, the focus of our analysis is exclusively on individual employment status and transitions from unemployment to
employment (and viceversa). In future work, we are planning to include the wage in our analysis.
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value 1 in case of transitions from employment to unemployment and zero otherwise.
Next, we link individuals and parents using personal identification numbers of relatives
provided in the BHPS. For all individuals i for which such information is available, we
associate a father, a mother, a spouse and three friends. Call Efatheri,t the employment status
of the father of individual i at time t and similarly for the mother, the spouse and all friends.
In principle we could just use the raw employment status data in our regressions. How-
ever, since we have monthly job histories, we are not capable of determining precisely whether
jobs ending at time t are covering the full month representing time t or only a small por-
tion of it. The problem is relevant because a correct identification of the timing of spells is
crucial to correctly estimate the partial effect of interest: suppose for instance that a father
is employed until December 20th when he becomes unemployed, while his offspring obtains
a job on December 10th. Since job histories are written in monthly format, it is possible
that the father will result unemployed in December, while his offspring will result employed
from December onwards. However, it is not clear whether we should have considered the
father employed rather than unemployed, since the labor market spell of his offspring began
during his employment spell. In order to exclude these controversial cases, we consider only
labor market statuses that are unambiguously assigned in a given month, that is we exclude
those cases in which the labor market spell changes between two months. Basically, instead
of using EFatheri,t as defined above, we use
EFather, ongoingi,t =
EFatheri,t if EFatheri,t+1 = EFatheri,tmissing if EFatheri,t+1 6= EFatheri,t
We construct similar variables for mothers and, for comparison purposes, spouses.
1.5.1 Difference-in-Differences Estimation
In order to identify the effect of parental networks on employment prospects, we divide our
sample in two groups, one of which is assumed not to be affected by parental networks.
Consistently with the stylized model presented in Section 1.4, the control group is made
up by all those workers who are not very young anymore. In particular, we employ an age
threshold of 27 for discriminating between control and treatment group17. The rationale
behind this definition of the control group is that individuals accumulate social contacts
while working so that their pool of contacts become more and more different from those of
their family connections over time. For this reason, an alternative definition of the control
17Results are robust to changes in the threshold age. Using any age between 25 and 29 yields a coefficient that yields between
6 and 8 p.p., that is significantly different from zero.
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group is based on the experience of individuals18. For both definitions of control group, we
run linear19 regression models of the form
Yi,t = β0 + β1E
Father, ongoing
i,t−1 + β2Ti,t + β3Ti,tE
Father, ongoing
i,t−1 + γXi,t + i,t (1.5)
where Ti,t takes the value 1 if the individual belongs to the treatment group (as explained
before). The employment status of the father EFather, ongoingi,t−1 has a one period lag, in order to
avoid problems of double causality (i.e. when the offspring is employed, the father becomes
employed thanks to the offspring). Xi,t is a vector of control variables and the dependent
variable Yi,t will be, alternatively, the employment status, the job finding rate Jfi,t and the job
separation rate Jsi,t. Controls will include a third degree age polynomial, dummies for gender,
education, occupational sector (observed for employed, imputed for unemployed), marital
status, ethnic group, smoking behaviour, region of residence and quarterly dummies. We are
interested in the estimation of β3, which will give us the effect of parental networks on labor
market outcomes. The identifying assumption is that all other factors affecting the outcome
variable other than parental networks affect the offspring of employed and unemployed in
the two groups in the same way. That is, we only need that the relative difference in the
way these factors affect individuals remains unchanged across the treatment and the control
group. Under this assumption, our estimator βˆ3 will identify the effect we are looking for:
βˆ3 = (Y¯T,EF=1 − Y¯T,EF=0)− (Y¯C,EF=1 − Y¯C,EF=0) . (1.6)
1.5.2 Other Linear Probability Models
In order to check that our results hold when changing the model specification, we also employ
three other types of regressions: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, Random Effects GLS and
Fixed Effects. In this case we do not use any control group and our identification strategy
with FE estimation estimation crucially depends on the time-invariance of the other factors
affecting the outcome variables. The estimating model is a reduced version of the previous
one and reads as follows
Yi,t = β0 + β1E
Father, ongoing
i,t−1 + γXi,t + i,t (1.7)
18In a robustness check, we define the control group as those workers who have at least a given number of years of potential
experience (defined as years elapsed after the completion of education) in the labor market.
19In principle, linear models are not ideal for analyses that involve probability because they might predict negative or bigger
than one probabilities. We choose linear models over probit/logit formulations because of the easier interpretation of marginal
effects. When we run similar logistic regressions, we obtain substantially the same results. Results are now available upon
request and will be included in the Appendix of a future version of the paper.
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We are interested in the estimation of the coefficient β1. While the POLS is the standard
empirical baseline, we are more interested in empirical models that exploit the time structure
of the data. In particular, the time-invariant individual heterogeneity captured by the Fixed
Effects estimator might affect our results significantly if fixed individual characteristics not
captured by controls Xi,t are correlated with labor market outcomes of parents20. We run
such regressions for both parents and, for comparison purposes, spouses and the three best
friends.21
For a more in-depth analysis, later on we restrict the sample to those individuals who
have employed parents only: that is, an observation is included in the sample if and only if
EFather, ongoingi,t−1 = 1.
Using the occupations Oi,t, defined for both employed and unemployed individuals as
explained in the Data subsection, we compute a new variable Si,t, where S stands for “same”
sector:
Si,t =

1 if Oi,t = OFatheri,t
0 if Oi,t 6= OFatheri,t
missing otherwise
Such variable captures whether an unemployed individual is assumed to be (or not)
seeking a job in the same sector of his employed father, or whether an individual is currently
working (or not) in the same sector of his employed father.
We run regressions similar to those explained above, where the job finding events Jfi,t is
regressed on the same sector indicator Si,t. Notice that in this case the sample will include
only those individual whose parents are employed, meaning that any correlation associated
to Si,t will be additional to those obtained when looking at the correlation with the employed
status of parents.
With the expection of our diff-in-diff specification, in all regressions described above we
include individual-level fixed effects, in order to take out fixed individual characteristics that
can be correlated with job market outcomes. Moreover, we cluster standard errors at the
parents’ level, because within-families correlations are likely to be important and to bias
standard errors downwards if not properly accounted for.
In the Robustness section we question our empirical strategy, allowing for a more flexible
specification; we show that our strategy yields the most "conservative" estimates, and we
20For instance the IQ, motivation, social skills or whatever other factors that are likely to be transmitted across generations
and have an impact (directly or indirectly) on the performance in the labor market.
21Although we would like to run the same regressions for all these variables at the same time, the low amount of data for
which all variables are available does not allow us to do so.
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argue that what seems to be the most "obvious" approach leads to upward biased estimates
of the marginal effects. Furthermore, the more flexible specification yields negligible gains
in efficiency.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Difference-in-Differences Estimation
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3)
Emp.Status Job Finding Job Separation
Father’s emp. status (2m, lagged) -0.00329 -0.0439 -0.000594
(0.016) (0.048) (0.002)
Younger than 27 -0.0745*** -0.131** 0.00162
(0.023) (0.052) (0.003)
Younger than 27*Father’s emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.0822*** 0.114** -0.00253
(0.023) (0.049) (0.003)
N 115823 7912 105727
R2 0.066 0.040 0.006
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.7. Difference-in-differences regressions of Employment Status, Job Finding and Job Separation. The control group is
given by individuals aged at least 27. We report the coefficient of the employment status of father, of belonging to the
treatment group and the interaction term (the effect we want to estimate). Standard errors are clustered at the father
level. All regressions include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for education, gender, region of residence, smoking
behaviour, marital status, ethnicity, quarter, occupation of search/employment, defined according to the assumptions described
in Appendix A.
In Table 1.7 we report the results of our diff-in-diff specification. The estimates indicate
that having a father employed (rather than unemployed) increases in the individual employ-
ment rate of about 8 p.p.. We then decompose this result between an higher job finding rate
and a lower job separation, simply by running the same regression changing the dependent
variable. Column 2 and 3 of Table 1.7 shows that the bulk of the economic advantage lies in
a much higher job finding rate (the effect estimates is 11 p.p.). We want to stress how the
effects estimated by our regression are very large and significant. In section 1.6.2 we report
the results of other linear probability models in which we control for individual unobserved
heterogeneity22.
22If we were to include individual fixed effects in the DD regressions, the identification of the father’s effect would rely
almost exclusively on cross-sectional variation, in the absence of a large number of individuals who happen to belong to both
groups over their life-cycle. In other words, the DD specification would not work properly. On the other hand, the presence of
individuals who belong to both the control and the treatment over their life-cycle can also create problems to the identification.
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1.6.1.1 Other DD results
The results shown in the last section are perfectly consistent with our stylized model of
intergenerational transmission of networks. Importantly, the estimates are robust to alter-
native definitions of the treatment group. In Table 11 (in Appendix 3.7), we run again the
same regressions using years of potential experience in the labor market (years elapsed from
completion of education), instead of age. The control group is defined as all the individuals
with more than 10 years of potential experience. The results are virtually unchanged.
We also investigate whether the effect depends on individual characteristics such as age
and education. In Table 12 (in Appendix 3.7), we estimate again the baseline regression
adding a full set of interaction terms with a gender dummy (in column 1) and a college-
education dummy (in column 2). The estimates indicate that the effect of the employments
status of the father does not differ by gender, but instead it greatly diminishes when the
individual has a college degree. This might reflect the fact that parents are more willing to
help their offspring when the latter ones are more disadvantaged (for instance, less educated).
Otherwise, this could also mean that the help received by college graduates lies in a better
employment, rather than on the margin between employment and unemployment23.
Finally, we do not find that the same results hold for mothers. Table 13 (in Appendix
3.7) shows that mothers are not useful work connections for their offspring: in particular,
even though the effect on the employment status (column 1) is positive and significant,
column 2 reveals that this effect does not arise through higher job finding rates. Therefore,
the empirical evidence rejects that having the mother employed help the offspring find a job.
1.6.2 Job Finding Rate - Parental Links
In the remainder of the paper, we focus uniquely on the job finding rate since, as we show in
the previous section, the differences in employment prospects of individuals by employment
status of the father are mainly driven by differences in finding rates. Table 1.8 shows that
having the father employed rather than unemployed has a strong and significant effect on the
job finding rate of the offspring, perfectly in line with the results outlined above. The partial
correlation observed in POLS models, including all relevant controls, lays in the region of 5-6
p.p. These effects are quite large (to be compared with a 12% in-sample average job finding
rate) and robust to several model specifications. Panel regressions with RE yield a similar
coefficient (6.4 p.p.). Importantly, the coefficient keeps the same size and it is estimated with
Nevertheless, we tried to run the regressions excluding such individuals from the sample and results (available upon request)
are substantially unchanged.
23Among college graduates, the unemployment rate is just 3%.
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a similar precision even in fixed effects models. This suggests that the effects captured by
the coefficient do not depend on fixed factors (e.g. genes) that might be transmitted across
generations. Notice that the in-sample average job finding rate is higher than the average
job finding rate of the overall sample, consistent with the lower average age of the estimating
sample. We estimate the baseline POLS regression separately by gender, finding that the
father has a large and significant effect both on males and on females.
Conversely, mothers do not appear to have any significant effect on the job finding rate
of offspring, neither for males nor for women. The coefficients are ranging between 3 and 4
p.p. but their estimates are less precise, even when we use the data as repeated cross-sections
(Table 1.8, panel B).
As the employment status of couples is likely not to be independently distributed, our models
might be suffering from omitted variable bias. In order to control for correlations between
the employment status of the father and of the mother, we estimate the model including
both regressors. The results shown in Table 1.8 (panel C) confirm the patterns shown in the
separate regressions, yielding the father’s employment status as the only important predic-
tor of offspring’s transitions. This is consistent with other studies as for instance Magruder
(2010). The effect of having the father employed ranges between 7.6 and 11 p.p., while the
effect of the mother is not stable across specifications and never significantly different from
zero. This suggests that the positive effects of mother’s employment status –shown in panel
B of Table 1.8– were almost entirely driven by within-couple correlation in employment sta-
tus. Notice that, even though standard errors rise in fixed effects estimation, the father’s
coefficient keeps having the same size (or even higher). This indicates that such effects do
not depend on within-household correlation in employment status.
In order to get further insights on the father effects found so far, we test whether these are
magnified when the occupational sectors of the offspring and of the father coincide. That is,
we investigate whether individuals who search for a job in the same sector where their father
is employed have additional advantages. As shown in Table 1.9, such additional advantages
are estimated to be in the region of 4 p.p.24. The size of the coefficient is again robust to the
inclusion of individual fixed effects. This is a substantial difference and it might be one of the
main factors driving the occupational persistence across generations that we find in the data.
24This implies that having the father employed in the same sector where individuals are looking for jobs generates an effect
that is at least 1.6 larger than having the father employed in some other sector. The effect found in Table 1.8 is a composition
of the effect of fathers in the same sector and fathers in other sectors. For this reason, computing the additional effect as the
ratio between the two estimates (0.4/0.6=0.66..) simply provides a lower bound.
33
Panel A Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS POLS (men) POLS(women) GLS FE
Emp. Status (father, lagged) 0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0559∗∗∗ 0.0965∗∗∗ 0.0645∗∗∗ 0.0566∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.028) (0.016) (0.021)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 22.1 22.4 21.6 22.1 22.1
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.120 0.114 0.131 0.120 0.120
N 7772 5051 2721 7772 7772
R2 0.041 0.052 0.061 0.030
N of groups 753 753
Panel B Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS POLS (men) POLS (women) GLS FE
Emp. Status (mother, lagged) 0.0365∗∗ 0.0457∗ 0.0498 0.0365 0.0266
(0.018) (0.025) (0.035) (0.022) (0.026)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 22.6 22.8 22.2 22.6 22.6
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.123 0.118 0.131 0.123 0.123
N 7384 4640 2744 7384 7384
R2 0.045 0.052 0.078 0.033
N of groups 703 703
Panel C Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS POLS (men) POLS (women) GLS FE
Emp. Status (Father, lagged) 0.0835∗∗∗ 0.0870∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗ 0.0764∗
(0.021) (0.029) (0.033) (0.027) (0.039)
Emp. Status (Mother, lagged) -0.000429 -0.0192 0.0195 0.00135 -0.00587
(0.024) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.041)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 22.1 22.3 21.8 22.1 22.1
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.126 0.119 0.137 0.126 0.126
N 5420 3473 1947 5420 5420
R2 0.047 0.062 0.082 0.037
N of groups 573 573
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.8. Linear regressions of Job Finding Rate (transition from Unemployed to Employed); coefficient for employment
status of father and mother (1 for employed, 0 for unemployed), standard errors (clustered at the father level), average age
and average job finding rate in the sample of the regression. Models 1-3 are pooled OLS regressions, model 4 is a random effects
GLS regression, model 5 is a fixed effects regression. All models include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for
education, gender, region of residence, smoking behaviour, marital status, ethnicity, quarter, occupation of search/employment,
defined according to the assumptions described in Appendix A.
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Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3)
POLS GLS FE
Emp. in Same Sector (father) 0.0422∗∗ 0.0447∗∗ 0.0407
(0.018) (0.021) (0.026)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 22.0 22.0 22.0
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.130 0.130 0.130
N 6257 6257 6257
R2 0.045 0.031
N of groups 666 666
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.9. Regressions of Job Finding; coefficient for father in same sector (0 employed in other sector, 1 employed in same
sector), standard errors (clustered at the father level), average age and average job finding rate in the sample of the regression.
Model 1 is a pooled OLS regression, model 2 is a random effects GLS regression, model 3 is a fixed effects regression. All models
include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for education, gender, region of residence, smoking behaviour, marital
status, ethnicity, quarter, occupation of search/employment, defined according to the assumptions described in Appendix A.
We do not find any effects for mothers, consistently with our previous findings. Mothers’
employment status does not appear to provide any advantages to offspring, not even when
their job is similar to the one their offspring are looking for (the associated regression table
is available upon request).
1.6.3 Job Finding Rate - Comparison with other strong Links
In this section we consider the employment status of the three closest friends and of the
spouse, investigating whether these partial correlations are similar in magnitude to the
parental ones we documented in the previous section. To ease the comparison we employ
the same empirical strategy and model specifications. The only difference is that we do not
distinguish between males and females in the regressions.
In the first model, we consider the number of employed friends25, among the three closest as
reported by individuals. Table 1.10 reveals that friends’ employment status has a significant
impact on the probability of transition from unemployment to employment. Having an addi-
tional employed (rather than unemployed) friend raises on average the individual job finding
rate by 3 p.p. Notice that this coefficient is significantly smaller than the father’s coefficient
(about half in magnitude). Moreover, the friends’ coefficient drops with the inclusion of
fixed effects in the model, suggesting that individual characteristics are producing a bias in
the baseline regressions. Some fixed factors are positively correlated with both the ability of
25We follow the same strategy as Cappellari & Tatsiramos (2011).
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finding a job and having good (employed) friends. Our estimates are in line with those of
Cappellari et al. (2010), who find an effect of about 7.4 p.p. on yearly transitions.
Panel A Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3)
POLS GLS FE
Num. Employed Friends (lagged) 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0110
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 33.5 33.5 33.5
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.101 0.101 0.101
N 14127 14127 14127
R2 0.028 0.031
N of groups 1919 1919
Panel B Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3)
POLS GLS FE
Emp. Status (spouse, lagged) 0.0527∗∗∗ 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.0614∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.015) (0.022)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 43.3 43.3 43.3
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.100 0.100 0.100
N 10580 10580 10580
R2 0.027 0.021
N of groups 1075 1075
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.10. Regressions of Job Finding Rate (transition from Unemployed to Employed); coefficient for number of employed
friends (from 0 to 3) employment status of spouse (0 or 1), standard errors (clustered at the individual level), average age
and average job finding rate in the sample of the regression. Model 1 is a pooled OLS regression, model 2 is a random effects
GLS regression, model 3 is a fixed effects regression. All models include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for
education, gender, region of residence, smoking behaviour, marital status, ethnicity, quarter, occupation of search/employment,
defined according to the assumptions described in Appendix A.
As Table 1.10 shows, spouse links seem to be stronger than those of friends. Accord-
ing to regression results, individuals whose spouse is employed experience a job finding rate
that is 5-6 p.p. higher than that of individuals who are married to an unemployed spouse.
One possible concern is assortative mating, i.e. the fact that people who are more likely to
be employed tend to marry among them. However, the fact that the size of the estimated
coefficient is robust to fixed effects estimation strategies suggests that this mechanism is not
driving the results. Summing up, spouse effects are comparable in size to father’s ones, while
friendship ties seem to be a less important factor in the determination of the job finding rate.
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1.7 Discussion
In this section we discuss our results and provide some possible alternative mechanisms that
can explain the partial correlations observed in the data. The focus of our discussion is ex-
clusively on the effects of fathers’ variables on offspring’ job finding rates, which we consider
as the most important of our results. At a first glance, these positive effects are consistent
with standard models of networks in the labor market (Calvó-Armengol & Jackson (2004)).
Information flow on vacancies and job opportunities probably represents one of the main
channels through which individuals belonging to the same social network help each other.
Of course, the partial correlations uncovered by our regressions possibly include several other
mechanisms.
Genetical and Human Capital Transmission
For instance, genetical and human capital transmission across generations might be driving
the results. To this respect, we have to consider that for each of the models we estimate, we
always include fixed effects as the last specification. In this way we capture fixed individual
characteristics that have an effect on the dependent variable and are possibly correlated
with the explanatory variables of interest 26. Genetical endowments are an example of such
individual characteristics that are properly controlled for in fixed effects models, assuming
that their effect is linear and non time-varying. With respect to human capital, even though
it could –at least in part– be assimilated to fixed factors in adult individuals, this is cer-
tainly not true for young individuals. Human capital is a time-varying factor that can be
potentially relevant in our estimates. The presence of educational group dummies in our
regression attenuates this problem, as education is a good proxy for human capital. How-
ever, if the effects were due to the transmission of human capital or work ethics, then we
should find that the exact timing of the employment status (or the sectoral belonging) of
the father does not matter much. Indeed, such transmission mechanisms are supposed to be
long-lasting, and it is also reasonable to think that they take some time in order to produce
their effects. Hence, as a further robustness check we include in our regression several lags
of the employment status of the father. Interestingly, columns 1-4 of Table 1.11 reveals that
26To some extent, father’s fixed effect might be better at capturing fixed characteristics that are transmitted across generations.
Including such fixed effects in our regression -rather than individual ones- leaves the results unchanged.
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only the contemporaneous employment status and sector of the father have an effect. The
coefficient of the lags considered (3, 6 and 12 months) are actually negative or not significant,
indicating that human capital transmission is not a relevant factor in our estimates. Since
strong collinearity might be causing a bias in our coefficients, we also estimate a regression
including only the 12-months lag of our variables of interest (columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.11).
We find this to have, if anything, a slightly negative effect on the job finding rate. Repeating
the same test for both the employment status and the occupational sector provides a test
for, respectively, a general and an occupation-specific human capital interpretation. As we
can see, the empirical evidence is strongly at odds with this interpretation. The fact that the
coefficients of the current variables are even higher now reveals that in the baseline models
these coefficients were picking up the negative correlations of the lagged variables, which are
serially correlated.
Direct Hiring
Second, another possible channel is direct hiring of individuals by their father. Even though
it is unclear whether this should be considered as an informational advantage or another kind
of mechanism, we investigate whether a major part of the effects we find can be attributed to
this channel. We study whether having a father who hires employees (rather than employee
or self-employed without employees) boosts the advantages in terms of job finding rate.
Column 5 of Table 1.11 shows that, if anything, having a father who is an employer has
a negative effect on the individual job finding rate. This is strongly inconsistent with an
interpretation of our results as direct hiring.
Local Labor Market Conditions
Another possibility is the existence of common shocks affecting both parental employment
status and offspring’ performances. For instance, if an individual and his father both live in a
region that has experienced a positive shock, their employment statuses will be correlated as
they will be caused by the same fundamental shock. Similar considerations can be made with
respect to the occupational sector. If the partial correlations we find are due to local labor
market conditions, then we should expect these correlations to be stronger when the offspring
lives together with his father. To this purpose, we use the region of residence, generating a
dummy that takes the value 1 when the region of residence of the offspring does not coincide
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Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lags Lag 12 only Sector lags Sector lag 12 only Fat. Hires Employees
Emp. Status (father, lagged) 0.0759∗ 0.0577∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.019)
Emp. Status (father, 3 months lag) -0.0275
(0.036)
Emp. Status (father, 6 months lag) -0.0238
(0.030)
Emp. Status (father, 12 months lag) 0.00726 -0.0257
(0.025) (0.024)
Father in Same Sec. (lagged) 0.0790∗∗
(0.040)
Father in Same Sec. (3 mths lag) 0.00338
(0.051)
Father in Same Sec. (6 mths lag) -0.0197
(0.040)
Father in Same Sec. (12 mths lag) 0.00691 -0.0117
(0.028) (0.021)
Father Hires Employees -0.106
(0.082)
N 6621 7648 4841 5855 8563
R2 0.026 0.024 0.035 0.029 0.027
N of Groups 654 719 554 624 791
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.11. Discussion: Human Capital and Direct Hiring. All regressions are fixed effects estimates. All regressions include
all controls discussed in previous sections. Standard errors are clustered at the father level.
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with the one of the father. Column 1 of Table 1.12 shows that the partial correlation of
father’s employment with offspring’ job finding rate is instead magnified when the offspring
lives in a different region from his father, even though the estimate of the difference is not
very precise. In our regression we control for regional changes of offspring, to account for the
possibility that individuals migrate in order to find a job, which would bias the estimate of
the father’s employment coefficients. Individuals who belong to different regions definitely
belong to different local labor markets, and therefore we have to conclude that local labor
market conditions are not an important driver of the correlations we find. In order to control
further for local labor market conditions, we also compute the average unemployment rate
by sector and by region. We then add these new variables to our regressions as additional
controls. As shown in columns 2-5 of Table 1.12, the partial correlations are unchanged by
the inclusion of all these possible controls. In particular, we are including dummies for the
sector interacted with the year in column 4 and for the region interacted with the year in
column 5, controlling for possible booms or busts of given segments of the labor market.
Nonetheless, this does not appear to capture at all the effects outlined so far.
1.8 Robustness Checks
In this section we explore whether our results are robust to different choices of the sample and
to different empirical strategies. First, we want to understand whether the composition of our
sample might be driving our estimates. The fact that our estimating sample includes many
individuals who are still at school or at the university might be creating problems of sample
selection. To control for this possibility, we try to exclude individuals with a college degree
from our sample. Column 1 of table 1.13 presents results of this estimation: although the
size of the estimate is somewhat lowered, it still is statistically and economically significant,
showing that college-educated individuals are not driving the bulk of the correlations we
find.
Then, we consider the possibility that only very young workers (aged 16-20) are affected
by the employment status of their father. However, when we include only individuals aged
more than 20 years of age in the estimation (column 4), we maintain the size of the coefficient,
despite losing more than one-third of our original sample.
Also, we consider the possibility that our assumptions on sectors of search might be
important for our results: by using future and past occupations as proxies of current sectors of
search, we are de facto excluding those individuals who are always unemployed in the BHPS,
or who never report their occupation. To account for this possibility, we exclude controls for
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Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Local Conditions Sector Unemp. Region Unemp. Sector*Year Region*Year
Emp. Status (father, lagged) 0.0558∗∗∗ 0.0553∗∗∗ 0.0553∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗ 0.0542∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Father emp. (in other region) 0.0619
(0.049)
Father unemp. (in other region) -0.121
(0.150)
Has Changed Region X
from last year
Unemployment of Sector X
Unemployment in Metropolitan X
Area of residence
Interactions Sector × Year X
Interactions Region × Year X
N 7816 8563 8563 8563 9246
R2 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.047 0.062
N of Groups 754 791 791 791 828
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.12. Discussion: Local Labor Market Effects. All regressions are fixed effects estimates. All regressions include all
controls discussed in previous sections. Standard errors are clustered at the father level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
No College No Sectors Different Model Age > 20
Emp. Status (father, lagged) 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0490∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025)
Father U-E 0.172∗∗
(0.072)
Father E-U 0.0526
(0.057)
Father E-E 0.0632∗∗∗
(0.019)
N 7826 9246 8644 5889
R2 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.031
N of groups 671 828 792 576
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.13. Robustness Checks: regression without college graduates (column 1), no sectoral dummies (column 2), more
flexible specification (column 3), Only individuals aged > 20 (column 4). Omitted category: Father U-U. All regressions are
fixed effects estimates. All regressions include all controls discussed in previous sections. Standard errors are clustered at the
father level.
occupation from our estimations. Results are reported in column 2: the coefficient is lowered
by about 1 percentage point, maintaining statistical and economical significance.
Finally, we question our empirical strategy and consider the possibility that a more
flexible model may allow us to better capture the nature of the correlations we find. That
is, we do not keep only fathers who are on an ongoing spell but rather all the observations
which are not missing. Specifically, we construct four indicators based on the two months
of job history of the father during the offspring’s transitions: hence we have one dummy for
“father unemployed past month and current”, one for “father unemployed past month but
employed on current” and so on. Column 3 shows the results of such experiment: while
the coefficient roughly corresponding to our empirical strategy (employed past month and
current) maintains substantially the same magnitude and standard error, the coefficient
corresponding to “father unemployed last month, employed today” is strikingly high. Such
a coefficient is due to a relatively large number of transitions taking place at the same time
(for both fathers and offspring) and does not correctly capture any direct effect of fathers
on offspring. There are at least two main issues: first, common high-frequency shocks that
we are not able to properly control for might be a common cause for these contemporaneous
events. Second, there is the possibility that in fact offspring are affecting fathers (instead of
the other way around), producing a large upward bias due to reverse causality.
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1.9 Conclusion
We tested whether parental links affect labor market outcomes of individuals using rich panel
data from the British Household Panel Survey. Our results indicate that, on average, those
whose father is employed rather than unemployed experience an employment rate that is
about 8 percentage points higher, with job finding rates which are higher by 5 percentage
points and job separation rates which are lower by 0.3 p.p.. We also show that such difference
is larger when individuals work in occupations similar to those of their father. We do not find
similar correlations for mothers, and we show that father’s effects are similar in magnitude, or
larger, to those of other supposedly relevant links. We also document that the job separation
rate is on average lower for individuals whose father is employed in similar occupations to
theirs.
By means of a number of robustness checks, we show that our results are unlikely to
be attributable to human capital transmission, to common shocks driving both outcomes at
the same time or to the fact that fathers directly hire their offspring. Our conclusion is that
parental networks are likely to play an important role in determining labor market outcomes.
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Chapter 2
Like Father, Like Son: Occupational
Choice, Intergenerational Persistence
and Misallocation
2.1 Introduction
It is well known that a number of economic outcomes are correlated across generations, most
notably income, education and occupational choice.1 Such persistence is commonly believed
to represent a failure of the equality of opportunity principle, besides being potentially
symptomatic of an underlying misallocation of resources and talents (Mora 2009, Güell et
al. 2015). In particular, a large degree of persistence in occupational choice may reflect the
presence of barriers of various types in the labour market, implying a suboptimal allocation
of workers to jobs. However, a quantitative theory of occupational persistence, that would
help us understand whether or not persistence is indeed associated with inefficiencies, has
not been developed yet.
In this paper, we study how intergenerational occupational persistence and labor misal-
location are related. We demonstrate that when persistence stems from a number of sources,
it is crucial to measure the quantitative importance of each and how they interact with one
another. To do so, we develop a dynamic model of occupational choice and search frictions
that features multiple channels of intergenerational transmission, and use it to decompose
1The first important contribution in the intergenerational literature was Becker & Tomes (1979); more recently, Solon
(1992b), Solon (2002), Corak (2006b), Hertz (2006) and Björklund & Jäntti (2009) have documented persistence in income.
For persistence in education, see Chevalier et al. (2009); and for occupational persistence, see Hout & Beller (2006), Constant
& Zimmermann (2004), Escriche (2007), Eberharter (2008) and Dustmann (2004). Two reviews of the literature can be found
in Black & Devereux (2010) and Ermisch et al. (2012).
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the occupational persistence observed in UK data. Our model provides novel insights on the
impact of different sources of persistence on the sorting of workers in the labor market, and
therefore the aggregate level of efficiency and welfare.
To illustrate our main mechanism, we first develop a simple two–period model, in which
both abilities and social contacts are transmitted across generations. We show that persis-
tence can indeed be a sign of misallocation if parents help their offspring find a job faster in
their current occupation, which is not necessarily where their offspring’s comparative advan-
tage lies. In our model, workers optimally choose their occupation, so that mismatch is not
always detrimental to welfare. However, we find the equilibrium to generally be inefficient, as
workers do not internalize that: i) search frictions interact with the level of mismatch present
in the economy, and firms offer fewer jobs if they expect workers to be more mismatched
and consequently less productive;2 and ii) mismatch has dynamic effects, via intergenera-
tional transmission. We also analytically establish that higher levels of persistence can be
associated with either higher or lower welfare, depending on whether they are the result of
stronger transmission of productivity or social contacts across generations.
To assess the quantitative importance of the different channels of persistence, we then
extend our theory to a dynamic model that embeds a third channel of transmission (i.e.
preferences)3 and allows for mobility over the life–cycle. We investigate the quantitative
importance of the three different forces in generating occupational persistence, and find that
parental networks can account for about 78% of persistence, whereas transmission of compar-
ative advantage and preferences account for 19% and 10%, respectively.4 The very large role
played by parental networks depends on the fact that they strongly interact with the other
two factors generating persistence, thus acting as a multiplier. Moreover, we demonstrate
that a model in which only productive abilities are transmitted across generations (which
we call the restricted model) falls short in accounting for several key pieces of evidence and
in general provides a much worse fit to the data.
The theory delivers two main predictions for agents who choose to pursue the same
occupation as their parents (occupational followers) relative to those who do not (occupational
movers). First, the former find jobs at a faster rate. Second, they earn lower wages. We
find confirmation of both implications using data from the British Household Panel Survey
(1991–2008) on male workers and their fathers. This dataset allows us to observe labor
market transitions, occupational affiliation and wages of both fathers and sons, together
2This channel is present also in Bentolila et al. (2010b).
3Studies on intergenerational transmission of preferences and work attitudes include Dohmen et al. (2011), Paola (2013) and
Bisin & Verdier (2005). Research on how these transmitted traits affect occupational choice includes Doepke & Zilibotti (2008),
Caner & Okten (2010) and Escriche (2007).
4The sum of the effects of the three transmission channels exceeds 100% because they are endogenously correlated.
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with a large number of other covariates.
We estimate that the degree of occupational persistence in the UK is substantial: at the
1–digit level, a worker is 72% more likely to be employed in a given occupation if his father
is also currently employed in that occupation. When we test the model’s predictions, we find
that occupational followers exhibit monthly job–finding rates that are 5–6 p.p. higher than
those of occupational movers. Given that the average in–sample job–finding rate is about
12.5 p.p., being in the same occupation as one’s father yields a substantial advantage in
terms of unemployment risk (robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects). Regarding
wages, we find that occupational followers exhibit large discounts (between 7 and 14 log
points) relative to occupational movers. These results are shown to be robust to alternative
definitions of the occupational followers group, using information on the entire labor market
careers as well as only contemporaneous information. Finally, we also document that sons
of high–wage fathers are more likely to be occupational followers, a fact that supports our
theory, which is based on comparative advantage (rather than absolute advantage).
We calibrate the quantitative model in order to match the above–mentioned key pieces of
empirical evidence, along with several other moments of the UK economy. In particular, the
parameters governing intergenerational transmission are pinned down as follows: the parental
networks transmission replicates the job–finding rate premium of followers, the comparative
advantages replicates the differential in persistence by parental wage, and the preferences
transmission is the residual channel of occupational persistence. We use the quantitative
model to assess how each source of persistence affects welfare. When we shut down parental
networks or the transmission of preferences, welfare improves. This is due to the improved
(i.e. more aligned with productive advantages) allocation of workers to occupations: output
per worker goes up, and firms react by posting more vacancies per worker than previously.
In contrast, when we shut down the transmission of abilities, the reduction in persistence
is accompanied by a reduction in welfare, driven by the inferior allocation of the workforce,
which in turn also leads to less firm entry. However, the changes in welfare are relatively
small, with a magnitude of 0.1% in consumption equivalent variation (CEV).
We also investigate the role of search frictions and find that the impact of parental
networks on the allocation becomes negligible as frictions tend to zero; also, an increase in
the severity of frictions in our model simultaneously generates a rise in the unemployment
rate and a drop in labor productivity. Finally, in our model more generous unemployment
benefits imply that workers are less likely to choose the same occupation as their father in
order to reduce the probability of unemployment. This implies that, in addition to reduc-
ing occupational persistence, increasing benefits can potentially be welfare–improving, since
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the allocation of the workforce may also improve. Nonetheless, we find that an increase in
unemployment benefits triggers a reallocation towards preferences rather than comparative
advantages. Therefore, the overall effect on welfare is slightly negative. For instance, an
increase in unemployment benefits of 25% yields a decrease in welfare of 0.3% (CEV). Im-
portantly, the restricted model yields very different implications for this policy change by
underestimating the negative welfare effects of increased benefits.
While there is a significant amount of research on income persistence across generations,
work on occupational choice is far scarcer in the literature.5 We contribute to this liter-
ature along several dimensions: First, we add to the empirical literature on occupational
persistence across generations (Constant & Zimmermann 2004, Hellerstein & Morrill 2011,
Ermisch & Francesconi 2002, Di Pietro & Urwin 2003, Long & Ferrie 2013) by documenting
new facts on labor market outcomes of occupational followers. We show that, relative to other
observationally equivalent workers, they find jobs faster but earn lower wages. Moreover, we
provide new estimates of the likelihood of belonging to the same occupational category as
one’s father using contemporaneous information based on monthly transitions.
Second, our study bridges the literature on the determinants of occupational choice
(Miller 1984; McCall 1991; Keane & Wolpin 1997; Papageorgiou 2014; Carrillo-Tudela &
Visschers 2014), its consequences for inequality (Kambourov & Manovskii 2009) and unem-
ployment duration (Wiczer 2014) and the literature on occupational persistence and career
following (Laband & Lentz 1983). Our paper is one of the few to adopt a theoretical and
quantitative perspective on occupational choice across generations,6 thus providing novel
insights into how persistence maps to efficiency and aggregate welfare.
Third, we relate to the literature on social networks in the labor market (for instance,
see Horváth 2014 and Galenianos 2014b)7 and particularly the transmission of contacts or
related advantages across generations (Corak & Piraino 2011b, Kramarz & Skans 2014b,
Pellizzari et al. 2011, Lentz & Laband 1989 and Aina & Nicoletti 2014). Fourth, our paper
investigates the possibility of misallocation of the labor force due to socially suboptimal
occupational choice, as in Bentolila et al. (2010b), Celik (2015), Hsieh et al. (2013) and
Munshi & Rosenzweig (2016). Finally, the decomposition exercise undertaken here is very
close in spirit to those of income persistence across generations, such as Restuccia & Urrutia
(2004), Lee & Seshadri (2014), Abbott et al. (2013) and Gayle et al. (2015).
5The economic literature has primarily focused on the study of income, while the sociological literature, pioneered by Blau
& Duncan (1967), has focused on occupational persistence. More recent contributions include Stier & Grusky (1990), Checchi
(1997) and Andres et al. (1999).
6In this sense, the closest paper to ours is Sinha (2014), who studies how borrowing constraints affect occupational choices
and how this mechanism can be important in understanding persistence in developing countries.
7Other contributions include Granovetter (1973b), Montgomery (1991b), Calvó-Armengol & Jackson (2007), Pellizzari
(2010b), Cingano & Rosolia (2012), Hensvik & Skans (2013), Topa (2001b) and Dustmann et al. (forthcoming).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a two–period model of
occupational choice and intergenerational transmission. Section 3 presents empirical evidence
on occupational persistence. Section 4 outlines the dynamic quantitative model, which is
calibrated and used for counterfactual experiments in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2.2 A Simple Two–Period Model
The model is based on Bentolila et al. (2010b), which is a static version of the standard
search model à la Diamond-Mortensen–Pissarides. We add the following features to their
framework: i) overlapping generations that are connected to each other; ii) a notion of
occupational persistence across generations; and iii) two different sources of persistence across
generations.
The economy is populated by a measure 2 of risk–neutral individuals who live for two
periods (a young and an old phase of life). The population has the typical OLG structure,
with each young individual being connected to one old individual (who we call “his father”).
There are two occupations denoted by j ∈ {A,B}, each of which corresponds to a separate
labor market. The only choice made by individuals is in which occupation to search for a
job.
In each of the two markets, matches between unemployed workers and vacancies take
place according to a matching function M(Uj, Vj), where Uj represents the total number
of search efficiency units, and Vj is the number of vacancies in the market. We define the
probability of finding a job for an unemployed worker exerting 1 unit of search efficiency
as p(θj) =
M(Uj ,Vj)
Uj
, where θj =
Vj
Uj
represents the labor market tightness. Conversely,
q(θj) =
M(Uj ,Vj)
Vj
represents the job-filling rate (probability of a firm meeting a worker).
Upon matching, the generated surplus is split according to Generalized Nash Bargain-
ing, where the worker’s bargaining power is equal to β. If unmatched, workers receive an
unemployment benefit (normalized to 0 without loss of generality). We assume that search
takes place during the young phase, while production takes place only during the old phase.8
As a result, equilibrium wages are equal to a share β of the worker’s productivity.
Workers are heterogeneous in their occupation–specific productive advantage and in the
endowment of social contacts. A worker without productive advantage produces y, whereas
he produces (1+a)y when he can exploit his productive advantage, where a > 0. We assume
that there exist two types of workers, with τ = {A,B} denoting the occupation in which
each type has his productive advantage.9 Types are transmitted across generations according
8These assumptions are made for simplicity, since they make the model static.
9We could allow the comparative advantage to vary, depending on the occupation chosen by the worker, and this would not
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to the following transition probabilities: P (τ = A|τF = A) = P (τ = B|τF = B) = ρ (we
denote the father’s variables with an F superscript), with ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Due to the symmetry
of the transition matrix, the long–run distribution is characterized by P (τ = A) = P (τ =
B) = 1
2
, so that types are independent if ρ = 1
2
. In what follows, we assume that ρ > 1
2
,
that is an individual has a tendency to be of the same type as his father, on average.
Importantly, in this framework there is no productive absolute advantage. This is consistent
with Papageorgiou (2014) who argues that comparative advantage is the most important
component in occupational choice.
Social contacts are occupation–specific and help individuals find jobs by increasing the
efficiency units of search. We assume that young individuals have more social contacts in
their father’s occupation: one possible interpretation is that they can exploit their father’s
networks if they decide to enter the same occupation. Without loss of generality, we normalize
the network of young workers who do not search in the same occupation as their father to
zero. Thus, their efficiency units of search are equal to 1 + n˜, where n˜ represents the size of
the network they can exploit. We further assume that all workers, when passing from the
young to the old phase, accumulate a network of size N with probability µ and of size n
otherwise, with µ ∈ [0, 1]. To sum up:
n˜ =

0 if o 6= oF
N if o = oF w.p. µ
n if o = oF w.p. (1− µ)
where o denotes the occupation chosen, and oF denotes the father’s occupation. Finally, we
also assume that n < a < N (Assumption A), in order to induce different groups of workers
to make different occupational choices.
2.2.1 Equilibrium characterization
We focus on steady state symmetric equilibria, given that the two markets have the same
fundamentals.10 In equilibrium, each market attracts a measure 1 of workers, with an iden-
tical composition of labor productivity and contacts endowment. In order to facilitate the
exposition, we will sometimes frame the discussion using occupation A, given that the same
results hold for occupation B.
alter the qualitative predictions of the model. The crucial assumption underlying our results is that ability types change more
slowly than contacts.
10Thanks to the symmetry of the equilibrium, we will frequently use the following property: P (A|B) = P (B|A) whenever A
and B are events defined over the distribution of types and occupations (which have equal mass in equilibrium).
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There is a subset of workers in this economy for which the occupational choice is trivial.
In other words, all those workers whose productive advantage lies in their father’s occupation
will simply choose that occupation. We calculate their mass as follows:11
P (τ = A|oF = A) =P (τ = A|oF = A; τF = A)P (τF = A|oF = A)+ (2.1)
P (τ = A|oF = A; τF = B)P (τF = B|oF = A),
where oF denotes the father’s occupation. Noting that type transmission does not depend
on the occupational affiliation of the father, and after defining P (oF = A|τF = A) = m (an
endogenous object yet to be determined), we can simplify the previous expression to the
following:
P (τ = A|oF = A) = ρm+ (1− ρ)(1−m) ≡ Ψ(m), (2.2)
where we have used the fact that P (τF = A|oF = A) = P (oF = A|τF = A). Here, (1 −m)
is a measure of the productive mismatch in the economy, i.e. how poor the sorting between
workers and occupations is along the productivity dimension. If m = 1, the occupational
choice is perfectly aligned with the type, that is, all workers of a given type enter the same
occupation, which is where they are most productive. Moreover, Ψ(m) denotes the mass of
young workers who do not face any tradeoff in their occupational decision.
In order to solve for the equilibrium m, we first look at the optimal occupational choice
of the workers who face the tradeoff. These are the workers whose productive advantage
lies in one occupation but whose father (and his social contacts) is employed in the other.
For instance, consider those for whom τ = A and oF = B. They will optimally choose
occupation A if and only if:
p(θ)β(1 + a)y ≥ p(θ)(1 + n˜)βy, (2.3)
where a higher wage in occupation A, namely (β(1 + a)y), more than compensates for the
higher job–finding rate in occupation B, namely (p(θ)(1 + n˜)). It is easy to see that, under
Assumption A, Condition (2.3) holds only for those workers endowed with a small network.
All the others (whose mass is µ) optimally decide not to pursue their productive advantage.
We now look at the total probability that type A chooses occupation A:
P (o = A|τ = A) = Ψ(m) + (1− µ)(1− Ψ(m)), (2.4)
where we have rewritten the total probability that type A chooses occupation A as a weighted
11In the analysis, we will frequently use the Law of Total Probability: P (A|C) = ∑n P (A|Bn)P (Bn|C), where {Bn : n =
1, 2, 3, ...} is a partition of the sample space.
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average of the probability of him choosing occupation A when he has a tradeoff and when
he does not. In the first case, he chooses A with probability 1 and in the second case, with
probability (1−µ). The expression in (2.2) must equal the share of old workers of type A in
occupation A (which we previously defined as m) in steady state. Equating the two yields:
m∗ =
1− µρ
1 + µ(1− 2ρ) . (2.5)
Lemma 1. The degree of sorting of workers according to their productive advantage, m∗, is
decreasing in µ and increasing in ρ.
Proof. See Appendix.
There are two extreme cases: m∗ = 1 when µ = 0 (no one’s choice depends on contacts)
andm∗ = 1
2
when µ = 1 (everyone follows in their father’s footsteps, regardless of their type).
In general, m∗ is decreasing in µ and increasing in ρ. The former effect is straightforward
to demonstrate: the higher is µ, the more workers will choose purely according to contacts,
which availability needs not be aligned with productivity. In contrast, the reason for the
latter effect is that, as ρ increases, the pool of workers who choose the same occupation as
their father (which is the pool of workers using social contacts) increasingly coincides with
the pool of workers who would have chosen that occupation even without social contacts. In
this sense, an increase in the persistence of productive types across generations attenuates
the negative effects of the use of contacts on worker sorting. As a result, the allocation of
the workforce improves. In the limit case when ρ = 1, the allocation of workers is no longer
affected by µ and there is no mismatch in the economy.
It is useful to derive an expression for the equilibrium value of Ψ , by substituting equation
(2.5) into (2.2):
Ψ ∗ =
ρ+ µ− 2ρµ
1 + µ(1− 2ρ) . (2.6)
Lemma 2. The share of workers who do not face any tradeoff in their occupational choice,
Ψ ∗, is decreasing in µ and increasing in ρ.
Proof. See Appendix.
An increase in µ, in equilibrium, triggers an increase in the share of workers who choose
their occupation according to the availability of contacts. In turn, this lowers Ψ , as more
young workers will face a tradeoff. Conversely, an increase in ρ improves the alignment of
contacts and comparative advantage, by means of an increase in m∗.
In order to close the model, we now consider the entry of firms. Free entry implies
that firms will post vacancies up to the point at which the expected profits from doing
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so are exactly equal to the fixed cost κ. In order to evaluate profits, firms need to form
an expectation of worker productivity in the market. Define γ(m) as the probability with
which, upon matching, the firm meets with a high–productivity type. This probability will
differ from m, since different workers exert different efficiency units of search.
Define the total efficiency units of search as U:
U(m) = Ψ(m)[(1− µ)(1 + n) + µ(1 +N)] + (1− Ψ(m))[(1− µ) + µ(1 +N)] = (2.7)
= 1 + µN + Ψ(m)(1− µ)n.
The previous expression is composed of four terms. The former two represent the efficiency
units of search exerted by those workers who do not face a tradeoff and can therefore exploit
their network, which can be either small or large. The latter two represent the units of
search exerted by those with a tradeoff. A proportion (1− µ) of them decide to stay in the
occupation in which they have a comparative advantage, thus giving up their contacts. The
remaining share µ decide not to pursue their comparative advantage and to exploit their
large network of contacts. This latter group is the only one for which the type and the
occupation chosen in equilibrium are not aligned.
Thus, a firm meets with high–productivity type with probability:
γ(m) = 1− (1− Ψ(m))µ(1 +N)
U(m)
. (2.8)
This expression is in fact the relevant dimension of mismatch for aggregate outcomes, that
is how poor the allocation of workers is perceived to be by firms. In general, it can be shown
that γ(m) < m for µ > 0. This is because mismatched workers are overrepresented in the
unemployment pool, thus displacing more productive workers. It turns out that an increase
in µ has a negative effect on γ(m) for two reasons, since not only does it increase the number
of mismatched workers, it also increases their probability of being drawn by a firm. On the
other hand, ρ has a positive effect on γ(m): it reduces the number of those workers with
a tradeoff (by raising Ψ(m)), and it raises the total efficiency units of search (through the
effect on Ψ(m), see Equation 2.7).
Lemma 3. The probability of meeting with a productive type in the pool of the unemployed,
γ∗, is decreasing in µ and increasing in ρ.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now look at the free entry condition. In equilibrium, the expected profits of firms
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must equate the fixed cost of posting a vacancy:
q(θ)(1− β)(1 + γ(m)a) = κ. (2.9)
This shows that equilibrium tightness closely depends on γ(m), the likelihood of a firm
matching with a high–productivity type. This implies that any factor which affects γ(m),
will also affect equilibrium tightness in the same direction. This reflects the fact that firms
react to changes in the average labor productivity of the economy. For instance, a decrease
in γ(m) reduces the expected profits from a match and therefore reduces incentives for firm
entry. As a result, equilibrium tightness declines. In other words, the fact that some workers
decide not to pursue their comparative advantage generates externalities on the demand side,
such that aggregate variables are eventually also affected.
Lemma 4. The equilibrium labor market tightness, θ∗, is decreasing in µ and increasing in
ρ.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.2.2 Occupational Followers vs. Occupational Movers
In this section, we derive empirical predictions for the workers who decide to enter the same
occupation as their fathers.
We first derive an expression for the degree of occupational persistence across generations
in the economy. Such an expression will be useful in the calculations that follow:
P (o = A|oF = A) =P (o = A|oF = A; τ = A)P (τ = A|oF = A)+ (2.10)
P (o = A|oF = A; τ = B)P (τ = B|oF = A) =
= Ψ(m) + µ(1− Ψ(m)) ≡ P(m).
We denote as P(m) the degree of intergenerational occupational persistence, that is,
the probability of a young worker choosing the same occupation as his father. We define
pi as an individual dummy that takes the value 1 if the worker is in the same occupation
as his father and 0 otherwise. The model allows us to derive predictions for occupational
followers (for whom pi = 1) and occupational movers (for whom pi = 0). We first consider
the probability of finding a job, which is equal to the product of p(θ) and the efficiency units
of search exerted, denoted by s. Occupational followers can exploit their social contacts and
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therefore will have higher units of search than occupational movers. Thus,
E(s|pi = 1) = mpi(1 +N) + (1−mpi)[µ(1 +N) + (1− µ)(1 + n)] > 1 = E(s|pi = 0). (2.11)
Note that, among occupational followers, some workers will be mismatched (their mass
is mpi, an endogenous object that we solve for below). These workers necessarily must have
exploited large networks, and thus their efficiency units of search are (1+N) with probability
1; otherwise, they would not have given up their comparative advantage. On the other hand,
the non–mismatched workers may have either large or small networks, with probability µ
and (1− µ) respectively. In any case, each subgroup’s total efficiency units of search exceed
1. As a result, the job–finding rate of occupational followers will be strictly higher than that
of occupational movers.
In order to discuss wages in the model, we first need to derive expressions for the
probability of being a productive type, for both followers and movers. In other words,
we need to solve for mpi:
mpi ≡ P (τ = A|o = A; oF = A) =P (τ = A; o = A; o
F = A)
P (o = A; oF = A)
= (2.12)
=
P (o = A|τ = A; oF = A)P (τ = A; oF = A)
P (o = A; oF = A)
=
=
Ψ(m)
P(m) =
Ψ(m)
Ψ(m) + µ(1− Ψ(m)) ,
where we have used P (τ=A;o
F=A)
P (o=A;oF=A)
= P (τ=A|o
F=A)
P (o=A|oF=A) . We define (1−mpi) as the mismatch among
occupational followers. If µ > 0, then mpi is strictly smaller than one: the very fact that some
workers base their occupational choice on contacts induces some mismatch in the economy.
It is easy to verify that repeating the same calculations for the occupational movers shows
that there is no mismatch in their case, i.e. P (τ = A|o = A; oF = B) = 1. This is because, by
construction, those workers who do not choose the same occupation as their fathers are not
using contacts and therefore they necessarily must have based their decision on productive
advantage.
Conditional on matching, the probability of meeting with a high–productivity type
among occupational followers is as follows:
γpi(mpi) = 1− (1−m
pi)(1 +N)P(m)
Upi(mpi)
, (2.13)
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where Upi(mpi) is the total efficiency units exerted by occupational followers:
Upi(mpi) = P(m)[mpi(µ(1 +N) + (1− µ)(1 + n)) + (1−mpi)(1 +N)].
This equation consists of three terms: the first two represent the efficiency units of search
exerted by the occupational followers who are not mismatched and are using either a large
or small network, while the last term, in contrast, represents the mismatched workers, who
are necessarily using a large network.
We can now derive the expected wages for the two groups:
E(w|pi = 1) = β(1 + γpi(mpi)a)y < β(1 + a)y = E(w|pi = 0). (2.14)
For µ > 0, we have γpi(mpi) < 1, and therefore the wages of occupational movers are, on
average, strictly higher than the wages of occupational followers. The two predictions derived
so far are summarized in the following statement.
Empirical Prediction 1. Workers who choose the same occupation as their father have, on
average, higher job–finding rates and lower wages. Moreover, the former effect is predicted
to survive the inclusion of controls for the fixed productive type, while the latter is not:
1. E(JF |o = oF ) > E(JF |o 6= oF ).
2. E(w|o = oF ) < E(w|o 6= oF ).
3. E(JF |o = oF ; o = o˜; τ = τ˜) > E(JF |o 6= oF ; o = o˜; τ = τ˜) with o˜, τ˜ ∈ {A,B}.
4. E(w|o = oF ; o = o˜; τ = τ˜) = E(w|o 6= oF ; o = o˜; τ = τ˜) with o˜, τ˜ ∈ {A,B}.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The presence of the father in the
same occupation increases the son’s available amount of social contacts, thus increasing his
job–finding rate. This occurs regardless of the worker’s type or occupation. On the other
hand, the differences in wages are driven only by selection of workers. In particular, all
mismatched workers happen to be occupational followers. However, once we control for the
occupational choice and the fixed type (that is, his productivity level), wages are no longer
affected by the father’s presence.
Another key prediction of the model is that wages are correlated across generations.
In this economy, only two wage levels are offered in equilibrium: β(1 + a)y to the non–
mismatched workers and βy to the mismatched workers. We show that having a mismatched
father increases the probability that the son will be mismatched as well. Define w¯ as a dummy
that takes the value 1 if the worker is non–mismatched (that is, he is a potential high earner),
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and 0 otherwise. The probability of being a high earner, conditional on having a high–wage
father, is as follows (the derivation is reported in the Appendix):
P (w¯ = 1|w¯F = 1) = ρ+ (1− µ)(1− ρ). (2.15)
Symmetrically, one can also show that:
P (w¯ = 1|w¯F = 0) = (1− ρ) + (1− µ)ρ. (2.16)
It is easy to verify that P (w¯ = 1|w¯F = 1) > P (w¯ = 1|w¯F = 0) for µ > 0. In words, having a
high–earning father increases the chances of being a high–earning worker. As a result, wages
are correlated across generations.
Empirical Prediction 2. Wages are correlated across generations. Sons of high–earning
(low–earning) fathers are more likely to be high earners (low earners) themselves.
Remarkably, this result does not hinge on any transmission of efficiency level (i.e., uni-
dimensional productivity) across generations, as is usually assumed in the literature. In
our case, the transmission of wages across generations is a byproduct of the transmission of
mismatch across generations.
2.2.3 Occupational Persistence and Mismatch
In this section, we examine how changes in the structural parameters of the economy (ρ and
µ) affect occupational persistence across generations. We also shed light on the relationship
between occupational persistence and productive mismatch.
In this economy, occupational persistence is brought about through two different chan-
nels: use of contacts and transmission of type (comparative advantage). Strengthening either
of these two channels (by increasing µ or ρ, respectively) increases persistence.
Proposition 1. The probability that a young worker chooses his father’s occupation, P∗, is
strictly increasing in both µ and ρ.
Proof. See Appendix.
In order to understand the comparative statics exercise behind Proposition 1, let us first
write an expression for the equilibrium level of persistence, evaluating equation (2.10) at
equilibrium:
P(m∗) = µ+ (1− µ)Ψ(m∗). (2.17)
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An increase in µ has a twofold effect on persistence: on the one hand, it increases the share of
workers who base their occupational choice on contacts; on the other hand, it decreases the
share of workers who do not face any tradeoff. These two effects work in opposite directions,
but it turns out that the former is always stronger than the latter.
In constrast, an increase in ρ affects persistence only by way of Ψ ∗. In particular, a
higher probability of transmission of type improves the overall allocation of workers and
therefore reduces the probability of facing a tradeoff. Thus, occupational persistence also
increases.
We now look more in depth at the relationship between occupational persistence and
mismatch. We derive an equation relating the overall level of mismatch in the economy to
the mismatch among occupational followers and the degree of occupational persistence:
m =P (τ = A|o = A; oF = A)P(m) + P (τ = A|o = A; oF = A)(1− P(m)) = (2.18)
=mpiP(m) + (1− P(m)).
Thus, overall mismatch can be rewritten as a weighted average of the mismatch among
occupational followers and that among occupational movers. Plugging equation (2.10) into
(2.18) and evaluating it in equilibrium yields:
m∗ = Ψ(m∗) + (1− P(m∗)). (2.19)
An implication of (2.19) is that (1 − m∗) ≤ P(m∗), i.e. the degree of mismatch in the
economy is bounded above by the degree of occupational persistence. This is due to the fact
that only occupational followers can be mismatched in equilibrium.12
2.2.4 Constrained Efficiency
We now turn to the efficiency properties of our model economy. Inefficiency of the Search
Equilibrium (SE hereafter) arises in our setup for two distinct reasons: First, the economy
suffers from the usual inefficiency typical of the random search framework. Secondly, the
equilibrium level of mismatch does not need to correspond to the efficient level. These
two sources of inefficiency are independent of one another, and we describe them below
sequentially. We start with the latter, since it is a characteristic feature of our setup, while
the former applies to many other search models.
12This depends on the fact that if a worker is mismatched, it is because he is using social contacts, and this is something that
only occupational followers can do. If we were to relax the assumption that social contacts only work through parents, this
would no longer be the case. For instance, we could allow workers to have social contacts in the occupation that is not their
father’s. As long as the probability of having social contacts is higher in their father’s occupation, all of our results would still
hold.
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2.2.4.1 Optimal Level of Mismatch and Occupational Persistence
There are three reasons why the occupational choices of workers (and therefore, the level
of productive mismatch) may not be aligned to those of a social planner (SP hereafter): a)
workers do not internalize the detrimental effects of the level of mismatch on the equilibrium
tightness; b) workers do not internalize that the mismatch has dynamic effects via the
intergenerational distribution, since the shares of workers with/without a tradeoff (Ψ , in the
notation of the SE) depend on the level of mismatch; and c) workers do not internalize the
vacancy costs that have to be paid to transform search efficiency units into actual matches.
The externalities described in (a) are not faced by the SP, since he is not constrained by
the free entry condition, and can therefore fix the preferred levels of mismatch and tightness
independently.13 Hence, we specify the SP’s problem without any reference to this channel,
so that the tightness θ is treated as if it were an exogenous parameter, with the understanding
that the SP can also operate on this margin.
Since the occupational choice of each subgroup of workers (i.e., combinations of produc-
tive types, large/small networks, mismatched/non–mismatched father) affects the equilib-
rium allocation differently, we allow the SP to choose different degrees of mismatch across
groups. Thus, beyond the general level of sorting m, we also define {m1, ...m8} ∈ [0, 1]8 as
the sorting of each subgroup. For instance, m1 represents the share of workers sorted along
their comparative advantage among those with a well–sorted father, the same productive
type as their father and a large network (see Appendix for a complete description of the
groups). The welfare function to be maximized by the SP is as follows:
WSP(m1, ...,m8) = 2
{
mρµ[p(θ)y(1 +m1a)− κθ](1 +m1N) (2.20)
+ mρ(1− µ)[p(θ)y(1 +m2a)− κθ](1 +m2n)
+ m(1− ρ)µ[p(θ)y(1 +m3a)− κθ](1 + (1−m3)N)
+ m(1− ρ)(1− µ)[p(θ)y(1 +m4a)− κθ](1 + (1−m4)n)
+ (1−m)ρµ[p(θ)y(1 +m5a)− κθ](1 + (1−m5)N)
+ (1−m)ρ(1− µ)[p(θ)y(1 +m6a)− κθ](1 + (1−m6)n)
+ (1−m)(1− ρ)µ[p(θ)y(1 +m7a)− κθ](1 +m7N)
+ (1−m)(1− ρ)(1− µ)[p(θ)y(1 +m8a)− κθ](1 +m8n)
}
,
where m, which is the total share of workers who realize their comparative advantage, is a
13It is true that, if workers were aware of the fact that equilibrium tightness depends on the level of mismatch, there would
be less mismatch. However, at the same time, this margin is simply ignored by the SP. As a consequence, (a) does not represent
a reason for the SP to produce less mismatch than in the SE.
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strictly increasing function of {m1, ...m8} (see Appendix). It is straightforward to show that
the SP indeed cares about the consequences of occupational allocation on future generations,
via intergenerational transmission. In other words, he internalizes the fact that the share of
each subgroup is a function of m (channel (b) described above).14
The total derivative ofWSP w.r.t. the sorting of any of these groups is composed of two
different terms:
dWSP
dmj
=
∂WSP
∂m
∂m
∂mj︸ ︷︷ ︸
reallocation effect
+
∂WSP
∂mj︸ ︷︷ ︸
inner effect
∀ j ∈ {1, ..., 8}. (2.21)
The reallocation effect has to do with the intergenerational distribution. In other words,
the SP understands that the equilibrium shares depend on the allocation. The inner effect,
though it involves a similar tradeoff as the one faced by workers, includes the additional
consideration of the vacancy costs. In general, both of these effects depend on all the
elements of the vector ~m = {m1, ...m8} and it is not easy to fully characterize the SP’s
equilibrium. Instead, we derive conditions under which the SE allocation is not efficient (see
the Appendix for details).
Define N∗ = N
1+N
− N
1+N
κθ
p(θ)y
and n∗ = n
1−n − n1−n κθp(θ)y .
Proposition 2. Depending on the parameter values, the SE allocation ~mSE does not neces-
sarily coincide with the efficient one.
• Under a > N∗ and a > n∗ :
The SP wants to achieve less mismatch than in the SE.
• Under a < N∗ and a < n∗, ∃ρ¯ > 1
2
such that ∀ρ < ρ¯ :
The SP wants to achieve more mismatch than in the SE.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, high values of N and n, along with low values of a and κ, and ρ arbitrarily
close to 1
2
, can drive the SP to choose even more mismatch than in the SE. In this case, the
benefits from using better search technology more than offset the costs (i.e. a drop in labor
productivity) for the economy as a whole.
Another implication of Proposition 2 is that, in general, the level of occupational per-
sistence in the SE is not socially optimal.15
14For instance, the share of subgroup 1 (whose allocation is described by the m1 variable) is a function of the mismatch of
the parent generation, as well as of the transmission parameters (mρµ). In Equation 2.20, we are considering a steady–state
allocation (in which the mismatch of both generations is the same).
15Occupational persistence is a function of the allocation of workers {m1, ...m8} (see the Appendix for details).
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2.2.4.2 Optimal Level of Tightness
We now turn to the optimal level of labor market tightness in the economy. We define
WSE as the welfare achieved by the SE, which corresponds to aggregate net income, that is,
the difference between expected match output and the vacancy cost multiplied by the total
number of search efficiency units in the economy:
WSE = 2[p(θ)(1 + γa)y − κθ]U. (2.22)
We take the level of γ and U , which are endogenous variables that depend on the level of
m, as given. It is easy to show that the equilibrium level of θ is generally inefficient, unless
we are in a knife–edge case. In particular, the derivative of welfare with respect to market
tightness is as follows:
∂WSE
∂θ
= 2κ
[
ηV (θ)− (1− β)
1− β
]
U. (2.23)
where we have used the fact that q(θ)(1 + γa)y = κ
1−β and the definition p(θ) = q(θ)θ,
and where ηV (θ) = q
′(θ)θ+q(θ)
q(θ)
is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to V .
Generally, ηV (θ) will differ from (1− β), thus making the equilibrium inefficient.16
2.2.4.3 Occupational Persistence and Welfare
In this section, we establish the relationship between occupational persistence and welfare.
The former is an endogenous object, and therefore we first need to understand how welfare
is affected by changes in the determinants of persistence (that is, the parameters µ and ρ).
Changes in µ or ρ have, in principle, an ambiguous effect on welfare. More specifically, each
of them affects three different variables simultaneously: the total amount of efficiency units
of search U , the sorting of workers across occupations γ and the level of tightness θ. The
total derivative of welfare with respect to µ is as follows:
dW
dµ
=
∂W
∂µ
+
∂W
∂θ
dθ
dµ
. (2.24)
The second term reflects the externalities mentioned in the previous sections, whereby varia-
tion in the average level of labor productivity transmits to the equilibrium level of tightness
( ∂θ
∂µ
< 0). Whether this increases (decreases) welfare depends on whether the equilibrium
level of tightness is inefficiently low (high).
With respect to the first term (the direct effect), it can itself be decomposed into two
16This is the same inefficiency studied by Hosios (1990), which arises from a combination of search externalities and Nash
bargaining with pre–fixed shares of surplus division.
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different margins:
∂W
∂µ
= 2 [p(θ)(1 + γa)y − κθ] ∂U
∂µ
+ 2p(θ)ayU
∂γ
∂µ
. (2.25)
The first term is always positive, reflecting the improvement in the search technology of the
economy (∂U
∂µ
> 0). The second term, on the other hand, is always negative, reflecting that
it is now harder for firms to match with productive types (∂γ
∂µ
< 0). The overall effect is
ambiguous, depending on the specific parametrization.
Turning to the effect of ρ, the same decomposition can be performed:
dW
dρ
=
∂W
∂µ
+
∂W
∂θ
dθ
dρ
. (2.26)
The aforementied considerations apply here as well. One important difference is that here
the effect of ρ on market tightness is positive (∂θ
∂ρ
> 0). Moreover, the direct effect (i.e. the
first term) is now unambiguously positive:
∂W
∂ρ
= 2 [p(θ)(1 + γa)y − κθ] ∂U
∂ρ
+ 2p(θ)ayU
∂γ
∂ρ
. (2.27)
Not only does an increase in ρ inflate the efficiency units of search (since ∂U
∂ρ
> 0) through
an increase in occupational persistence, but it also enhances the sorting of workers (∂γ
∂ρ
> 0).
An implication of the discussion so far is that, in general, there is no one–to–one rela-
tionship between occupational persistence and welfare.
Proposition 3. Changes in the degree of occupational persistence, P, can be associated with
either an increase or a decrease in the level of welfare, W. If ηV (θ) ≥ (1− β) and Nn ≤ Nˆ ,
(where Nˆ = f(µ, ρ, n), see Appendix), then:
• An increase (decrease) in persistence generated by an increase (decrease) in µ has neg-
ative (positive) effects on welfare: ∂P
∂µ
> 0 and ∂W
∂µ
≤ 0.
• An increase (decrease) in persistence generated by an increase (decrease) in ρ has pos-
itive (negative) effects on welfare: ∂P
∂ρ
> 0 and ∂W
∂ρ
≥ 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In other words, it is crucial to understand the extent to which the different channels are
generating persistence. For instance, if the latter is entirely due to the transmission of the
productive type, then it is not a sign of a suboptimal allocation of workers into occupations.
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If, instead, persistence is brought about by workers choosing according to the avilability of
their father’s contacts, then it may be a signal of underlying mismatch.
In this sense, it is unclear whether occupational persistence across generations is socially
desirable, unless we are able to decompose it into its sources. In order to answer this
question, in Section 4 we will construct a structural model of intergenerational transmission
and occupational choice, so that in Section 5 we will be able to perform a decomposition
exercise.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we document the degree of occupational persistence across generations in
the UK and test the key predictions (Empirical Prediction 1) of the model developed in the
previous section. To this end, we use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and in
particular the dataset constructed by Lo Bello & Morchio (2013).
2.3.1 The Data
The BHPS is a yearly survey taken by about 10,000 individuals per year in the UK. It was
first carried out in 1991, and the last available wave for this study is 2008. The survey is
characterized by a fairly high follow–up rate, with more than 90% of the individuals being
interviewed also in the subsequent year, and a number of new households entering the sample
each year. In total, 32,377 individuals were interviewed in the BHPS during the period 1991-
2008. We restrict our sample to males17 aged 16–65, and are left with 12,982 individuals,
for a total of 1,023,888 monthly observations. Individuals report a detailed job history of
the previous year, including all the employment/unemployment spells, along with several job
characteristics of each job (among them, the occupational group). In this way, we are able to
construct long labor market histories for each individual (potentially up to 216 months) and,
more importantly, we are able to observe transitions at the monthly frequency. Apart from
a detailed job history, each individual provides demographic information, including gender,
age, education, occupation, race, marital status, region of residence, etc. One key feature
of the dataset is that it allows us to connect individuals to their fathers and to track them
both over time.
The job–finding rate is defined as the monthly probability of transiting from unemploy-
17We exclude women from the sample for several reasons: i) employment rates of men and women are substantially different
(especially for the parent generations); ii) in order to maintain comparability to the rest of the literature, which also excludes
women; iii) in previous work we found that, although occupational following is also prevalent among women, there is no evidence
that mothers serve as network providers (see Lo Bello & Morchio 2013).
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ment to employment. Wages are calculated by dividing the total monthly labor income by
the number of hours normally worked per week multiplied by four (the information on hours
worked is only available for the current job at the moment of the interview, that is, it is
recorded annually).
2.3.2 Intergenerational Occupational Persistence
The data allows us to study the extent of occupational persistence across generations. We
compute the distribution of workers across occupations and study the probability of a father
and his son belonging to the same occupational group. In order to account for the unequal
distribution of workers across occupations, we construct likelihood ratios. For the sake of
concreteness, we define the persistence index Pj as the ratio between the probability of
belonging to a given occupation j conditional on the father also belonging to it and the
unconditional probability of belonging to occupation j:
Pj = P (o = j|o
F = j)
P (o = j)
.
We define nine occupational groups, following the SOC aggregation by major group (the
1–digit level), as established by the Employment Department Group and the Office of Pop-
ulation Censuses and Surveys. Results are shown in Table 2.1:
Occupational group Likelihood Ratio
Managers & Administrators 1.29
Professional 2.60
Associate Professional & Technical 1.62
Clerical & Secretarial 1.26
Craft & Related 1.55
Personal & Protective Service 1.58
Sales 1.34
Plant & Machine 1.94
Agriculture & Elementary 2.67
Average (unweighted) 1.76
Average (weighted) 1.72
Table 2.1. Occupational Persistence Indexes (Likelihood Ratios). Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
We find a large degree of occupational persistence. The estimated likelihood ratios of
occupational persistence are greater than 1, indicating that a worker is more likely to belong
to a given occupation if his father also belongs to it. The average likelihood ratio is estimated
to be 1.76, implying that an individual is 76% more likely to be in a given occupation if his
father is as well (this excess probability ranges from 29% to 167%, depending on occupation).
63
Interestingly, persistence does not appear to vary systematically with the occupation’s skill
level or wage.18 Repeating the same exercise at the 2–digit level, we find that the average
unweighted and weighted likelihood ratios are 5.69 and 4.71, respectively (see Table 16 in
the Appendix).
Part of the persistence might be explained by the usual socioeconomic variables, such
as age, education or the region of residence. In order to account for this, we estimate linear
probability models which regress the probability of belonging to a given occupation (as
opposed to any other) on a number of covariates. We estimate the model for each occupation,
and present the results in Table 15 (in the Appendix). The estimates reveal that a worker is
ceteris paribus 1.59 and 15.1 p.p. more likely to belong to the same occupation as his father.
These are large probability differences and are highly statistically significant in all of the 9
occupations.
We also perform some addditional checks in order to investigate whether occupational
persistence is primarily related to regional factors. For instance, living in a poor region
(or a region with a limited variety of job opportunities) might mechanically increase the
likelihood ratio. In that case, we would not be comparing the conditional probability to the
correct unconditional probability. We plot the region–specific weighted average likelihood
ratio against the average regional wage and a measure of occupational concentration (the
Herfindahl index), and find that neither of these two dimensions can predict persistence
(results are shown in Figures 11 and 12 in the Appendix, ). This provides reassurance that
regional factors are not playing a major role in determining the results.19
2.3.3 Intergenerational Occupational Persistence and Occupational Attachment
Thus far, we have shown that a worker’s occupational affiliation tends to be highly correlated
with that of his father. In this section, we investigate whether this phenomenon is persistent
over the life–cycle. This is important because young workers, who are potentially sampling
different occupations, may be those who are driving the likelihood ratios estimated in the
previous section. More importantly, these young workers might be using their father’s occu-
pation as a stepping stone to their eventual occupation (possibly to avoid unemployment).
If this is the case, then occupational persistence would be a short–run phenomenon, with
18This seems to suggest that borrowing constraints are not playing a major role in occupational choice. We also checked
whether likelihood ratios vary by father’s income within an occupational group. Our results show that occupational persistence
decreases only slightly. For instance, if we only consider the top 1/3 of earners in each of the occupations, the average likelihood
ratio drops to 1.61 (Table 17 in the Appendix).
19An important caveat is that we only have 19 regions. It is plausible that the relevant level for the father–son transmission
is finer than that. However, the sample size does not allow us to estimate occupation–specific indexes of persistence at the
regional level.
64
limited consequences for the allocation of workers to occupations.
First, we document that likelihood ratios are not decreasing over the life–cycle. For
instance, the average (unweighted) likelihood ratio is 1.88 for workers younger than 20, as
opposed to 1.91 for workers aged 25–30 and 2.03 for workers older than 30 (see Table 18 in
the Appendix).
Second, we look at the length of the occupational spells of followers, as opposed to those
of movers. The average occupational tenure is 2.16 years for followers, and 1.73 years for
movers.20 This is true also for occupations chosen very early in an individual’s career. Figure
2.1 plots the share of workers still in their first occupation against the number of years of
labor market experience, for followers and movers separately.
Figure 2.1. Share of workers still in their first occupation, by years of labor market experience. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
We can see that a worker who starts his career in the same occupation as his father’s is
substantially less likely to exhibit occupational mobility. For instance, after two years from
the start of their first employment spell, 60% of occupational followers will not have changed
occupation21 as compared to 49% of occupational movers. At the same time, these statistics
reveal a large degree of hysteresis in occupational transitions. In other words, the initial
20When we restrict our attention only to the spells that we observe from the start, we find again that followers tend to be
more attached to their occupation (average tenure of 1.84 years versus 1.69 years).
21In Figure 2.1, we do not count flows back into the original occupation as still in the same occupation. If we were to do
that, we would find a slightly larger difference between followers and movers.
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occupation is a good predictor of occupational affiliation even several years after the start of
the employment spell. In this sense, the father’s influence on the initial occupational choice
may have long–lasting consequences for his son’s outcomes and the aggregate allocation.
As an additional piece of evidence, we look at whether the contemporaneous presence of
the father in the same occupation has an impact on the probability of changing occupation.
To this end, we run the following regression:
OCi,t = α + βpii,t−1 + γXi,t + i,t, (2.28)
where OCi,t is a dummy taking the value 1 if the occupation at time t is different from
the one at t − 1 (i.e. there has been an occupational switch22) and 0 otherwise; pii,t is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the occupation of son i and his father coincide at
time t, and 0 otherwise; Xi,t is a vector of control variables that include a third degree age
polynomial, dummies for educational categories and occupational groups (observed for the
employed, imputed for the unemployed), marital status, ethnic group, smoking behavior (to
capture health level), region of residence and quarter dummies; i,t is the idiosyncratic error
term.
We estimate Equation 2.29 with pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects, with the
estimates of β shown in Table 2.2.
Dependent Variable: Occupational Change
(1) (2) (3)
POLS RE FE
Father in same occupation (pii,t−1) -0.00811∗∗∗ -0.00794∗∗∗ -0.00872∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Average in–sample OC rate 0.0265 0.0265 0.0265
N 53208 53208 53208
R2 0.015 - 0.014
Number of pairs - 938 938
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.2. Regressions of Occupational Change (transition from one occupation to another); coefficient for father in same
occupation last month (dummy variable), standard errors and average occupational change rate in the regression sample.
Model 1 is a pooled OLS regression, model 2 is a random effects GLS regression, and model 3 is a fixed effects regression. All
models include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for education, gender, region of residence, smoking behavior,
marital status, ethnicity, quarter and occupation of employment. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
We find that if the father is employed in the same occupation, there is a substantial
reduction in the likelihood of changing occupation. The estimated impact is in the region
of -0.8/0.9 p.p., which represents about one–third of the average in–sample monthly occu-
22The occupational switch can take place either through unemployment (where we compare the previous and subsequent
occupations) or not (direct employment–to–employment switch).
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pational change rate (2.65 p.p.). One possible interpretation is that some workers are more
mobile than others in general, and therefore they will happen to be less often in the same
occupation as their father, thus mechanically generating a correlation between the two vari-
ables. However, notice that: i) we are exploiting the exact timing of the transitions (using
the lagged persistence variable), thus making this interpretation less likely; ii) in Column 3,
we are controlling for individual fixed effects, ruling out this type of explanation. The esti-
mated coefficient, which is quite stable across specifications, suggests that a worker is more
reluctant to leave his father’s occupation, even on top of any unobserved fixed heterogeneity.
In the following subsections, we turn to testing the two main predictions of the model,
namely that occupational followers23 have, on average, higher job–finding rates but lower
wages.
2.3.4 Occupational Persistence and Job–Finding Rates
The first prediction of the model is that occupational followers, i.e. sons who are in the same
occupation as their father, will on average have a higher job–finding rate. Given that we
observe employment status and occupational affiliation, we can directly test this prediction.
Therefore, we run the following regression:
JFi,t = α + βpii,t + γXi,t + i,t, (2.29)
where JFi,t is defined only for the unemployed and takes the value 1 if a job is found at time
t and 0 otherwise; pii,t is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the occupation of son i
and his father coincide at time t and 0 otherwise;24 Xi,t is a vector of control variables that
include a third–degree age polynomial, dummies for educational categories and occupational
groups (observed for the employed, imputed for the unemployed), marital status, ethnic
group, smoking behavior (to capture health level), region of residence and quarter dummies;
i,t is the idiosyncratic error term.
We estimate Equation 2.29 with pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects, and
present the estimates of β shown in Table 2.3:
We find that occupational followers have, on average, a substantially higher monthly
job–finding rate (+5.4 p.p.) relative to occupational movers. Given that the unconditional
probability of finding a job is estimated to be 12.5%, an individual whose father is in the
23Our working definition of occupational follower is based on pii,t. However, the following results for JF rates and wages hold
for more stringent definitions of occupational follower (for instance, starting the spell as a follower and then staying there for
at least 6 or 12 months).
24The occupation of an unemployed individual is assumed to be the one in which a job will be found at the end of the
unemployment spell. Moreover, this variable is defined only for those with an employed father.
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Dependent Variable: Job–Finding Rate
(1) (2) (3)
POLS RE FE
Father in same occupation (pii,t) 0.0546∗∗∗ 0.0531∗∗ 0.0546∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.026)
Average in–sample JF 0.125 0.125 0.125
N 4142 4142 4142
R2 0.057 - 0.046
Number of pairs - 401 401
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.3. Regressions of Job–Finding Rate (transition from Unemployed to Employed); coefficient for father in same
occupation (dummy variable), standard errors and average job–finding rate in the regression sample. Model 1 is a pooled
OLS regression, model 2 is a random effects GLS regression, and model 3 is a fixed effects regression. All models include
a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for education, gender, region of residence, smoking behavior, marital status,
ethnicity, quarter, and occupation of search/employment. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
same occupation increases his monthly probability of finding employment by about 42%.
Importantly, the effect is robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects (column 3), which
control for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. The identification of individual
fixed effects is made possible by the panel structure of the data. The coefficient presented
in column (3) of Table 2.3 is estimated by exploiting the variation in pi (i.e. whether or
not the father is in the same occupation), within the son’s working life. This is in line with
our model, which predicts that even after controlling for occupation and fixed type (τ), the
father’s occupation is still an important determinant of the individual’s job–finding rate. We
also find that these effects are robust to the exclusion of the self–employed from the sample
(see Table 19 in the Appendix).
To the extent that social networks are slowly accumulated over time (as will be the case
in our quantitative model), we also look at whether the impact of the father’s occupation
changes with his occupational tenure. Consistent with the prediction of the theory, we obtain
a positive (though not statistically significant) coefficient for the interaction between pii,t and
father’s tenure, as shown in Table 20 in the Appendix.
Finally, we examine whether the impact of pii,t changes with age. We find that the effect
is particularly high (up to +12 p.p.) among the youngest workers and then monotonically
declines thereafter (Figure 13 in the Appendix). This piece of evidence lends support to our
interpretation: young workers, who lack experience in the market, are expected to depend
more heavily on their father’s contacts. In a dynamic setting, like that to be developed in
Section 2.4, workers accumulate contacts themselves, and therefore the influence of their
father will fade over time.
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2.3.5 Occupational Persistence and Wages
The second key prediction of the model is that occupational followers have lower wages on
average, which according to the model is entirely due to selection. In fact, upon choosing an
occupation, the wage only depends on the individual’s productivity level in that occupation.
That is, the father’s occupational affiliation no longer matters. Thus, the difference between
occupational followers and occupational movers is predicted to disappear after controlling
for individual fixed effects (which capture the productivity level).
In order to test this hypothesis, we construct for each individual an index of how long he
spent in the same occupation as his father during his working life. We do this for two reasons:
first, we want to construct groups that do not change over the life–cycle of individuals; and
second, it is generally unclear whether we should look at the father’s occupation at the
moment of the wage observation or at the start of the job spell.25 Thus, we define qi as the
fraction of his months in employment that individual i spent in the same occupation as his
father:
qi =
∑
t
pii,t∑
t
Ei,t
, (2.30)
where Ei,t is a dummy taking the value 1 if the individual is employed in period t and 0
otherwise. The index qi ranges from 0 to 1, and is a measure of the number of months (out
of those in which he was employed) during which his occupation coincided with his father’s.
In Figure 2.2, we plot the wage profiles of three groups: those for which qi = 0, qi ≥ 0.5 and
qi = 1.
We can see that the wages of those who spent more time in the same occupation as their
father are lower by up to 20% on average throughout their entire working life. Remarkably,
this difference appears to be constant over the lifecycle.
We investigate whether these differences depend on observable heterogeneity across
workers. In particular, we estimate the following regressions:
log(wi,t) = α + βqi + γXi,t + i,t, (2.31)
where log(wi,t) is the natural logarithm of the wage (observed at the annual frequency); qi is
defined in (2.30); Xi,t is a vector of control variables; and i,t is the idiosyncratic error term.
We estimate Equation 2.31 by POLS and RE. Given that controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity is not possible in this regression model, we estimate the same regression again
25In the Appendix (Figure 14), we show that differences in wages are robust to alternative definitions of occupational followers.
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Figure 2.2. Wage profiles by proportion of employed worklife spent in the same occupation as the father. Source: BHPS
(1991–2008).
except that we replace the independent variable qi with pii,t, the time–specific persistency
dummy variable:
log(wi,t) = α + βpii,t + γXi,t + i,t. (2.32)
The first two columns of Table 2.4 indicate that individuals who have spent more time
in the same occupation as their father tend to earn lower wages, even after adding all the
controls. We find that those who spend 10% more of their employed working life in the
same occupation as their father earn 1.45%–1.52% lower wages, on average. Columns 3 to 5
present the estimates of β in Equation (2.32). We find an average discount of 7.6% associated
with the presence of the father in the same occupation. However, this effect declines to 2.4%
(which is barely statistically significant at the 90% confidence level) when we allow for RE in
the regression model, and is reduced even further (to the point that it is neither statistically
nor economically significant) when individual fixed effects are included in the regression.
Overall, these results lend strong support to our theory.
In the Appendix (Table 21), we show that these results are robust to trimming the
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sample (i.e. removing the top and bottom 1% or 5% of the wage observations).
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS RE POLS RE FE
Share of time in same occ. as father (qi) -0.145*** -0.152***
(0.017) (0.035)
Father in same occ. (pii,t) -0.076*** -0.024* -0.0003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
N 6485 6485 4776 4776 4776
R2 0.623 - 0.604 - 0.624
Number of pairs - 922 - 850 850
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.4. Regressions of Log Hourly Wage; coefficient for share of time spent in same occupation as father (from
0 to 1), standard errors and father in same occupation (dummy variable). Models 1 and 3 are pooled OLS regressions,
models 2 and 4 are random effects GLS regressions, and model 5 is a fixed effects regression. All models include a third-degree
polynomial in age and dummies for education and occupation, second–order polynomials in occupational tenure and potential
labor market experience, firm size, region of residence, smoking behavior, marital status, ethnicity, and year. Source: BHPS
(1991–2008).
2.3.6 Unemployment Risk and Wages
We have so far established that occupational followers: i) tend to spend less time in un-
employment; and ii) tend to earn lower wages. However suggestive, these two pieces of
evidence per se do not imply that individuals actually face the tradeoff (between employ-
ment prospects and wages) described in our model. For instance, it could be that these two
observations are the results of looking at two different subsamples (the unemployed and the
employed), which may differ in other characteristics as well.
In order to overcome this issue, we exploit the entire working life of the workers in the
sample. For each worker i, we compute the share of time spent employed E¯i =
∑
t Ei,t∑
t Ei,t+Ui,t
(a
measure of his employment prospects) and the average monthly wage26 earned throughout
his working life W¯i (a measure of lifetime labor earnings). In order to compute these lifetime
statistics, we include observations from age 25 onwards.27
We find that E¯i is positively related to qi, while the opposite is true for W¯i (Figure 2.3).
Occupational followers appear to be characterized by better employment prospects and lower
wages.
26This measure incorporates the unemployment risk margin as well. We construct it in the following manner: first, for each
year, we multiply the monthly wage by the number of months that the individual is employed; we then sum them over the
years; and finally, we divide the total by the number of wage observations (to correct for the unbalanced nature of the panel).
27The rationale behind this is to ensure that we are not capturing effects related to variation in the age of entry into the
labor market.
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Figure 2.3. Locally weighted linear polynomial regression (degree 1, bandwidth 0.5) of share of lifetime employed and log
average mean wage against the share of time spent as a follower. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
In Table 2.5, we show the residual partial correlation between the aforementioned vari-
ables, controlling for fixed characteristics of individuals (i.e. education and race). Column
1 and 2 deliver the same message as Figure 2.3: occupational followers tend to have lower
wages (by up to -24%) but better employment prospects (on average, they are employed
for 5.2 p.p. more of their total time spent in the labor force). Interestingly, employment
prospects and wages are generally positively correlated (Column 3), but their respective
correlations with qi have opposite signs. The sign of both of these correlations is robust
to the introduction of the other control variables. In other words, conditional on lifetime
employment prospects, followers tend to have lower wages (Column 4); and conditional on
the average lifetime wage, tend to spend more time employed (Column 5).
Overall, the empirical evidence presented here is consistent with the tradeoff featured in
our simple model, strongly suggesting that workers indeed face such a tradeoff.
2.3.7 Absolute vs. Comparative Advantage
One of the key findings presented above, namely the wage discount of occupational followers,
may also be consistent with theories of occupational sorting based on absolute advantage,
such as Groes et al. (2014). According to this alternative view, sons of high–wage fathers
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Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
W¯i E¯i E¯i W¯i E¯i
Share of time in same occ. as father (qi) -0.239∗∗∗ 0.0526∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ 0.0514∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.025) (0.061) (0.014)
Log avg. mean wage (W¯i) 0.103∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Share of litefime employed (E¯i) 2.006∗∗∗
(0.169)
Controls (educ, race) X X X X X
N 524 601 524 524 524
R2 0.064 0.014 0.209 0.267 0.228
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.5. Regressions of log average mean wage (W¯i) and share of lifetime spent employed (E¯i); coefficient for share of time
spent in same occupation as father (from 0 to 1), log average mean wage and share of lifetime spent employed; standard
errors in parentheses. All models include dummies for education and ethnicity. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
tend to be high–ability workers themselves and therefore they may be more prone to change
occupation (perhaps because they face lower switching costs or because they have a higher
level of talent to realize). If this were indeed the case, then the wage discount of occupa-
tional followers would be delivered by a mechanism that does not imply any occupational
misallocation.
We argue that such an alternative view implies a negative relationship between the
father’s wage and the son’s likelihood of being a follower. Our theory, which is based on
selection along the comparative advantage margin, implies exactly the opposite relationship:
there is a higher chance that sons of high-wage (and therefore well-matched according to
our theory) fathers are more likely to be followers. This is due to the fact that the sons of
high–wage fathers face less of a tradeoff in their occupational choice than those of low–wage
fathers.
Furthermore, the selection mechanism based on absolute advantage implies that, once
we control for the individual’s wage, the father’s wage does not have any residual predictive
power for persistence (to the extent that the individual’s wage accurately captures the in-
dividual’s ability level).28 In contrast, according to our theory, the father’s wage maintains
its positive predictive power. To see this, notice that the probability of being a follower
28If we were to consider measurement error in wages, the father’s wage would still retain negative predictive power.
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conditional on the individual’s wage is as follows:
P [pi = 1|w¯ = 0] =1
P [pi = 1|w¯ = 1] =P [w¯F = 1|w¯ = 1] ρ
+P [w¯F = 0|w¯ = 1] (1− ρ)
Given that ρ > 1/2, this conditional probability is positively correlated with the level of the
father’s wage. The intuition behind this is straightforward: high–wage (i.e. well–sorted) sons
are occupational followers to a larger extent if their father is also high–wage (i.e. well–sorted).
We test the opposite predictions of the two theories by regressing the likelihood of being
a follower on the father’s wage, both unconditional and conditional on the individual’s wage
(Table 22 in the Appendix). In both cases, the strongly positive correlation between the two
variables is supportive of our theory, which is based on comparative advantage.
2.4 The Quantitative Model
In this section, we develop a quantitative model that extends the model in Section 2 in a
number of dimensions. First, the model presented here is dynamic, such that individuals
face a stochastic ageing process. Second, we have O different occupations. Third, we in-
troduce non–pecuniary benefits (preferences) for occupations,29 which are composed of a
permanent as well as a temporary component. The permanent component is allowed to be
correlated across generations, providing an additional source of occupational persistence. In
constrast, the introduction of shocks to non–pecuniary benefits allows the model to generate
occupational mobility over the life–cycle.30 Finally, we introduce occupation–specific human
capital. We retain the assumption that social contacts are occupation–specific, and that
fathers help their sons find a job in their occupation, without internalizing that in their own
occupational choice. Both social contacts and occupation–specific human capital evolve over
time.
2.4.1 The Model Environment
Time is discrete (t = 0, 1, 2, ...) and goes on forever. The economy is divided into a discrete
number of submarkets O, which represent the different occupations. A measure 2 of workers
29This could also be interpreted as the effect of social pressure or, more generally, any other factor that shifts the utility level
for a specific occupation.
30This is important, in order to provide the correct mapping between the model and the data (which has an inherently
dynamic nature).
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populate the economy. All agents (both workers and firms) are risk–neutral and discount
the future at rate λ. There are two phases of life: young and old. Every period young (old)
individuals age (die) with probability ζ. All individuals who die are replaced by young un-
employed workers. We assume that these shocks are perfectly correlated within a household
(father–son pair). This is equivalent to assuming that individuals stop being connected to
their parents when they have children, so that at each point in time only two generations
are connected.31
Workers are indexed by i and differ along several dimensions: preferences for occupations
φit, comparative advantage τ i, occupation–specific human capital hio,t and social capital nio,t
(networks). Preferences φit are represented by a vector of size O, where the oth element is the
level of non–pecuniary benefits associated with occupation o. We assume that preferences
have both a permanent and a transitory component, so that the period t non–pecuniary
benefits are equal to the sum of the two components: φio,t = φi,Po + φ
i,T
o,t , for each o. The
permanent preferences component φi,Tt , as well as the comparative advantage τ i, are drawn
at birth (i.e. on entry into the labor market) and do not change over time. In contrast,
the temporary component of preferences, as well as occupation–specific human and social
capital, evolve over time according to laws of motion to be specified below. Each worker
is either employed or unemployed (eit ∈ {0, 1}), and is attached to some occupation oi.32
Unemployed workers receive an unemployment benefit equal to b per period.
We denote the father’s variables using an F superscript, so that the occupation of indi-
vidual i’s father will be denoted by oi,F , the father’s networks by ni,Fo and so on.
Upon matching, the surplus generated is split according to a linear sharing rule, such
that the wage is set to a share χ of the worker’s productivity.33
2.4.2 Search and Relocation across Occupations
We assume that search is costless and directed across occupations. Workers start their work-
ing life unemployed and decide in which occupation to look for vacancies. Employed parents
help their unemployed sons find a job, by letting them use part of their occupation–specific
network. As a consequence, unemployed sons find vacancies in their father’s occupation with
higher probability than anywhere else, ceteris paribus. We assume that unemployed fathers
31This assumption is made for simplicity and does not alter the results.
32Another way of modelling this would be to have the unemployed pool out of all occupations. We claim that this alternative
model would yield exactly the same implications as our model, due to the CRS matching function and the fact that we focus
on a symmetric equilibrium.
33Assuming other forms of wage determinations, such as Generalized Nash Bargaining, would be a rather extreme assumption
in our setup, since in that case we would have to assume that all networks, preferences and the productivity levels in all other
occupations are common knowledge within the match.
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do not help their sons, since they are actively searching for a job themselves.
Each occupation is a separate labor market, where the number of matches between
unemployed workers and vacancies is governed by the following constant returns to scale
technology:
Mo,t = (Uo,t)
η(Vo,t)
1−η, (2.33)
where Mo,t denotes the total number of matches produced, Uo,t is the total efficiency units
of search exerted and Vo,t is the measure of vacancies posted at time t in occupation o. The
elasticity of the matching function with respect to Uo,t is given by η.
Search effort is exerted both by unemployed workers and employed fathers whose sons
are currently unemployed. When searching for a job, workers exploit their social networks.
Networks are assumed to operate such that information on vacancies can flow within athem
at zero cost and there is no competition among workers belonging to the same network.
Thus, social networks can help workers find a job, and having a larger network represents an
advantage for unemployed workers. This is represented in the model by an increase in the
efficiency units of search that a worker can exert. In particular, it is assumed that a worker
with network nio,t can exert (1 + nio,t) efficiency units of search. Thus,
Uo,t =
∫ (
1 + nio,t
)
1{ei = 0; oi = o}di︸ ︷︷ ︸
Units of Search of Unemployed workers
(2.34)
+
∫
ξ
(
1 + ni,Fo,t
)
1{ei = 0; oi = oi,F = o; ei,F = 1}di︸ ︷︷ ︸
Units of Search provided by Employed Fathers
,
where ξ represents the proportion of the father’s network passed on to the son. The
occupation–specific individual job–finding rate pio,t is the sum of the probability of an in-
dividual finding a job himself (either through his own effort or through his social network)
and the probability of his father finding a vacancy for him, if they are in the same occupation:
pio,t =
Mo,t
Uo,t
[
(1 + nio,t) + ξ(1 + n
i,F
o,t )1
{
ei,F = 1; oi,F = o
}]
. (2.35)
Thus, at each time t workers face a single job–finding rate in their current occupation.
We assume free entry of firms, and that posting a vacancy costs κ per period. Firms
in occupation o meet with a worker with probability qo,t =
Mo,t
Vo,t
. Matches are exogenously
destroyed at rate δ per period.
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Workers (both employed and unemployed) can freely relocate across occupations.34 It is
assumed that when an employed worker wants to relocate, he is separated from his current
match (i.e. the match is destroyed) and moves into the unemployment pool of his new
occupation. Furthermore, his occupation–specific human capital and social contacts stocks
fully depreciate upon changing occupation.
2.4.3 Intergenerational Transmission and Laws of Motion
We assume that upon entry into the labor market, an individual imperfectly inherits the
duplet {φP , τ} from his father:
φP ∼ F (φP |φF ,P ) (2.36)
τ ∼ G (τ |τF ) (2.37)
The initial level of occupation–specific human and social capital is assumed to be zero in
all occupations. Both human and social capital evolve over time according to the following
laws of motion:
ho,t+1 = Fh (ho,t|et) (2.38)
no,t+1 = Fn (no,t|et) (2.39)
Finally, the temporary preference vector is drawn each period from the distribution Fφ:
φT t ∼ Fφ (2.40)
As already mentioned, we assume that ho and no are reset to zero following a change in
occupation.35
2.4.4 Timing
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. Old (young) workers die (age) with probability ζ. A young worker who has aged loses
the connection to his father and gives birth to an unemployed son.
2. Preference shocks are realized.
3. Unemployed and employed workers decide whether or not to relocate.
34We abstract from direct costs of relocation, since these cannot be separately identified from the magnitude of the standard
deviation of preference shocks.
35We do this for computational reasons, even though in principle it would be interesting to track all occupation–specific
variables and have them decay over time when the worker is no longer attached to that occupation.
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4. Wages and unemployment benefits are paid, and occupation–specific utility flow is re-
alized.
5. Exogenous separations take place. Unemployed workers either find a job or remain
unemployed.
6. The workers’ state variables are updated according to the laws of motion.
2.4.5 The Worker’s Problem
At the beginning of a worker’s life, the worker’s problem consists of choosing the occupation
in which to search. Besides this initial choice, workers have the option of relocating into
a different occupation at the beginning of each period. In what follows, we suppress the i
superscript and the t subscript for readability, although all variables (except for φP and τ)
change over time. We denote the next period’s state variables with a prime. All functional
equations are conditional on the worker’s state variables.
Denote the state of a worker by Γ = {φ, τ, ho, no, o, e}, where for simplicity o is set
equal to zero for those workers who are choosing an occupation for the first time. A young
worker’s choices are influenced by his father who can help him find a job, so that his own
state also includes his father’s state Γ F = {φF , τF , hFo , nFo , oF , eF}. We must track all of
the father’s state variables because the son takes into account that: i) even if his father is
unemployed today (and therefore does not affect the current job–finding rate), his father will
help them him find a job in the future once he becomes employed; and ii) fathers also change
occupations over the life–cycle. Conversely, we make the father’s problem independent of
his son’s; that is, a father optimizes his choices without taking into account the impact
they have on his son’s problem.36 In the following, we make explicit the dependence of a
worker’s value functions on his employment status and occupation. Hence, conditional on
employment status and occupational affiliation, we denote the state variable of workers by
Ω = {φ, τ, ho, no} ∪ Γ F . All Bellman equations are conditional on Ξ, the aggregate state
variables, even though we omit this dependance for readability. We first write the value
functions for old workers (denoted by a subscript F ), with the understanding that they are
characterized by Γ F = ∅.
36From the model’s standpoint, this is akin to assuming that fathers are not altruistic (i.e., they attach zero weight to their
son’s value function). We make this assumption for two reasons: first, we believe that this represents more faithfully actual
occupational choices (due to the timing of fertility vs. occupational choices – that is, occupational choices are typically made
first); second, for simplicity, since allowing for an altruistic motive of fathers would create a complex dynamic game between
fathers and sons (for instance, see Barczyk & Kredler 2014).
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The Father’s Problem
We denote by WR the value of relocation across occupations:
WRF (Ω) = max
j∈{1,...,O}
{
WUj,F (Ω) + φ
T
j,F
}
, (2.41)
where φTj,F represents the temporary preference shock for occupation j. Note that unem-
ployed workers draw a vector of size O–by–1 of preference shocks each period.
The value of unemployment in occupation o (net of the preference shock),WUo,F , includes
the value of unemployment benefits for the current period and the expected discounted value
of the future:37
WUo,F (Ω) = b+ λ˜
[
po(Ω)E
[
WEo,F (Ω
′)
]
+ (1− po(Ω))E
[
WRo,F (Ω
′)
] ]
. (2.42)
An unemployed worker is matched with a vacancy in his occupation with probability
po(Ω), and remains unemployed with probability (1 − po(Ω)), in which case he can decide
to relocate in the next period. The future is discounted at the rate λ˜ = λ(1− ζ), in order to
account for the risk of dying.
Employed workers face the relocation decision at the beginning of each period. If they
decide to stay on the job, they receive the flow utility, earn the corresponding wage and stay
in the same job next period, unless their match is exogenously destroyed (which happens
with probability δ). Define WˆEo (Ω) to be the value of staying employed in occupation o (that
is, the value of being employed and choosing not to relocate):
WˆEo,F (Ω) = φ
P
o,F + φ
T,E
o,F + w(Ω) + λ˜
[
(1− δ)E [WEo,F (Ω′)]+ δ E [WRF (Ω′)] ]. (2.43)
At the start of each period, a worker’s value function is as follows:
WEo,F (Ω) = max
{
WˆEo,F (Ω),W
R
F (Ω)
}
, (2.44)
since this includes the possibility of leaving the job and relocating into a different occupation.
Notice that employed workers draw two sequences of preference shocks: the first deter-
mines whether or not they stay on the job, while the second determines their new occupation,
in the case they wish to relocate.38
37In this case, the value function for unemployment has to be interpreted at the stage immediately after the relocation
decision. That is, the worker has to spend the whole period unemployed in occupation o.
38This is done for computational convenience.
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2.4.6 Wage Determination
Upon matching, wages are set by a linear sharing rule, such that the worker is paid a fixed
share of his productivity. Denote y(τ, h) as the productivity level of a worker of type (τ, h).
Then, the equilibrium wage is:
w(τ, h) = χ y(τ, h).
Importantly, we assume that all payoff–relevant information is common knowledge within
the match. We also assume that wages are perfectly flexible and that they are renegotiated
every period, upon changes in the worker’s level of human capital.
2.4.7 Relocation Across Occupations
We denote by j∗ the preferred occupation in which to search, namely the occupation that
maximizes the value of relocation:
j∗F (Ω) ∈ argmaxj∈{1,...,O}
{
WUj,F (Ω) + φ
T
j,F
}
. (2.45)
Notice that j∗(Ω) may or may not be the same or not the same as a worker’s current
occupation. If not, then an unemployed worker will always want to relocate, while in the case
of an employed worker the choice will depend on the difference between the value functions
WˆEo,F (Ω) and WRF (Ω).
We define Rko,F (Ω) (for k ∈ {E,U}) as the policy function with respect to the reloca-
tion decision. Thus, when Rko,F (Ω) = 1, a worker of type Ω with employment status k in
occupation o optimally decides to relocate. In other words:
RUo,F (Ω) = 1{j∗F (Ω) 6= o}.
REo,F (Ω) = 1{WRF (Ω) > WˆEo,F (Ω)}.
The Son’s Problem
A son faces a very similar problem to that of a father. The only difference is that he takes
into account his father’s decisions. As a result, a young worker can decide to relocate as a
consequence of a change in his own state variables (preferences) or because his father’s state
variables have changed, in which case he might want to follow his father in order to benefit
from a higher probability of finding a job.
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The expression for the value of relocation remains identical:
WRS (Ω) = max
j∈{1,...,O}
{
WUj,S(Ω) + φ
T
j,S
}
. (2.46)
The value of unemployment and employment are augmented by the fact that the worker will
become a father in the next period with probability ζ:
WUo,S(Ω) = b+ λ
[
po(Ω)
(
ζ E
[
WEo,F (Ω
′)
]
+ (1− ζ)E [WEo,S(Ω′)]) (2.47)
+(1− po(Ω))
(
ζ E
[
WRo,F (Ω
′)
]
+ (1− ζ)E [WRo,S(Ω′)]) ].
WEo,S(Ω) = max
{
φPo,S + φ
T,E
o,S + w(Ω)
+λ
[
(1− δ) (ζ E [WEo,F (Ω′)]+ (1− ζ)E [WEo,S(Ω′)]) (2.48)
+δ
(
ζ E
[
WRF (Ω
′)
]
+ (1− ζ)E [WRS (Ω′)]) ],WRS (Ω)}.
The relocation decisions RUo,S(Ω) and REo,S(Ω) are isomorphic to those of the father, and
are defined according to the above–specified value functions.
2.4.8 The Firm’s Problem
A firm is represented by a single job that is either filled or vacant. The value function for
a job filled with a worker of type Ω is denoted by Jo,k(Ω), where k ∈ {F, S} denotes the
age of the worker. Provided that the worker does not choose to leave the firm, this value
function includes the current profit (given by production net of the wage payment) and the
continuation value of keeping the worker. The value of keeping an old worker is given by:
Jo,F (Ω) = 1{REo,F (Ω) = 0}
[
y(τ, ho)− w(Ω) + λ˜
[
(1− δ)E [Jo,F (Ω′)] + δV ′o
]]
(2.49)
+1{REo,F (Ω) = 1}Vo.
The output of the match is given by the function y(τ, ho), which we assume to be
increasing in both arguments. The match is exogenously destroyed with probability δ in the
next period (in which case, as in the case of endogenous separation, the firm is left with the
value of a vacancy Vo). With probability (1−δ), the match continues, and the state variables
of the worker are updated.
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The value of keeping a young worker is as follows:
Jo,S(Ω) = 1{REo,S(Ω) = 0}
[
y(τ, ho)− w(Ω) + λ
[
(1− δ)(ζ E [Jo,F (Ω′)] (2.50)
+(1− ζ)E [Jo,S(Ω′)]
)
+ δV ′o
]]
+ 1{REo,S(Ω) = 1}Vo.
This equation has the same interpretation as the one for an old worker, except that it allows
for the possibility of a worker becoming old (as a result of the ζ shock) and the match
continuing.
The value of a vacancy Vo is given by the expected profits less the posting cost κ.
Vo = −κ+ qo E [Jo(Ω′)] + (1− qo)V ′o , (2.51)
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of unemployed workers in occupation o,
which include all possible types Ω and possible ages {F, S}.
2.4.9 Equilibrium Definition
We focus on a symmetric steady state equilibrium (SS) in which all value functions and
relocation decisions are constant over time. As a result, worker flows are also constant over
time (the equations describing such flows are relegated to the Appendix).
Definition: An SS equilibrium is a set of value functions WUo,F (Ω), WUo,S(Ω), WEo,F (Ω),
WEo,S(Ω), Vo; relocation decisions RUo,F (Ω), RUo,S(Ω), REo,F (Ω), REo,S(Ω), j∗F (Ω), j∗S(Ω); labor
market tightness θo; wages wo(Ω); laws of motion for the individual state variables; and laws
of motion of unemployed and employed workers over all occupations, such that:
• The value functions for workers and relocation decisions satisfy Equations (2.42), (2.44),
(2.47), (2.48).
• There is free entry into all occupations: Vo = 0 ∀o ∈ {1, .., O}.
• Labor market tightness satisfies Equation (2.51).
• Wages satisfy Equation (2.31).
• Individual state variables evolve according to Equations (2.38), (2.39) and (2.40).
• Distributions of workers evolve according to Equations (41), (42), (43) and (44) (in the
Appendix).
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• The measures of employed and unemployed workers of each type Ω are constant over
time.
• Flows of employed and unemployed workers of each type Ω are constant over time.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we quantitatively assess the importance of each of the channels operating
in the model (ability, preferences and networks transmission) in delivering occupational
persistence. We first assign values to the structural parameters of our model, and then use
the calibrated model to decompose occupational persistence and perform welfare analysis
and policy experiments.
2.5.1 Calibration Strategy
Our strategy involves exogenously fixing some of the parameters, and jointly calibrating all
the rest to relevant moments of the UK data. First, we fix the number of occupations O
to 9 in order to be consistent with the SOC–1 digit aggregation. One period in the model
corresponds to one month, and therefore the discount factor λ is set to 0.9966. The age shock
ζ is set so as to deliver an average working life of 40 years (20 as a young worker and 20
as an old one), implying a value of 0.00416. We also fix the surplus sharing rule parameter
χ to 0.7 and the scale of the matching function A to 0.1. Finally, we fix η = 0.5 following
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
We calibrate the rest of the parameters in order to match relevant features of the data.
In order to do so, we first need to choose the grid of possible values of the worker–specific
state variables, as well as the functional forms describing their laws of motion. We let h and
n take two different values, with the lower one being normalized to 1:
h ∈ {1, 1 + hˆ},
n ∈ {1, 1 + nˆ},
where hˆ and nˆ represent the premia of human capital and networks that are associated with
tenure. The accumulation/depreciation of these occupation–specific variables is subject to a
Markov-process characterized by the following parameters: p+h , p
−
h , p
+
n , p−n , where the + and
− superscripts denote accumulation (when employed) and depreciation (when unemployed)
probabilities, respectively.
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We also assume that each worker has a talent τ in one occupation, in which he has a
productivity premium τˆ . The minimum level of productivity is normalized to 1. The match
production function y(τ, ho) is assumed to be:
y(τ, ho) =
ho if o 6= ττˆ ho if o = τ
In the same way, we assume that each worker has a preferred occupation φ, where he
obtains a non–pecuniary benefit (φˆ) that is higher than elsewhere. At the same time, we
also normalize the baseline level of preferences for a job φ¯ to 0. Both τ and φ are drawn
at birth, with ρτ and ρφ being the probabilities of drawing the same values as the father
(ρ = 1 represents perfect persistence). Let τ and φ be respectively the occupations in which
a worker has a comparative advantage and the preference premium:
τ =
τF w.p. ρτo 6= τF w.p. (1−ρτ )
O
∀ o 6= τF
φ =
φF w.p. ρφo 6= φF w.p. (1−ρφ)
O
∀ o 6= φF
Finally, we assume that the idiosyncratic preference shocks are drawn from a Type–1 Extreme
distribution, with standard deviation σ.39
Together with κ and ξ, we have a total of 14 parameters to be calibrated. We search for
the parameter configuration that minimizes the following loss function:
L =
√∑K
n=1 (
Mn(Θ)−Tn
Tn
)2
K
,
where T is a K–by–1 vector containing our target statistics and M is a K–by–1 vector
containing the statistics generated by the model (we choose K = 14, so that the model is
exactly identified). Table 2.6 contains the list of all parameters of the model, each of which
is associated with the identifying moment in Column 4.
The vacancy posting cost κ is calibrated in order to match the average monthly UE rate,
which is 0.1251. A lower posting cost induces more entry from the firms’ side, implying higher
tightness and higher finding rates. The exogenous separation rate δ is set in order to match
the average EU rate, which is 0.0047. The transmission of networks ξ is set to replicate the
39This is a standard assumption in the literature on occupational choice. See for instance Wiczer (2014).
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job–finding rate premium (of 0.0546) of occupational followers w.r.t. movers. A higher value
of ξ implies that a son can take advantage of a larger proportion of his father’s network.
The transmission of comparative advantage is calibrated to match the differential in the
likelihood of occupational persistence by the father’s wage. In particular, we target the 2.3%
difference in the probability of being an occupational follower if the father’s wage is above
the average, as observed in the BHPS data. An increase in ρτ increases the chances that the
occupation of the father is also that in which the son finds his comparative advantage when
the father is well–matched, thus increasing persistence for those with a high–wage father. The
parameter governing the transmission of preferences ρφ is pinned down by asking the model
to replicate the occupational persistence observed in the data (likelihood ratio of 1.72 at the
1–digit level). In other words, we are using the transmission of preferences as the residual
channel to entirely match occupational persistence, above and beyond the persistence already
generated by the other two channels.
Next, the comparative advantage premium τˆ is calibrated to match the level of within–
occupation log wage variance. The rationale for this is that the more heterogeneous are the
potential productivity levels of workers across occupations, the more dispersed equilibrium
wages will be. The networks premium nˆ is calibrated to match the proportion of jobs found
through networks in the UK, which is 0.23 (Pellizzari 2010b). The higher nˆ is, the more
networks will be present in the economy and used for job search. The preference premium φˆ
is chosen to replicate the average wage discount (of 0.0763 log points) of occupational follow-
ers. High values of φˆ imply that preferences are relatively more important than comparative
advantages in occupational choice. The standard deviation of the preference shocks distribu-
tion (σ) is calibrated to the probability of switching occupation after an unemployment spell
(0.3567). The larger the variance of the shocks, the more frequently occupational changes
occur. The value of unemployment b is calibrated to match the average replacement rate in
the UK of 0.53 (OECD).
Moreover, we calibrate p+h = 0.0166 which, together with hˆ = 0.26, implies that the
average occupational returns after 5 years are equal to 26%, as observed in the data. The
probability of losing human capital p−h is calibrated to match the average wage discount after
unemployment of 7.6% (Arulampalam 2001). The probability of losing networks p−n is set
to match the slope of the JF rate–unemployment duration profile. In particular, we ask the
model to replicate the drop in finding rates that occur between the first and second months of
unemployment duration. Finally, we calibrate the probability of accumulating networks p+n
to the conditional correlation of job–finding rates with months of past occupational tenure,
which is 0.008.
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2.5.2 Calibration Results
The model is able to precisely match all targets, both the cross–sectional and the inter–
generational ones. We are able to replicate the full extent of occupational persistence ob-
served in the data by making both preferences and comparative advantages persistent across
generations (where the probability of inheriting them is 0.147 and 0.141, respectively).The
proportion of parental networks exploited by the son is 0.325, which generates the same
job–finding rate premium as in the data.
A large degree of heterogeneity is needed in order to match the data moments: the pref-
erence premium is 0.811, while the comparative advantage premium is even higher, at 1.008.
The networks premium is also substantial (1.104), whereas the human capital premium is
0.26 (taken directly from the data). The accumulation of both human capital and networks
is slow: the monthly probability of human capital growing is 0.0166, while for networks it
is 0.005. In contrast, their depreciation during unemployment is substantially faster: the
monthly probability of networks depreciating is 0.115, while for human capital it is 0.79.
We calculate that in this economy posting a vacancy costs around 4 times the average
wage. Finally, the exogenous match destruction rate is 0.003, with the rest of the EU flows
being accounted for by endogenous separations.
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2.5.3 Occupational Persistence Decomposition and Welfare Analysis
The model allows us to study the factors behind occupational choice, and how they differ
in importance between followers and movers. In Table 2.7, we calculate how often the
occupational choice is aligned with each of the three possible factors (parental networks,
comparative advantage, and preferences) under the baseline calibration.
All Followers Movers
Sorting along comparative advantage (fathers) 0.656 - -
Sorting along preferences (fathers) 0.455 - -
Sorting along parental networks (sons) 0.183 0.959 0.000
Sorting along comparative advantage (sons) 0.708 0.624 0.729
Sorting along preferences (sons) 0.402 0.461 0.388
Average log wage (sons) 0.292 0.232 0.307
Average unemployment rate (sons) 0.061 0.045 0.065
Table 2.7. Occupational sorting.
For fathers, comparative advantage seems to be more important than preferences for
occupational sorting: 66% (46%) of fathers choose the occupation in which they have a
comparative advantage (preference). Among sons, the same holds true: about 71% of them
pick the occupation in which they are most productive, whereas about 40% of them pick
their preferred occupation. Finally, the occupational choice is aligned with parental networks
in 18% of the cases. Striking differences in sorting arise between followers and movers: the
former put more weight on preferences in their occupational decision (46% versus 39% of
movers) and less on comparative advantage (62% versus 73% of movers). As a consequence,
followers earn lower wages, as can be seen in row 6 of Table 2.7. At the same time, followers
have better employment prospects than movers, with an average unemployment rate of 4.5%,
versus 6.5% for movers. Summing up, the model economy generates a clear sorting of workers
in the two regions of high–employment/low–wages and low–employment/high–wages.
However suggestive, these correlations are not yet informative about the nature of oc-
cupational persistence. For this reason, we now sequentially shut down each of the three
channels delivering occupational persistence. In this way, we are able to: i) quantify the
contribution of each channel to overall persistence; and ii) evaluate welfare in each different
scenario. Table 2.8 shows the results of the experiments: column 1 is the case of the baseline
economy, while in columns 2-8 we set ξ = 0, ρτ = 1/O and ρφ = 1/O, along with all possible
combinations of these parameter changes.
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First, all factors seem to matter for occupational persistence, though by differing degrees.
Shutting down parental networks generates the largest drop in persistence, of about 79%
(column 2), while comparative advantage and preferences transmission (columns 3 and 4)
respectively account for about 19% and 10% of persistence. Moreover, networks transmission
appears to work in conjunction with the other sources of persistence, since shutting down
these channels in pairs delivers less of a drop than the sum of the effects separately (columns
5 and 6 vs 2–4). In contrast, comparative advantage and preferences work independently
from one another (the drop in column 7 is equal to or even larger than the combined effects of
column 3 and 4). To better understand the surprisingly large effect of networks and how they
interact with the other factors, in Figure 2.4 we plot the average policy function (occupational
choice) of unemployed workers whose father is employed and whose comparative advantage
and preferences are not aligned.40
Choose Adv Choose Pref Choose Other Occ.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Father
No Father
Figure 2.4. Plot of Average Policy Function (Occupational Choice) for unemployed workers with comparative advantage and
preference in different occupations.
As already noted, individuals in this economy tend to choose their occupation more ac-
cording to comparative advantage than preferences. Moreover, the presence of an employed
father strongly impacts the occupational choice of his son. For instance, on average, individ-
uals choose the occupation in which they have a comparative advantage with a probability
of 80% if the father is also employed in that occupation. This probability drops to 60% if
40The workers for which comparative advantage and preferences are not aligned represent the large majority of the population.
In the Appendix, we show the same average policy function of those workers for whom the two factors are aligned.
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the father is employed in a different occupation (compare the first two bars in Figure 2.4).
This effect is even larger for preferences: the occupation for which preference and parental
networks are aligned is chosen in 55% of the cases, while the preferred occupation without
parental networks is chosen in only 26% of the cases. It is significant that the benefits from
the father’s networks alone are not enough to attract the son. Indeed, by comparing the last
two bars, one can easily see that choosing an occupation with neither comparative advantage
nor preferences is almost never an attractive option, with or without the father’s network.
The reason for this stark difference is that the value of employment differs from the value
of unemployment to a larger extent in occupations with either comparative advantage or
preference than in other occupations. By improving the chances of employment, parental
networks act as a multiplier of these differentials, therefore playing a much larger role in
conjunction with these other fixed factors than alone.
Second, the welfare consequences of a reduction in persistence vary widely across the
experiments. When we shut down parental networks (column 2), welfare improves by 0.11%,
due to the improved allocation of workers to occupations (sorting along the productivity
dimension increases from 71% to 74%) and despite a worsened sorting along the preferences
dimension (which drops from 40% to 37%). As a consequence of the increase in the pro-
ductivity of the workforce, output per worker increases and wage variance decreases. Also,
unemployment improves (declines by 1.5%) despite the fact that less efficiency units of search
are now exerted in the market, since firms react to the change in average labor productivity
by posting more vacancies. In contrast, when we shut down the transmission of comparative
advantage (column 2), welfare decreases by 0.04%, while output per worker declines (sorting
along the productivity dimension worsens, while sorting along the preferences dimension im-
proves) and unemployment rises (by 0.33%). Finally, shutting down preferences transmission
(column 3) has a similar though smaller effect to that of shutting down parental networks.
Thus, productivity becomes more dominant in an individual’s choice, output per worker
increases and unemployment decreases. The net effect of these changes, despite a worsened
sorting along the preferences dimension, is an increase in welfare of 0.03%.
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2.5.4 Other Counterfactual Experiments
2.5.4.1 The Importance of Multiple Transmission Channels
The model is characterized by several degreess of heterogeneity, and intergenerational persis-
tence is influenced by three different factors (comparative advantage, preferences, networks).
One interesting exercise we will now carry out is to shut down some of these channels and
recalibrate the model in order to match the data with fewer degrees of freedom. This allows
us to understand whether all model dimensions are really necessary in order to replicate the
data patterns. We keep the transmission of productive abilities as the only transmission
channel, since it embeds in a reduced–form way genetic transmission, educational choices
and human capital transfers in general, which are the channels most commonly emphasized
in the intergenerational literature. Therefore, we set ξ = 0 and ρφ = 1/O and ask the model
to match all data moments in Table 2.6 except for the JF rate premium and the wage dis-
count. The rationale for our choice is that, with only one source of persistence, the model
cannot replicate either of these two moments.
In general, the fit of the model is now substantially worse.41 The model is not able
to fully account for occupational persistence, producing a likelihood ratio of only 1.597.
The value of ρτ is set as high as possible, since this is now the only source of occupational
persistence. By doing so, the model largely overshoots the differentials in the propensity to
be a follower by the father’s wage (in fact, it is more than 10 times larger than in the data).
Another consequence is that, in order to generate high persistence, the model completely fails
to generate the wage discount (non–targeted) of followers relative to movers (and actually
generates a wage premium). This reflects the fact that productivity transmission is the only
channel producing persistence, and therefore occupational followers base their occupational
choice on productivity to a larger extent than movers. By construction, the model also
cannot replicate the job–finding rate premium of followers (non–targeted), since networks
transmission is shut down.
When we shut down occupational persistence in the restricted economy (Table 2.9), it
turns out that persistence is absolutely neutral in this economy. Shutting down the only
source of persistence delivers an identical economy in all dimensions, except for occupational
persistence, which vanishes completely. This is because in this economy persistence is not a
sign of distortions in the occupational choice of individuals. Furthermore, persistence in this
economy is generated only by the fact that father–son pairs tend to be more similar than
two randomly picked workers. In this sense, occupational persistence is no longer a reflection
41The calibration table of the restricted model can be found in Appendix 3.7.
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of the fact that sons care about the occupational choices of their father and are affected by
them. In other words, a son’s policy and value functions are now independent of his father’s
state variables.
(1) (2)
No parental net. (ξ = 0) n.a. n.a.
No comp. adv. trans. (ρτ = 1/O) - X
No pref. trans. (ρφ = 1/O) n.a. n.a.
Occupational Persistence 1.597 1.000
(∆% from baseline) - (-100.00)
Welfare (∆% from baseline) - (0.000)
Sorting along comparative advantage (sons) 0.344 0.344
Sorting along preferences (sons) 0.767 0.767
Sorting along comparative advantage (fathers) 0.365 0.365
Sorting along preferences (fathers) 0.746 0.746
Output per worker (=1 in baseline) 1.000 1.000
Log Wage Variance (∆% from baseline) 0.181 (0.000)
Welfare CV (∆% from baseline) 0.153 (-0.000)
Unemployment Rate (∆% from baseline) 0.067 (-0.000)
Average UE Rate (∆% from baseline) 0.112 (0.000)
Average EU Rate (∆% from baseline) 0.004 (-0.000)
Equilibrium Tightness 1.255 (0.000)
Table 2.9. Occupational Persistence Decomposition and Welfare Analysis (Restricted Model).
2.5.4.2 The Role of Search Frictions
Search frictions are an important determinant of productive mismatch in our framework.
Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the extent to which the severity of frictions affects
the importance of parental networks, the level of persistence and the overall allocation. To
do so, we impose the degree of frictions implied by the monthly finding rates of different
economies on the UK baseline calibration. We focus on two polar cases among OECD
countries: the US and Spain. We target the average monthly job–finding rates estimated in
Hobijn & Şahin (2009): 0.5630 for the US and 0.0389 for Spain. We recalibrate κ in order
to match these rates, keeping all other parameters constant; the implied new values of the
parameter are 1.30 (for the US) and 15 (for Spain). We repeat the persistence decomposition
exercises of subsection 2.5.3 for both of the counterfactual economies, with the results shown
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in Table 2.10.
Two main results stand out: First, the importance of parental networks crucially de-
pends on the size of the frictions. In the low–friction economy, removing parental networks
barely affects persistence (which is reduced by only 2.3%), whereas the reduction in the
high–friction economy is much more pronounced (79%). At the same time, the removal
of networks is welfare–improving in the high–friction economy (since it raises average la-
bor productivity), but is welfare–decreasing in the low–friction economy (since it crowds
out occupational choice along the preferences dimension, due to the fact that networks are
basically not generating any occupational choice that is not based on productivity in the
baseline equilibrium). Relatedly, we find that occupational persistence is much higher in the
high–friction economy than in the low–friction economy, other things being equal (likelihood
ratio of 1.68 vs. 1.25).
Second, by comparing column 1 to column 5, we can see that search frictions may be
responsible for high unemployment and low productivity at the same time. This is a reflection
of the fact that networks are more distortionary in environments with large frictions, where
individuals are more willing to trade their productive advantage for better employment
prospects.
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2.5.4.3 Policy Experiment: Unemployment Benefits
We now look at how changes in unemployment benefits affect the equilibrium of the economy.
In order to assess the welfare consequences of such changes, we introduce a lump–sum tax
τ on existing matches (which is split between workers and firms, where χ is the share paid
by the workers) and a government budget constraint. The new value functions for employed
workers and firms are as follows:
WEo (Ω) = max
{
φPo + φ
T,E
o + w(Ω)− χτ+ (2.52)
λ˜
[
(1− δ)E [WEo (Ω′)]+ δ E [WR(Ω′)] ],WR(Ω)}.
Jo(Ω) = 1{REo (Ω) = 0}
[
y(τ, ho)− w(Ω)− (1− χ)τ + λ˜
[
(1− δ)E [Jo(Ω′)] + δV ′o
]]
(2.53)
+1{REo (Ω) = 1}Vo.
The government balances its budget in each period. That is, the change in unemployment
benefits from the baseline equilibrium must be financed by the tax revenues:
∆bu = τ(1− u), (2.54)
where u is the unemployment rate of the economy. The rest of the model remains unchanged.
Some of the channels commonly emphasized in the literature through which unemploy-
ment benefits have an effect on the economy, such as the scope for redistribution (in the
presence of risk aversion) or the disincentivizing effect on the search efficiency units choice,
are absent in our framework. At the same time, unemployment benefits interact very strongly
with the main tradeoff at work in our model. Thus, an increase (decrease) in the value of
unemployment benefits decreases (increases) the distance between the value of employment
and unemployment for workers. As a consequence, parental networks become less (more)
important in the son’s choice, since insurance against unemployment becomes less (more)
valuable. This implies that workers sort more (less) according to productivity and prefer-
ences. To the extent that this increase in sorting is more prominent along the comparative
advantage dimension, unemployment benefits can produce productivity gains.42
In the quantitative experiment (Table 2.11), an increase of 10% (25%) in b favours
sorting along the preferences dimension, whereas it slightly dampens the sorting along the
comparative advantage dimension. As a consequence, output per worker decreases by about
42This mechanism has a very similar flavor to that in Acemoglu & Shimer (2000) and Golosov et al. (2013).
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0.1% (0.3%). At the same time, occupational persistence decreases (since parental networks
are less attractive) and unemployment increases (since unemployment is now a more attrac-
tive option). The overall net effect on welfare is negative (−0.09% and −0.31%), reflecting
the fact that the tax rate increases proportionally more than b, given that unemployment
increases. Columns 4 and 5 show that decrease in b have qualitatively opposite effects.
When we repeat the same exercises under the restricted calibration (lower part of Table
2.11), we find the effect to be similar. One important difference is that, under the restricted
calibration, increases in b do indeed lead to improvements in output per worker, even if the
magnitude of the change is quite small (0.2% and 0.4%). The increase in unemployment is
therefore smaller than in the baseline case, reflecting a relatively higher level of firm entry
(in response to the increase in labor productivity). Interestingly, welfare moves in the same
direction in both model specifications, even though the magnitude of the change is very
different. For instance, an increase of 25% in b generates a welfare loss of 0.31% under the
baseline calibration, while in the restricted calibration the loss is only 0.16% . Hence, it
turns out that allowing for multiple sources of persistence is also relevant for the assessment
of labor market policy in general.
2.6 Conclusions
We investigated the determinants of occupational persistence across generations. When per-
sistence is generated from multiple sources, it is crucial to assess their relative importance
in order to understand the relationship between persistence and misallocation, and to de-
rive welfare implications. A simple model of occupational persistence and search frictions,
in which both abilities and contacts are transmitted across generations, delivers clear–cut
testable predictions on employment prospects and wages, which are confirmed in UK data.
We extended the theory to a more complete dynamic model of occupational choice,
allowing for mobility over the life–cycle and accumulation/depreciation of human and social
capital. We found that parental networks account for the bulk of occupational persistence
and that a model based only on transmission of ability (the restricted model) would be at
odds with several features of the data. A key result of our quantitative analysis is that only
occupational persistence generated by parental networks and preferences transmission may
be detrimental to welfare. Furthermore, we show that search frictions interact with parental
networks, amplifying their importance and their adverse effects on the aggregate equilibrium.
We evaluate the cost of increasing unemployment benefits and find that the restricted
model understates the cost by a factor of two. Hence, we conclude that modeling multiple
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in b (∆% from baseline) - +10% +25% -10% -25%
Baseline Economy
Occupational Persistence 1.720 1.702 1.673 1.737 1.762
(∆% from baseline) - (-2.516) (-6.500) (2.418) (5.875)
Welfare (∆% from baseline) - (-0.091) (-0.311) (0.058) (0.094)
Sorting along comparative advantage (sons) 0.708 0.707 0.704 0.709 0.710
Sorting along preferences (sons) 0.402 0.404 0.407 0.402 0.401
Sorting along comparative advantage (fathers) 0.656 0.655 0.652 0.657 0.658
Sorting along preferences (fathers) 0.455 0.456 0.459 0.454 0.454
Output per worker (=1 in baseline) 1.000 0.999 0.997 1.001 1.001
Unemployment Rate (∆% from baseline) 0.061 (3.694) (11.369) (-2.884) (-6.061)
Restricted Model
Occupational Persistence 1.597 1.607 1.623 1.589 1.578
(∆% from baseline) - (1.545) (4.224) (-1.380) (-3.185)
Welfare (∆% from baseline) - (-0.054) (-0.164) (0.040) (0.080)
Sorting along comparative advantage (sons) 0.344 0.346 0.350 0.342 0.340
Sorting along preferences (sons) 0.767 0.765 0.761 0.769 0.771
Sorting along comparative advantage (fathers) 0.365 0.367 0.370 0.363 0.361
Sorting along preferences (fathers) 0.746 0.744 0.741 0.748 0.750
Output per worker (=1 in baseline) 1.000 1.002 1.004 0.999 0.997
Unemployment Rate (∆% from baseline) 0.067 (2.476) (6.925) (-2.156) (-4.890)
Table 2.11. Policy Experiment: effect of changes in unemployment benefits.
sources of intergenerational transmission is crucial not only to understanding the conse-
quences of persistence, but also for the assessment of labor market policy.
Interesting directions for future research are the study of the cross–gender patterns
of occupational persistence, and asymmetric equilibria across occupations. Analyzing the
latter would make it possible to capture heterogeneity across occupations, though it requires
much richer data in order to reliably estimate the separate channels of persistence at the
occupational level.
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Chapter 3
Structural Transformation, Innovation
and Growth: The Role of Income
Distribution
3.1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that over the last decades countries experienced remarkably different
paths of economic development. Structural change1 – the secular shift of labor and output
away from agriculture to manufacturing and services– has been considered one of the key
features of development.2 Recently, the attention of economists and policymakers has been
drawn by the outstanding economic performance of countries that performed a rapid catch-
up in the living standards such as Korea, Japan, India and China. These countries did so by
industrializing and developing a large manufacturing sector. For this reason, several authors
and international organizations have argued that a larger degree of structural change (that
is, large outflows of labor from agriculture) is indeed what underdeveloped countries lack,
therefore implying a direct link between structural change and growth.
This paper challenges that belief, documenting that not all countries that undertook a deep
structural change in the last decades experienced also fast growth. We empirically show that
the relationship between structural change and growth negatively depends on the level of
income inequality. Consistent with this, we develop a model in which a more unequal distri-
1Structural change (or structural transformation) is broadly defined as a long–run change in the structure of an economy.
In this paper we specifically look at the employment structure, and in particular at the outflow of labor from agriculture.
2Kuznets & Murphy (1966) includes structural change as one of the main stylized facts on development. More recently,
McMillan & Rodrik (2011) and Duarte & Restuccia (2010) study how the structural change affects productivity dynamics,
which is at the heart of differentials of living standards across countries.
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bution of income generates a less agriculture–intensive employment structure, but without
effectively fostering technological innovation and growth, due to the creation of many differ-
ent markets of small size.
Working with a sample of 41 countries for the last 50 years, we document that structural
change per se does not always imply higher growth. Splitting the sample of countries into
two groups by the level of income inequality reveals the following: structural change ex-
plains growth (in the period 1960-2010) only among low-inequality countries. Interestingly,
the structural change phenomenon is very similar across the two groups, both quantitatively
(how much labor moved out of agriculture) and qualitatively (in which sectors the labor
flew into). When we investigate labor productivity dynamics, we find that it grew at very
different rates across the two groups. For instance, agriculture labor productivity grew at
1.68% per year on average in high–inequality countries, while it grew at 3.69% per year in
low-inequality countries. Furthermore, similar differences are found in all other sectors in
a consistent fashion. These differentials may be due to underlying differences in the inno-
vativeness of firms across these two groups of countries.3 Consistent with this view, recent
cross–country studies on OECD economies show that high inequality is correlated with less
innovativeness indeed (see for instance Hopkin et al. (2014)).
Motivated by this evidence, we build a model in which income inequality affects the em-
ployment structure of the economy as well as the development path of the economy. In
particular, a higher level of inequality generates an employment structure which is less
agriculture–intensive, besides having a detrimental effect on the innovation process. The
latter effect stems out of a demand structure that is not concentrated enough to induce
firms to adopt the modern technologies capable of increasing TFP. In our model, prefer-
ences feature income non–homotheticity, implying that changes in income will translate into
changes in the bundle of the goods consumed by the households. Households have the same
sources of income (a balanced portfolio of wages and profits) but differ in their share of total
income: the large majority of the population (1− pi) are poor households, while the rest of
the population pi represents rich households. Consumers choose the quantity of the homo-
geneous good (mapped to the agriculture good) and the amount of varieties (consumed in
discrete units) of the differentiated goods (mapped to the manufacturing and services goods,
the modern sector), ordered along a hierarchy. Poor households consume a strict subset of
what rich households consume, in equilibrium. Therefore, the employment structure of the
economy is largely determined by how income is distributed, as this shapes both aggregate
demand and type of technologies used by firms.
3On the relationship between innovation and productivity at the firm–level, see Hall (2011) and Aghion et al. (2009).
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Technology innovation decisions of firms push the knowledge level of the economy and en-
hance growth. For the production of each variety in the modern sector, firms have the
possibility of updating the technology (allowing them to produce at lower marginal costs),
upon payment of a fixed cost. If they do so, then they are granted a lifetime patent for using
that specific technology and make profits out of production. As their profits depend on the
amount of goods that they will be able to sell, income distribution matters in that it shapes
the incentives for innovation. As a consequence, changes in the consumption structure will
determine changes in the employment composition of the economy, as firms decide to adopt
expensive (but productive) technologies only for those markets which are large enough.
We calibrate the model to the US economy and perform counterfactual experiments with
respect to the degree of income inequality. We find that high–inequality economies are char-
acterized by a relatively smaller agriculture sector and substantially worse growth prospects.
For instance, doubling the income differentials among rich and poor (from 2 to 4), decreases
the equilibrium growth rate of the economy from 2.6 to 1.56%. An increase in inequality
implies an increase in the total amount of labor devoted to production, which disproportion-
ately goes into the modern sector (rather than into the agriculture one), as the use of less
productive technologies by firms generates the need for more labor (the ratio of agriculture
to non–agriculture employment shares drops from 0.122 to 0.116).
Instead, when we vary the weight of the different goods in households’ consumption, a de-
crease in the size of the agriculture sector is accompanied by improvements in the growth
performance. An increase in the weight attached to the agriculture good in the utility
function from 0.025 to 0.05 generates a large increase in the agriculture to non–agriculture
employment shares (it rises from 0.055 to 0.174), along with a drop in the growth rate (from
2.22 to 1.64%).
To sum up, a relatively small agriculture sector may reflect the fact that most of the con-
sumption is in fact devoted to other goods (in which case, this has positive implications for
growth), but it may as well be symptomatic of the use of relatively inefficient technologies
in the modern sector (in which case, this has negative implications for growth).
Overall, the mechanisms outlined in our model lend a possible explanation to the experience
of several Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries in the last decades, character-
ized by high levels of income inequality and some degree of structural change that was not
accompanied by sustained growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. We
provide the empirical evidence in Section 3, while Section 4 to 6 are devoted to the model
and the quantitative experiments.
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3.2 Related Literature
This project is at the intersection of different strands of the literature. On the one hand,
the link between income inequality and economic growth is one of the oldest questions in
economics; on the other hand, there exists a large literature on structural change and growth;4
finally, this paper also builds on the seminal contributions of Romer (1989) and Grossman
& Helpman (1993), who construct models of R&D and growth.
With respect to the literature on inequality and growth, classical contributions include
Barro (2000), Aghion & Williamson (1998), Banerjee & Duflo (2003) and Galor & Moav
(2004). This paper is closer to the small literature that looks at the demand side of the
relation between inequality and the efficiency level of an economy. Murphy et al. (1989) is
the first contribution that studies this issue in a static framework, finding that a too dispersed
demand for industrial goods triggers less development. Zweimüller (2000) studies a similar
framework in a growth context with non–homothetic preferences, finding an ambiguous effect
of inequality on growth. More recently, other works have studied the interaction between
inequality and innovation, for instance Aghion et al. (2015), Jones & Kim (2014) and Hopkin
et al. (2014). Instead, Auclert & Rognlie (2017) and Auclert & Rognlie (2018) have studied
the effect of inequality on total output, via aggregate demand. Differently from these works,
the focus of our work is on the dynamic effects of inequality on innovation, that in turn
determines the growth rate of the economy. The closest study to this one is Foellmi &
Zweimüller (2006), which extends the analysis of Zweimüller (2000) to a context where
income inequality has a twofold effect on the incentives for innovation. This paper employs
a version of their model with two important twists: first, we allow for the presence of 2
sectors, out of which only one is subject to innovation; second, we model innovation as
technological adoption of new productive processes, rather than as production of new goods.
Moreover, the emphasis of our analysis is not on the effect of inequality on growth per se,
but rather on how the degree of income inequality can tilt the relationship between the
employment structure of the economy and growth.
Regarding structural change, the literature is divided between papers that emphasize
supply or demand factors. Ngai & Pissarides (2005) develop a theory of structural change
in which sectoral TFP growth rates differentials are responsible for the movements of labor
across sectors, consistently with the early conjecture of Baumol (1967). Opposed to this,
several other authors have claimed that instead demand changes are responsible for struc-
tural change. For instance, Echevarria (1997), Laitner (2000), Caselli & Coleman II (2001)
4A review of the literature on productivity and structural change is in Krüger (2008).
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and Gollin (2002) use income non-homotheticity to derive structural change. In their model,
individuals, as they get richer, adjust accordingly the expenditure shares on the different
goods, ultimately causing a change in the industry structure. Other papers on structural
change include Acemoglu & Guerrieri (2006), Matsuyama (2009), Boppart (2014) and Alder
et al. (2017). 5 The first part of this literature, the one based on TFP differentials, does
not look explicitly at the relationship between structural change and growth. Given that
movements of labor only depend on the relative movements in TFP growth rates, there is no
link between aggregate TFP and structural change. Conversely, models where income effects
play a major role imply a positive correlation between growth and structural change. For in-
stance, in Foellmi & Zweimüller (2008), higher growth (which is exogenous) unambiguously
generates faster structural change (therefore, a smaller share of the agriculture sector), not
consistent with the evidence documented in this paper.
3.3 Data and Suggestive Evidence
We construct a large panel dataset, building from two different sources. Our data on GDP
and population over time comes from the Penn World Tables (covering nearly all countries in
the world), while the data on the structure of the economies is only available for 41 countries
(from Europe, US, Latin America, Asia and Africa) and comes from the 10-Sector Database6.
Furthermore, we gather data on inequality from the World Income Inequality Database.
Throughout the analysis, we maintain a consistent sample composed of all countries and
years for which sectoral data is available. The time period spans the post–war period, with
some differences across samples and countries. A more accurate description of our data is in
Appendix A.
3.3.1 Stylized Facts
First, we look at the relationship between structural change and growth. The left panel
of Figure 3.1 reproduces the well–known fact that richer economies have an agricultural
sector that is on average smaller in relative terms. This seems to suggest that pulling out
labor from agriculture and diversifying the economy is an important driver of good economic
performance. In this same spirit, structural change has been advocated several times in order
5The majority of these papers study structural change in a closed economy setup, while an emerging literature now looks at
how trade affects structural change. For instance, among others see Teignier (2011), Betts et al. (2013), and Galor & Mountford
(2008) and Uy et al. (2013).
6This dataset is publicly available at the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
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to guarantee good economic outcomes for underdeveloped economies. Nonetheless, a more
accurate analysis actually reveals that the link between structural change and development
is quite heterogeneous across countries. We split our sample of countries into two groups:
high–inequality and low–inequality countries. In order to do that, we first compute the
average value of income inequality (as measured by the Gini Income coefficient) over the
period 1960-2010 for each country. Then, we sort the countries according to this value
and define “high–inequality” the top 50%7. The right panel of Figure 3.1 shows that the
relationship between the agriculture employment share and the level of development is lowest
in high–inequality countries. In order to quantify the differential across the two groups, we
run regressions of log GDP per capita against the agriculture employment share, including
country fixed effects. The inclusion of fixed effects controls for different initial conditions and
other fixed factors, allowing us to estimate the slope of the relationship depicted in Figure
3.1. As shown in Table 3.1, the estimated coefficient of -3.57 (Column 1) implies that a
decrease of 10% in the agriculture employment share is associated with an increase in GDP
per capita of about 35.7% in the whole sample. When we estimate this coefficient separately
for high–inequality and low–inequality countries (Columns 2 and 3), we find that in the
former subsample the estimate drops to -2.35. Conversely, the estimated coefficient for the
latter group is -5.42, more than twice as large. The estimates show that in high–inequality
countries structural change (outflow of labor from agriculture) is associated to growth to a
much lesser extent8. One possible concern of these regressions is the bounded support of the
explanatory variable, i.e. the fact that countries at a very advanced development level bunch
at the lower bound of the support. By construction, this can potentially bias our results.
We repeat our estimates keeping in the sample only those observations with at least 10% of
the labor force in the agriculture sector, and the results are practically unchanged (see Table
26 in Appendix B).
This same pattern is apparent in Figure 3.2, where we study the correlation between
the average growth rate and the total extent of structural change (outflows of labor from
agriculture) experienced in the period 1960–2010. Clearly, the correlation only shows up in
the subsect of low–inequality countries, whereas it is virtually zero among high–inequality
countries. Note that the degree of structural change (that is, the range of the horizontal
axis) is substantially similar across the two groups.
Dividing the sample into subgroups is potentially misleading, as these groups of countries
might be different in several other dimensions. Therefore, we also run similar regressions
to the one estimated in Column 1 of Table 3.1, estimating an interaction term between the
7Changing the threshold to 40% or 60% does not alter substantially the results.
8Results are robust to dividing the sample in 3 subsamples rather than two (Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3.1).
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Figure 3.1. Left panel: relationship between log GDP per capita and agricultural employment share. The observation unit
is country per year. Right panel: relationship between average yearly economic growth and structural change over the period
1960-2010 (Source: Penn World Tables, ASD, 10SD).
Dependent Variable: Log GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Sample Top 50% Bottom 50% Bottom 33% Middle Top 33%
Agr. Emp. Share -3.571*** -2.351*** -5.419*** -2.353*** -2.965*** -5.547***
(0.060) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.127) (0.077)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2099 1056 1043 714 658 727
R2 0.635 0.517 0.856 0.613 0.458 0.879
Number of Countries 41 21 20 14 13 14
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.1. Linear Regression of log GDP per capita against agriculture employment share. The coefficient is estimated
separately for the whole sample (column 1) and for different parts of the distribution of countries by income inequality in the
period 1960-2010 (columns 2 to 6).
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Figure 3.2. Relationship between average yearly economic growth and structural change for two groups of countries: high–
inequality and low–inequality. (Source: Penn World Tables, 10SD).
agriculture employment share and an indicator for belonging to the top 50% of inequality.
The results (shown in Table 26 in Appendix B) are perfectly in line with our previous findings:
high concentration of income substantially weakens the correlation between structural change
and growth. This result is robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects (controlling for common
trends across countries) and other controls such as: size of the country, degree of openness,
composition of GDP (consumption, investment and public expenditure) and dependence on
natural resources.
A possible hypothesis is that the structural change of high–inequality and low–inequality
countries had a different impact on growth because in fact they were quite different phenom-
ena from a qualitative point of view. So far we have controlled only for the outflow of labor
from agriculture, without saying anything on which sector that labor force flew into. In
particular, one possibility is that labor was entering the manufacturing sector (which is a
high–productivity sector) in low–inequality countries, whereas it was entering comparatively
more in the services sector (which is a low productivity sector) in high–inequality countries.
In Figure 3.3, we plot the cumulative inflow of labor into the manufacturing sector over time.
The figure reveals that the extent of structural change that interested the manufacturing sec-
tor is comparable across the two groups of countries. In particular, the average cumulative
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gross inflow is practically identical, and also the two distributions are very similar. We also
compute the cumulative inflow and outflow rates for each of the 10 sectors over the time
period, and the patterns are remarkably similar across the two groups (we report the results
in Appendix B, Table 27).
Figure 3.3. Cumulative inflow of labor into the Manufacturing sector, by natural resources abundance (Source: Penn World
Tables, ASD, 10SD).
Next, we study the behavior of labor productivity –as measured by value added per
worker– over time. We perform the exercise at the sectoral level, in order to shed light
on what are the sectors in which the high–inequality economies are falling behind. Table
3.2 shows very large differentials in the growth rates of labor productivity between the two
groups9.
Table 3.2. Average Yearly Labor Productivity Growth Rates, by Income Inequality Group.
Sector High Inequality Low Inequality
Agriculture 1.62 3.55
Manufacturing 1.88 3.52
Services 0.47 1.74
The differentials are relevant and significant in all macro sectors of the economy (Agri-
9A similar table for the 10 sectors is reported in Appendix B.
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culture, Manufacturing, Services). Furthermore, we do not find any relevant asymmetries
in this comparison between manufacturing and services. This observation will lead us to
postulate a model of 2 sectors only, abstracting from differences between manufacturing and
services. In the next section we outline an endogenous growth model through which we aim
to explain the data patterns presented so far.10
3.4 The Model
This model is an adaptation of the model by Foellmi & Zweimüller (2006) with two main
twists: first, we allow for the existence of an homogeneous good sector, mapped to the
agriculture sector (in order to study structural change); second, we assume that technological
progress in the modern sector takes place through process adoption rather than product
innovation. The numeraire of the economy is the homogeneous good, therefore we assume
that Pa(t) = 1 ∀ t.
3.4.1 Demand side
Consider an economy in which an homogeneous good and many differentiated products are
produced. At each time t, households choose a quantity Ca of the homogeneous good and
which differentiated goods j ∈ [0,∞) to consume. Differentiated goods are ranked in the
utility function of agents, such that goods more on the left in the hierarchy are needed
more urgently.11 We assume that the differentiated goods problem is a “yes or no” decision:
Cj ∈ {0, 1}. We model the hierarchy by assuming that Cj units of good j yield utility
v(Cj)ξ(j). We normalize the baseline utility, such that v(Cj) = Cj. Also, we assume that
the weighting function takes the form ξ(j) = j−γ.
Households solve the following intertemporal problem:
max
{Ca(t),{Cj(t)}∞j=0}∞t=0
U =
∫ ∞
0
1
1− σ
[
(Ca(t))
α
(∫ ∞
0
j−γCj(t)dj
)1−α]1−σ
e−ρtdt (3.1)
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
[
Ca(t) +
∫ ∞
0
Cj(t)Pj(t)dj
]
e−R(0,t)dt ≤
∫ ∞
0
I(t)e−R(0,t)dt+ V0 (3.2)
10In our model the employment shares will not be determined by different TFP dynamics, an element from which we abstract.
In the Appendix, consistent with the literature, we argue that differentials in TFP growth rates cannot be the only determinant
of structural change.
11In order to simplify the rest of the analysis, we assume that households never want to consume a given good j unless they
are consuming all goods j
′<j (Assumption UC). This greatly simplifies the equilibrium pricing scheme without altering the
qualitative predictions of our model. We also work out the equilibrium without Assumption UC in the Appendix.
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where R(0, t) =
∫ t
0
r(s)ds is the cumulative discount rate between 0 and t, I(t) is total
income (wages, profits and rents) at time t, and V0 is initial wealth.
Defining u(t) =
[
(Ca(t))
α (∫∞
0
j−γCj(t)dj
)1−α], the FOCs of the households’ problem read
as follows:
(Ca) : u(t)
−σα(Ca(t))α−1
[∫ ∞
0
j−γCj(t)dj
]1−α
e−ρt = λe−R(0,t) (3.3)
(Cj) : Cj =
1 if u(t)−σ(1− α)(Ca(t))α
[∫∞
0
j−γCj(t)dj
]−α
j−γe−ρt ≥ λPj(t)e−R(0,t)
0 otherwise
(3.4)
The LHS of inequality 3.4, after dividing both sides by λ, can be interpreted as the
willingness to pay for a discrete unit of good j. Notice that this amount is decreasing over
j: this means that, ceteris paribus, households are willing to spend more for goods that are
more urgent to them (more on the left in the hierarchy). Also, the willingness to pay depends
on the income level, that is on the marginal utility of wealth λ. The higher the latter, the
less households are willing to spend: this implies that rich households (which will have a
smaller λ) are willing to spend more than poor households.
3.4.2 Income Distribution
We assume that income is unequally distributed. There are two classes of individuals in
the economy: rich individuals represent a share pi of the population, while poor individuals
represent the remaining 1− pi. Let Ik(t) be total income of household k at time t. Let Cka (t)
and Nk(t) be respectively the amount of homogeneous good and the last differentiated good
consumed by household k, with k ∈ {R,P}. We assume that households own a balanced
portfolio of wages and profits, and that rich household own a larger share of total income,
that is IR(t) = θIP (t) ∀ t, with θ > 1. The income distribution can be thought as being
generated by differences in the capability of supplying labor efficiency units to the market.
Notice that in our setup the Lorenz curve is piecewise linear and standard measures of
inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, are increasing in the parameter θ (Figure 3.4).
3.4.3 Supply Side
Let A(t) be the technology level of the economy. In the agriculture sector production takes
place according to a linear technology, that transforms χ
A(t)
units of labor into 1 unit of
output. In the modern sector, instead, there exist two different technologies for producing
each single good: an old (constant returns to scale) technology, available to everybody at no
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Figure 3.4. Lorenz Curves under different values of θ and fixed value of pi = 0.1
cost, according to which it is possible to produce 1 unit of output with ψ
O
A(t)
units of labor;
and a new (increasing returns to scale) technology, available upon the payment of a fixed
cost F
A(t)
in labor units12, that allows to produce 1 unit of output with ψ
N
A(t)
units of labor,
with ψN < ψO. A producer adopting the new technology is free to set the price and decide
how much quantity to produce. However, his decisions are constrained by free-entry of firms
and by the presence of a competitive fringe that can produce with the CRS technology.
Agriculture Sector
Consider the maximization problem of a firm operating in the agriculture sector:
max
La(t)
A(t)La(t)
χ
− w(t)La(t) (3.5)
The FOC of this problem is:
1
χ
=
w(t)
A(t)
(3.6)
12Even though the nominal units of the fixed cost are decreasing in A(t), the cost in real terms will stay constant, as in
equilibrium the wage will also be increasing at the same rate as A(t). Importantly, as relative price and the ratio between the
wage and A grow at the same rate in equilibrium, an interior solution to the technology adoption problem of firms is ensured
(this is a necessary condition, as in our setup profits are bounded).
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Notice that from equation 3.6 it follows that w(t) and A(t) must grow at the same rate
in equilibrium. The intuition is that all advances in technology have a positive effect on
labor productivity and in a competitive framework this produces an increase in wages of the
same amount.
Modern Sector
Old Technology
max
LOj (t)
Pj(t)
A(t)LOj (t)
ψO
− w(t)LOj (t) (3.7)
As this technology is available to everybody, whenever it is used,
Pj(t)
ψO
=
w(t)
A(t)
(3.8)
Wage equalization across sectors and Equation 3.6 imply that Pj(t) = ψ
O
χ
. This is the
price that will be charged by the competitive fringe in equilibrium for any good j, if it
operates.
Modern Technology
When a firm pays the fixed cost F
A(t)
in labor units, it has access to the following technology:
Y Nj (t) =
A(t)
ψN
LNj (t) (3.9)
We assume that upon payment of the fixed cost, the firm receives a lifetime patent
on the technology. As the technology developed allows the producer to produces at lower
marginal costs than the competitive fringe, in equilibrium he will become a monopolist. The
monopolist has now the possibility of setting the price and decide how much quantity to
produce.
Consider first the price setting problem. Remember that the monopolist is constrained by
the competitive fringe that is willing to produce any quantity at price ψ
O
χ
. Therefore, the
price set by the monopolist cannot exceed that level in any case. The demand faced by the
monopolist reads as follows:
Qj(t)
= 0 if Pj(t) >ψO χ .∈ [0, Qmaxj (t)] if Pj(t) ≤ψO χ . (3.10)
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whereQmaxj (t) is the maximum size of the market, which is the amount of goods produced
by the competitive fringe at time t, before the entry of the monopolist.
It is trivial to see that whenever the producer is willing to produce any quantity, then
he will want to serve all the market. At the same time, it will not always be the case that
the monopolist wants to produce. In order to decide whether to enter the market, firms
evaluate the infinite stream of profits coming from being the monopolist in the production
of a particular good13.
Suppose that the competitive fringe is serving the market j, and that a prospective monop-
olist is considering to enter the market, innovating the production process. The value of
the technology adoption for good j at time t (which we denote Vj(t)) is given the optimized
value of discounted profits:
Vj(t) = max{Pj(s),Qj(s)}
∫ ∞
t
Πj(s)e
−R(s,t)ds = max
{Pj(s),Qj(s)}
∫ ∞
t
(
Pj(s)− ψ
N
A(t)
w(t)
)
Qj(s)e
−R(s,t)ds
(3.11)
where Qj(s) has to be consistent with Equation 3.10. Trivially, when the value of
technology adoption is larger than its cost (that is, Vj(t) ≥ F w(t)A(t)), it is profitable for the
monopolist to enter the market and start the production. Free entry implies that whenever
an innovation is to be made, discounted profits (Equation 3.11) are exactly equal to the cost
of innovation.
3.4.4 Innovation and Technology
The level of technology of the economy A is defined as the mass of modern technologies that
are adopted at a given point in time. This reflects the idea that technology adoption by firms
have spillover effects on the whole modern sector. In turn, this raises labor productivity for
the production of modern sector goods.
A(t) =
∫ ∞
0
1
{
Y Nj (t) > 0
}
dj (3.12)
The rate at which A(t) grows depends on LR(t), the amount of workers who are employed
in the research sector, developing new technologies.
A˙(t) = LR(t)
(
A(t)
F
)
(3.13)
13Whenever there are changes in the price and/or in the market size, it is crucial to know the time at which these changes
occur. This implies that growth rates of the variables are necessary in order to compute profits.
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The previous equation reflects the idea that technology raises labor productivity also
in the research sector. Another way of interpreting equation 3.13 is to multiply both sides
by F
A(t)
: the labor demanded in the research sector is the product of a measure of the mass
of goods that have technological adoption at a given time t (which is A˙(t)) and the labor
employed in each of these goods
(
F
A(t)
)
. The latter term is decreasing over time, meaning
that for a given technological innovation you need less and less labor.
3.4.5 Equilibrium Definition
Definition 5. Equilibrium An equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of allocations for
the households {CPa (t), CRa (t), {CPj (t), CRj (t)}∞j=0}∞t=0, allocations for the firms
{LA(t), {LOj (t), LNj (t)}∞j=0, LR(t)}∞t=0, prices {{Pj(t)}∞j=0, w(t), r(t)}∞t=0 and a sequence of tech-
nology levels {A(t)}∞t=0 such that:
• given prices, the allocations for the households solves their dynamic problem;
• given prices and technology level A(t), the allocations for the firms solves their problem
at each time t;
• the technology level A(t) is defined by equation 3.12 and evolves according to equation
3.13;
• markets clear at each time t:
Ya(t) =
A(t)
χ
La(t) = (1− pi)CPa + piCRa (3.14)
Y Oj (t) + Y
N
j (t) =
A(t)
ψO
LOj (t) +
A(t)
ψN
LNj (t) = (1− pi)CPj (t) + piCRj (t) ∀ j (3.15)
LA(t) +
∫ ∞
0
Lj(t)dj + LR(t) = L (3.16)
where Lj(t) = LOj (t) + LNj (t).
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3.4.6 Equilibrium Characterization
Lemma 6 (Consumption follows the hierarchy). In equilibrium, each type of household
consumes a continuous measure of varieties [0, Nk]. Furthermore, NP (t) < NR(t).
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, households expand their consumption basket gradually. Given that the sup-
ply side is symmetric across goods, it cannot be the case that households decide to consume
some good j if they do not consume all other goods that are higher up in the hierarchy.
Moreover, given that the incentives for savings are the same across households types, the
rich ones will consume a larger set of differentiated goods. Given that these goods are con-
sumed in discrete units, this imply that poor households consume in equilibrium a subset of
the goods consumed by the rich, as shown in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.5. Equilibrium demand of differentiated goods. NP = 5, NR = 8, pi = 0.3.
Figure 3.6 plots the quantity consumed of each differentiated good in equilibrium. Ev-
erybody in the economy consumes up to good NP (t), and then the rich will consume a
positive mass of additional goods, equal to NR(t)−NP (t). Note that when the consumption
follows the hierarchy, then the expression
∫∞
0
j−γCj(t)dj simplifies to N(t)
1−γ
1−γ .
Turning to the supply side, the first thing we establish is that for each good only one of
the two technologies will be employed at a given point in time. This follows from the fact
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that the new technology allows to produce at lower marginal costs than the technology of
the competitive fringe. Therefore, the producer owner of the new technology will price the
competitive fringe out.
Lemma 7 (No Coexistence of Both Technologies). For each good j, all the amount con-
sumed at each given point in time t, is entirely produced either with the old or with the new
technology.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now we study equilibrium prices. As the willingness to pay for good j is higher than
the willingness to pay for j′, with j′ > j, it must be the case that also technology adoption
follows the hierarchy. Denote by j∗(t) the last good for which the new technology is adopted
at time t.
Monopolists have no incentives in fixing strategically the prices in order to attract more
consumers, as demand would not react at all. Therefore, it is optimal for producers to fix
prices at the highest possible level.
Lemma 8 (Equilibrium Pricing). Equilibrium prices are flat: Pj(t) = ψ
O
χ
∀j.
Under a flat equilibrium pricing, profits are a step-function:
Πj(t) =
ψ
O−ψN
χ
if j ≤ NP
ψO−ψN
χ
pi if NP (t) < j ≤ NR(t)
(3.17)
We can note that profits are only a function of the quantity sold (market size). In
particular, they jump at the moment in which the good starts to be sold to the whole
population. Using equilibrium profits, we can write an expression for the value of innovation
in each single good market. It corresponds to the infinite stream of discounted profits
accruing from the technological adoption. The expression for Vj(t) reads as follows:
Vj(t) =

ψO−ψN
χ
∫∞
t
e−R(s,t)ds if j ≤ NP (t)
ψO−ψN
χ
[∫ t+∆Mj (t)
t
pie−R(s,t)ds+
∫∞
t+∆Mj (t)
e−R(s,t)ds
]
if NP (t) < j ≤ NR(t)
(3.18)
, where ∆Mj (t) is the waiting time for market j to become a mass market. The value
Vj(t) is constant for all goods which are consumed by the whole market, reflecting the fact
that prices and quantities are constant. Above the level NP , the value of innovation starts
to decrease in a continuous fashion: the further away j is from NP , the longer the producer
will need to wait in order to sell to the whole market.
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Lemma 9. Innovation Values Vj(t) is a continuous and decreasing function of j, ∀t. An
equilibrium in which ∃ j | Y Oj > 0 and ∃ j′ | Y ′Nj > 0 (there is neither no adoption nor full
adoption of modern technologies) must be such that j∗ ≥ NP .
Proof. See Appendix.
Now we turn again to the households’ optimal choices. First of all, we note that both
types of household consume the same proportion of the two goods (agriculture and the one
from the modern sector). This is an implication of Cobb–Douglas preferences, along with
the flat pricing.
Lemma 10 (Optimal Consumption of Differentiated Goods). In equilibrium, Equation 3.4
must hold with equality for both types of households.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, taking the ratio between 3.3 and 3.4 (for good N(t), for which it is binding) yields:
α
1− α
1
1− γ
Nk(t)
Cka (t)
=
1
PNk(t)
k ∈ {P,R} (3.19)
Equation 3.19, together with the constancy of relative prices, implies that the mass of
differentiated goods consumed grows at the same rate as this new variable. We define this
rate as gc(t):
gkc (t) =
C˙ka (t)
Cka (t)
=
N˙k(t)
Nk(t)
(3.20)
In turn, consumption growth rates depend on the interest rate (incentives for savings).
To see this, first we take logs of equation 3.3, obtaining the following expression:
− σ(α log(Cka (t)) + (1− α)(1− γ)(log(Nk(t))− log(1− γ)) + (α− 1) log(Cka (t))+
+ (1− α)(1− γ)(log(Nk(t))− ρt = log(λ)−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds (3.21)
Now, taking derivatives with respect to time, and using the fact that Cka (t) and Nk(t)
grow at the same rate, we can pin down the interest rate. In the following we omit the index
k in the growth rate of consumption gkc (t), given that households face the same interest rate
and therefore their consumption streams must grow at the same rate:
[σα + σ(1− α)(1− γ) + γ(1− α)]gc(t) = r(t)− ρ (3.22)
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3.5 Balanced Growth Path
The rest of the analysis focuses on a Balanced Growth Path equilibrium, in which all vari-
ables grow at a constant rate. From equation 3.22 it is clear that when the consumption
growth rate is constant (gc(t) = gc ∀ t), the interest rate will also be constant: r(t) = r ∀ t.
On a balanced growth path, the value of technological adoptions has a closed form. First,
note that on such a path it is possible to solve exlicitely for the waiting time ∆Mj (t).
NP (t)e
gc∆Mj (t) = j implies that ∆Mj (t) =
log
(
j
NP (t)
)
gc
, where gc is the constant growth rate
of NP . The waiting time is increasing in the distance between NP (the frontier of mass
goods) and j, and decreasing in the rate of growth of such frontier. Second, substituting the
fixed interest rate into equation 56, and plugging in the expression for the equilibrium prices
from equation 50, it is now possible to solve the integrals.
Thus, the expression simplifies further to:
Vj(t) =

ψO−ψN
χ
1
r
if j ≤ NP (t)
ψO−ψN
χ
(
pi e
−r∆Mj (t)−1
−r +
e
−r∆Mj (t)
r
)
if NP (t) < j ≤ NR(t)
(3.23)
The quantity sold starts at pi, for those goods between NP and NR, and then jumps to
1 after a period of time ∆Mj (t).
Figure 3.6. Value of Innovation for differentiated goods. NP = 5, NR = 8, pi = 0.3, ψ
O−ψN
χ
= 0.5, r = 0.01.
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Now, we derive a system of equations that characterizes the balanced growth path of
our model economy. The endogenous variables of this model are 10: CPa , CRa , NP , NR, r, gc,
gA, A, ∆MA . One level will have to be normalized, and then we can interpret the other ones
in terms of ratios to the normalized one. We choose to normalize A to 1.
The long–run equilibrium is characterized by the following system of equations (from which
we omit the time index t):
(Consumption Allocation of poor, from equation 3.19)
α
1− α
1
1− γ
NP
CPa
=
χ
ψO
(3.24)
(Consumption Allocation of rich, from equation 3.19)
α
1− α
1
1− γ
NR
CRa
=
χ
ψO
(3.25)
These two equations are derived from the FOCs of the households and represent the optimal
consumption allocation. Note that households consume the two consumption items in the
same proportions (in other words, preferences are homothetic across types of consumption
goods).
(Euler Equation, from equation 3.22)
[σα + (1− α) + (σ − 1)(1− α)(1− γ)]gc = r − ρ (3.26)
(Free-Entry Condition, from equation 56)
ψO − ψN
χ
(
pi
1− e−r∆MA
r
+
e−r∆
M
A
r
)
=
F
χ
(3.27)
This expression equates expected profits from innovation to its cost. Given g and r, it finds
the equilibrium ratio between A and NP , i.e. the distance between the technological frontier
and the last good consumed by the poor.
(Definition of Delta in a BGP)
∆MA =
log
(
A
NP
)
gc
(3.28)
This follows from the definition of ∆Mj , for the specific good on the technological frontier
(j = A). It says that the waiting time for the marginal good (for which the technology is
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being upgraded) to become a mass good is increasing in the distance between A and NP and
decreasing in the growth rate of consumption gc.
(Constancy of ∆MA )
gc = gA (3.29)
This equation guarantees that ∆MA is constant (see equation 3.28). This means that tech-
nology must grow at the same level of consumption, on a BGP.
(B.C. of poor)
CPa +NP
ψO
χ
gc − r =
A
χ
+NP (
ψO−ψN
χ
) + (A−NP )(ψO−ψNχ )pi − Fgcχ A
(gc − r)(piθ + (1− pi)) (3.30)
(B.C. of rich)
CRa +NR
ψO
χ
gc − r = θ
A
χ
+NR(
ψO−ψN
χ
) + (A−NP )(ψO−ψNχ )pi − Fgcχ A
(gc − r)(piθ + (1− pi)) (3.31)
These last two equations are the budget constraints solved for on the BGP. Total expenditures
(in the LHS) are equated to the total income stream (RHS), which is composed of wages (A
χ
)
and profits net of payment of the fixed costs. Note that A can be interpreted as the actual
level of the technology in the very first period of BGP. As already mentioned, we normalize
it to 1 in our simulations.
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3.6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we perform our quantitative analysis. First, we need to parametrize our
economy. Second, we will study the effect of inequality on the growth rate of the economy
in the long–run equilibrium. Moreover, we study the relationship between the relative size
of the agriculture sector and the growth performance, with a focus on how differentials in
inequality might affect this relationship. We will then be able to assess whether our model
is able to rationalize the empirical evidence presented earlier in this paper.
3.6.1 Calibration
This model has a total of 10 parameters to be calibrated. One period in the model corre-
sponds to 1 year. In the baseline calibration we pick parameter values so that our model
economy in BGP matches some features of the US economy.
Preferences are characterized by the following parameters: α, γ, σ, and ρ. We calibrate
σ = 5 (intertemporal elasticity of substitution) and ρ = 0.015 (household discount factor),
following the literature (Mehra & Prescott (1985)). The two remaining parameters α and γ
are calibrated to match the consumption expenditure share in agriculture in the US in 2005
(from the International Programme Comparison of the World Bank) and the average growth
rate of the US economy in the period 1960-2010 (from the World Penn Tables).
The technology parameters are: χ, ψO, ψN and F . The agriculture labor productivity χ is
normalized to 1. The parameters ψN and ψO regulate the difference in productivity of the
traditional and modern technology. Following Midrigan & Xu (2010), we choose ψN as to
replicate a TFP differential of 40%14 between modern and traditional technology firms. The
parameter ψO is then chosen to match the relative productivity of non–agriculture sector to
the agriculture sector. We match the relative VA per worker of the rest of the economy to
the agriculture sector in the US in the year 2005 (from the 10-Sector Database). The fixed
cost of innovation F is calibrated as to match the interest rate.
Finally, in the baseline calibration we set pi = 0.1 and we calibrate θ as to match the share
of total income held by the top 10%.
Table 3.3 summarizes the calibrated parameter values, together with the targets used.
14In their paper, this number implies a relative size of producers in modern to traditional sectors which is in line with Hsieh
& Klenow (2012).
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Table 3.3. Baseline Calibration. Values of Parameters and Targets.
Preferences Parameters
Parameter Description Value Target Data Model
α Weight of Agr.Good in the Utility 0.052 Cons. Exp. Shares 0.089 0.089
γ Weighting factor of varieties 0.388 Growth Rate 0.019 0.019
σ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.5 Mehra & Prescott (1985) - -
ρ Time discount Factor 0.015 Mehra & Prescott (1985) - -
Technology Parameters
Parameter Description Value Target Data Model
ψO Old Technology Parameter 1.058 Relative VA per worker 1.07 1.07
ψN New Technology Parameter 0.755 Midrigan & Xu (2010) - -
χ Agr. Technology Parameter 1 Normalization - -
F Fixed cost 5.143 Interest Rate 0.04 0.04
Income Distribution Parameters
Parameter Description Value Target Data Model
pi Share of Rich 0.1 - - -
θ Rich to Poor Income Ratio 3.33 Share of income held by top 10% 0.27 0.27
3.6.2 Effect of Inequality on Long–Run Growth
We simulate our model economy under the baseline parametrization, and the experiment we
perform involves changing the value of θ.15 Table 3.4 shows how changes in the inequality
impact the long–run equilibrium. Mechanically, an increase in inequality leads poor house-
holds to consume less and rich households to consume more. Changes in consumption do not
have any impact in the consumption composition, as in this economy Engel curves across
types of goods are linear. The increasing distance between A and NP makes innovation
less attractive, so that both the interest rate r and the growth rate g drop. Both of these
effects determine an increase in the waiting time ∆MA . Income concentration generates a
large number of small markets that do not provide strong incentive for innovation to firms.
Furthermore, all goods produced in the exclusive markets [A,NR] employ relatively more
labor (as they are produced with the old technology), and by doing so they take resources
away from investment in technology. Figure 3.7 shows that the growth rate of the economy
is monotonically decreasing in the degree of income inequality.
θ CPa C
R
a NP NR A ∆
M
A r g
2 0.085 0.170 0.901 1.801 1 4.02 0.0493 0.0260
3 0.078 0.235 0.832 2.496 1 8.89 0.0422 0.0207
4 0.073 0.292 0.775 3.101 1 16.34 0.0355 0.0156
5 0.069 0.345 0.733 3.667 1 33.97 0.0270 0.0091
Table 3.4. Simulations of the BGP, under the baseline parametrization. Impact of changes in inequality (θ) on the long–run
equilibrium.
15The Gini index is unambigously growing in θ, whereas the same is not true for pi. This is the reason why our exercises will
only involve changes in θ.
121
Figure 3.7. Effect of Inequality on Long–Run Growth, under the baseline calibration.
3.6.3 Effect of Inequality on Employment Shares
After establishing that inequality has a negative effect on growth, we now turn to study how
it affects the employment shares of the economy. Using the production function, we can
express the employment shares in terms of consumption:
La(t) = (1− pi)CPa + piCRa
χ
A(t)
(3.32)
LM(t) =
∫ ∞
0
Lj(t)dj = NP (t)
ψN
A(t)
+ (A(t)−NP (t)) ψ
N
A(t)
pi + (NR(t)− A(t)) ψ
O
A(t)
pi (3.33)
Intuitively, the employment shares directly reflect the division of consumption across
sectors, increasing when more consumption is allocated to a specific sector. Nonetheless,
another crucial aspect is which technologies are employed in the modern sector. In particular,
fixing the consumption shares across sectors, the less the modern technology is used (that is,
the higher the distance between NR and A, or the higher the pi), the more labor is allocated
-with respect to agriculture- to the modern sector. Thus, as it is apparent from Table 3.5
and Figure 3.8, an increase in θ causes a reallocation of labor from agriculture to the modern
sector. At the same time, both shares grow in absolute terms, as the amount of labor devoted
to the research sector (the one producing innovation) falls with θ, for the reasons we saw in
the previous section.
Note that these movements in the employment shares are not caused by changes in
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θ LA LM
LA
LM
g
2 0.094 0.772 0.122 0.0260
3 0.095 0.799 0.118 0.0207
4 0.096 0.825 0.116 0.0156
5 0.097 0.856 0.114 0.0091
Table 3.5. Simulations of the BGP, under the baseline parametrization. Impact of changes in inequality (θ) on the long–run
equilibrium.
consumption shares. A change in θ does not reallocate consumption from a sector to another,
but instead it only alters the share of modern goods produced with the modern technology as
opposed with the old one. In the next subsection we investigate how the long–run equilibrium
changes when consumption shares themselves change.
Figure 3.8. Effect of Inequality on Employment Shares, under the baseline calibration.
3.6.4 Effect of α on Employment Shares
Performing a comparative static exercise w.r.t. α is instructive, as it allows us to understand
how the equilibrium changes when the weights on the different consumption goods change.
As it is intuitive, an increase in α (that is, an increase in the importance of the agriculture
good for the households) has a negative impact on the growth performance of the economy
(see last column of Table 3.6). This is because less resources are spent in the modern sector,
and there are no strong incentives for firms to innovate (profits are low).
Another implication of an increase in α is that employment shares change, with more
(less) labor bein employed in the agriculture (modern) sector. Overall, the results shown in
Table 3.6 and Figure 3.9 reveal that having a small agriculture sector is good for the growth
123
α LA LM
LA
LM
g
0.025 0.046 0.842 0.055 0.0222
0.050 0.091 0.810 0.113 0.0192
0.075 0.136 0.780 0.174 0.0164
0.100 0.179 0.752 0.239 0.0133
0.125 0.224 0.729 0.307 0.0090
Table 3.6. Employment Shares and Growth performance. Impact of changes in consumption shares (α) on the long–run
equilibrium.
prospects of the economy. This is line with the common wisdom that structural change is
positively associated with fast growth. At the same time, the comparative statics exercise
w.r.t. θ reveals that a small agriculture sector can also be associated to lower growth, if
the labor is employed in relatively inefficient technologies in the modern sector. In other
words, ceteris paribus, changes in the consumption shares in favor of the modern sector are
unambigously associated to faster growth, while the same is not true for changes in the
employment shares.
Figure 3.9. Effect of Inequality on Employment Shares, under the baseline calibration.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
We have documented that, contrary to common wisdom, large movements of labor out of
agriculture are not always growth–enhancing. In particular, high–inequality economies typ-
ically undergo the structural change phenomenon without benefeting much to the extent
of growth. Motivated by this evidence, we have developed an endogenous growth model
in which the income distribution has implications for the employment shares of the econ-
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omy. Income inequality also matters for growth, as different household will demand different
goods, which makes markets more or less attractive for innovating firms.
The model is able to replicate the fact that economies characterized by high levels of income
inequality grew less in the last decades, even though they faced a similar structural trans-
formation process as other countries.
The entire analysis was based on the analysis of the balanced growth path, with compar-
ative statics exercises. In the future, we plan to introduce an additional layer of income
non–homotheticity by allowing for a minimum consumption level of the agriculture good.
This would imply that different households have different consumption shares between agri-
culture and non–agriculture goods, and that these shares change as they grow richer, thus
generating structural change in the economy. In the light of the findings of this paper, such
an exercise would be very interesting, as it would allow to have two different mechanisms at
work (a change in the consumption shares besides the change in firm incentives to innovate).
Investigating the properties of the transition to the BGP of such an economy looks like an
interesting research avenue.
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Appendix of First Chapter
Appendix A - The Data
Construction of Job Histories
The BHPS is a yearly survey, and therefore its basic structure contains yearly observations
for each individual. Among the available variables, individuals report what their employment
status and occupation is at the moment of the interview and when the current spell began.
In addition to the main dataset, there is a separate annex in which individuals list their
detailed job history in the last 12 months. Each single spell is identified with a start date
and an end date. When the month of the start date is missing, we replace it with the month
of the interview (if the spell began in the same year) or with December (if the spell began
in some previous year). In this way, we partly exploit those spells, that otherwise would be
completely missing. For each spell we are provided with the employment status, occupation
and other information.
We replace the yearly observations by 12 monthly observations for each individual. Then, we
fill in the employment status exploiting the information provided. Constructing correctly the
job histories is not a straightforward exercise, as the spells reported by individuals sometimes
overlap or conflict with each other. In order to solve this issue, we need to set a hierarchical
order of the available information. Importantly, we never replace the variables we copy
over time once they are assigned, even if they get into conflict with some future source of
information. We give priority to the current spell report, as the amount of recall needed to
report it correctly is smaller than for past spells. Therefore, first of all we copy the current
employment status over time, from the start date of the current spell to the date of the
interview. Second, we use past spells to fill in the remaining missing values. Again, we
assume that recalls closer in time are more reliable and therefore we first consider the very
last spell, then the second last and so on.
We fix 12 as the maximum number of difference in months between the interview (moment
of the recall) and the variable to assign (object of the recall). For individuals who are
interviewed every year this choice has virtually no effect, as their employment sequences are
constructed simply using for each given year the information provided in the interview of the
same year. For the others, this choice is meant to limit the amount of measurement error
generated by imperfect recall. We noticed that individuals often change their answer to the
lenght of the current spell or modify the order or the nature of a job spell, even after years.
This implies that without fixing a maximum time difference for assigning the variables, we
137
would end up with a dataset that included pieces of different spell, oftern misreported, one
after the other.
Employment Status Imputation of Friends
Individuals are asked about the employment status of their friends once per two years.
What is available in the basic structure of the BHPS is therefore a unique observation.
Unfortunately we cannot construct the job histories of friends, as no identification number
is reported. In order to keep the monthly frequency, we replicate the information on friends
over the following 12 months. This is done also to keep relatively large the sample size. Our
imputation procedure is based on the assumption that the employment status features a
relatively large degree of persistence over time. This is certainly true for employment spell,
as the job separation rate in the sample is small and implies long average job duration. It
is also true for unemployment spells, as the average unemployment spell duration is above
one year. By replicating the employment status in the following 12 months we are simply
assuming that those spells of friends are average ones. The only risk we bear is to misplace
them in time.
Sector Imputation of Unemployed
The unemployed, by definition, do not belong to any occupational sector. One might even
argue that unemployed are simply looking for some job, regardless of any occupational
classification. Instead, we believe that we gain useful insights by imputing sector of search
to the unemployed. From the data we see that individuals do not change occupational sector
often and, even when they do so, the change is usually not dramatic (e.g. movements from
sector 2 to sector 3). Moreover, it seems reasonable to think that individuals target their job
search to some particular sector of the economy, consistently with their educational level,
qualifications and past occupations. Therefore we treat unemployed workers -for which the
sector is in principle missing- as if they were still belonging to some occupational sector.
Furthermore, for the purpose of our analysis we need to assign them to some sector.
The problem is that we do not really know in which sector they are seeking jobs. The idea
behind our imputation is very simple: by logic, the sector where an unemployed worker finds
a job is just the sector where he was seeking jobs. The only limitation is that we assign the
whole unemployment spell to that particular sector, without allowing for movements across
sectors within the spell. When the sector after the unemployment spell is not reported,
then we use the previous sector. In any case, to limit the amount of measurement error
138
generated by our imputation, we only consider spells that immediately follow (or precede)
the unemployment spell of interest.
Educational and Occupational Classification
For constructing educational groups, we consider the highest educational qualification achieved
by individuals. The original variable contains more than ten possible values, with an elevated
degree of details. We collpase those ten groups into four. The first group corresponds to
those who hold a Bachelor’s degree or some higher degree. The second group includes the
individuals with a high school diploma or qualifications for teaching or nursing. Individuals
with an A level or O level fall into the third group. Finally, the fourth group is for those
who hold no qualification whatsoever.
With respect to the occupational classification, we follow the aggregation in major group of
the SOC as proposed by the Employment Department Group and the Office of Population
Cansuses and Surveys. The BHPS uses the SOC90 (Standard Occupational Classification),
a three-digit code, for describing occupations. At the most disaggregated level we have 347
categories, and in order to analyze the persistence across sectors we need to aggregate them.
We choose the aggregation in major groups (9 categories) as the one able to preserve some
substantial degree of persistence while keeping a satisfactory level of details.
For further details, refer to “Standard Occupational Classification - Structure and Definition
of Major, Minor and Unit Groups, Volume 1”
139
Representativeness of the BHPS sample
Figure 10. In-sample unemployment rate compared to the Harmonized Unemployment Rate in UK, 1991-2008 (Source:
OECD).
Appendix B - Additional Tables
Summary Statistics
Table 7. Summary statistics of labor market outcomes. Source: BHPS (1991-2008).
Variable Subsample Mean N
All Sample 6.15 1685930
Unemployment Rate Males 7.24 865469
Females 5.00 820051
All Sample 7.21 99532
Job Finding Rate Males 7.15 60356
Females 7.32 39121
All Sample 0.42 1549143
Job Separation Rate Males 0.49 786531
Females 0.34 762282
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Markov Matrices
Table 8. Markov matrix of occupational mobility: fathers when sons are 14-fathers over their life-cycle, relative frequencies.
Source: BHPS (1991-2008)
Father’s sector
when son is 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 59.32 4.41 6.16 7.32 6.31 1.63 6.33 7.10 1.42
2 16.03 68.07 9.13 3.07 0.72 0.33 1.12 0.66 0.86
3 11.72 11.11 54.46 10.82 4.28 0.18 4.85 1.01 1.58
4 14.72 2.10 2.60 49.86 3.38 8.08 15.22 4.04 0.00
5 5.16 2.54 3.89 1.85 65.88 3.19 0.37 12.75 4.37
6 9.54 0.19 18.41 21.96 3.61 38.66 1.94 3.51 2.18
7 27.79 0.00 1.59 9.95 4.58 0.00 33.60 18.49 4.01
8 8.24 3.47 1.08 1.11 8.91 1.86 1.15 70.11 4.07
9 14.81 15.68 0.50 4.16 12.28 5.45 4.18 22.36 20.59
Table 9. Markov matrix of occupational mobility: mothers when daughters are 14-mothers over their life-cycle, relative
fequencies. Source: BHPS (1991-2008)
Mother’s sector
when daughter is 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 46.01 0.00 6.78 21.68 0.00 16.29 1.54 6.36 1.33
2 0.98 62.87 19.81 7.57 0.00 0.94 0.00 2.29 5.53
3 1.61 7.20 69.76 4.66 0.72 10.90 0.76 0.68 3.70
4 17.05 3.21 5.88 62.81 0.88 2.11 5.04 0.27 2.75
5 2.25 0.00 3.56 43.34 12.66 9.10 16.60 6.94 5.53
6 13.49 2.59 6.14 12.88 0.23 46.58 6.44 1.68 9.97
7 7.61 5.80 1.91 12.83 4.92 13.02 40.40 0.81 12.70
8 3.02 0.98 13.06 28.24 9.71 3.59 8.00 28.41 4.98
9 7.08 4.60 5.21 6.17 0.28 12.29 12.83 3.19 48.34
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Descriptive Statistics of different groups
Table 10. Descriptive statistics (averages) of different groups: offspring of unemployed fathers, employed fathers and employed
fathers in their same occupational group. Source: BHPS (1991-2008).
Variable Father unemployed Father Employed Father in Same Sector
% Female 45 48 32
% Smoker 27 25 30
Age 21.44 22.22 23.49
% College-educated 6 12 13
% Married 6 10 13
% Non-White 7 3 1
Modal Sector 6 4 5
Diff-in-diff: Alternative Definition of Control Group
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3)
Emp.Status Job Finding Job Separation
Father’s emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.00415 -0.0254 -0.000894
(0.025) (0.037) (0.003)
Less than 11 yrs. of pot. experience -0.0563 -0.0876** 0.000791
(0.038) (0.043) (0.003)
Less than 11 yrs. of pot. experience* Father’s emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.0770** 0.103*** -0.00102
(0.036) (0.038) (0.003)
N 117110 8160 106833
R2 0.069 0.041 0.007
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 11. Difference-in-differences regressions of Employment Status. The control group is given by individuals with more
than 10 years of potential experience in the labor market. We report the coefficient of the employment status of father, of
belonging to the treatment group, the interaction term (the effect we want to estimate). Standard errors are clustered
at the father level. All regressions include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for education, gender, region of
residence, smoking behaviour, marital status, ethnicity, quarter, occupation of search/employment, defined according to the
assumptions described in Appendix A.
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Diff-in-diff: Heterogeneity Analysis
Dependent Variable
(1) (2)
Emp.Status Emp.Status
Father’s emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.0120 0.0155
(0.032) (0.026)
Younger than 27 -0.0834 -0.0613
(0.051) (0.040)
Younger than 27*Father’s emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.0856* 0.0802**
(0.051) (0.039)
Younger than 27*Father’s emp. status (2m, lagged)*Female -0.0307
(0.066)
Younger than 27*Father’s emp. status (2m, lagged)*College -0.105**
(0.052)
N 120460 120460
R2 0.068 0.064
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 12. Difference-in-differences regressions of Employment Status. The control group is given by individuals aged at least
27. We report the coefficient of the employment status of father, of belonging to the treatment group, the treatment
effect and the treatment effect interacted with Female in Column 1 and with College in Column 2 (the differential effect
we want to estimate). Interactions between Female (or College, respectively) and the Employment Status of Father and the
treatment group indicator are also included in the model, altough the coefficients are not reported. Standard errors are clustered
at the father level. All regressions include all controls previously discussed.
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Diff-in-diff: Regressions for Mother
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3)
Emp.Status Job Finding Job Separation
Mother’s emp. status (2m, lagged) -0.00894 0.0664*** 0.00394*
(0.027) (0.024) (0.002)
Younger than 27 -0.0779** 0.0283 0.00624
(0.040) (0.038) (0.005)
Younger than 27*Mother’s emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.0835** -0.0376 -0.00753
(0.039) (0.032) (0.005)
N 110711 7728 100897
R2 0.060 0.044 0.006
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 13. Difference-in-differences regressions of Employment Status, Job Finding and Job Separation. The control group is
given by individuals aged at least 27. We report the coefficient of the employment status of mother, of belonging to the
treatment group, the interaction term (the effect we want to estimate). Standard errors are clustered at the mother level.
All regressions include all controls previously discussed.
Appendix of Second Chapter
Derivations and Proofs
Empirical Prediction 2
Using the symmetry of the equilibrium, we can write the following:
P (w¯ = 1|w¯F = 1) = P (w¯ = 1|w¯F = 1; oF = A). (34)
Next, we define w¯j as a dummy taking value 1 when the joint event (w¯ = 1; o = j) is satisfied
(that is, the individual is a high–earner in occupation j). We can now rewrite the previous
expression as:
P (w¯ = 1|w¯FA = 1) = P (w¯A = 1|w¯FA = 1) + P (w¯B = 1|w¯FA = 1), (35)
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using the fact that w¯A = 1 and w¯B = 1 are mutually exclusive events. The first term of
Equation (35) can be calculated as follows:
P (w¯A = 1|w¯FA = 1) = P (o = A; τ = A|oF = A; τF = A) = (36)
= P (o = A|τ = A; oF = A; τF = A)P (τ = A|oF = A; τF = A) = ρ.
In contrast, the second term of Equation (35) can be rewritten as follows:
P (w¯B = 1|w¯FA = 1) = P (o = B; τ = B|oF = A; τF = A) = (37)
= P (o = B|τ = B; oF = A; τF = A)P (τ = B|oF = A; τF = A)
= (1− µ)(1− ρ).
By substituting the last two equations into (35), we arrive at the result.
Lemma 1
Proof. Taking the derivative of m∗ w.r.t. µ:
∂m∗
∂µ
=
−ρ(1 + µ(1− 2ρ))− (1− µρ)(1− 2ρ)
[1 + µ(1− 2ρ)]2
The numerator can be simplified to (1 + µ)(ρ − 1), which is clearly non–positive, ∀ ρ ≤ 1.
Therefore, ∂m∗
∂µ
≤ 0.
Taking the derivative of m∗ w.r.t. ρ:
∂m∗
∂ρ
=
−µ(1 + µ(1− 2ρ))− (1− µρ)(−2µ)
[1 + µ(1− 2ρ)]2
The numerator can be simplified to (1 +µ)µ, which is clearly non–negative, ∀ µ ≥ 0. There-
fore, ∂m∗
∂ρ
≥ 0.
Lemma 2
Proof. Taking the derivative of Ψ ∗ w.r.t. µ:
∂Ψ ∗
∂µ
=
(1− 2ρ)[1 + µ(1− 2ρ)− ρ− µ+ 2µρ]
[1 + µ(1− 2ρ)]2
The numerator can be simplified to (1− 2ρ)(1− ρ), which is clearly non–positive, ∀ ρ ≥ 1
2
.
Therefore, ∂Ψ∗
∂µ
≤ 0.
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Taking the derivative of Ψ ∗ w.r.t. ρ:
∂Ψ ∗
∂ρ
=
(1− 2µ)[1 + µ(1− 2ρ)] + 2µ[ρ+ µ− 2ρµ]
[1 + µ(1− 2ρ)]2
The numerator can be simplified to 1−µ, which is clearly non–negative, ∀ µ ≤ 1. Therefore,
∂Ψ∗
∂ρ
≥ 0.
Lemma 3
Proof. Taking the derivative of γ∗ w.r.t. µ:
∂γ∗
∂µ
= − [(1− Ψ
∗)(1 +N)− µ(1 +N)∂Ψ∗
∂µ
U∗ − (1− Ψ ∗)µ(1 +N)∂U∗
∂µ
(U∗)2
The numerator can be rearranged as
−
[
(1− Ψ)[(1 +N)U∗ − µ(1 +N)∂U∗
∂µ
]− µ(1 +N)∂Ψ∗
∂µ
U∗
]
.
The term µ(1 + N)∂Ψ∗
∂µ
U∗ is clearly non–positive, since ∂Ψ∗
∂µ
≤ 0. For the first term, it
suffices to show that: U∗ ≥ µ∂U∗
∂µ
. The left–hand side of this inequality can be written as
1 + µN + Ψ(1 − µ)n, while the right–hand side is: µN + µ∂Ψ∗
∂µ
(1 − µ)n − µΨn. Cancelling
terms yields: 1 + Ψ ∗n ≥ µ∂Ψ∗
∂µ
(1− µ)n, which is always satisfied, since ∂Ψ∗
∂µ
≤ 0. Hence, the
whole term in square brackets is non-negative, and therefore ∂γ
∗
∂µ
≤ 0.
Taking the derivative of γ∗ w.r.t. ρ yields:
∂γ∗
∂ρ
= −−µ(1 +N)
∂Ψ∗
∂ρ
− (1− Ψ ∗)µ(1 +N)∂Ψ∗
∂ρ
[(1− µ)n]
(U∗)2
The numerator can be rearranged to: ∂Ψ∗
∂ρ
[−µ(1 + N) − (1 − Ψ ∗)µ(1 + N)(1 − µ)n]. The
term in square brackets is non–positive, and the fact that ∂Ψ∗
∂ρ
≥ 0 completes the claim that
∂γ∗
∂ρ
≥ 0.
Lemma 4
We evaluate the free–entry condition at equilibrium:
q(θ∗)(1− β)(1 + γ∗a) = κ
The fact that q′(θ) < 0 implies that θ∗ adjusts to the new equilibrium in the same direction
as γ∗. The fact that ∂γ
∗
∂µ
≤ 0, ∂γ∗
∂ρ
≥ 0 (shown in Lemma 3) completes the claim that ∂θ∗
∂µ
≤ 0
and ∂θ∗
∂ρ
≥ 0.
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Proposition 1
We evaluate persistence at equilibrium:
P∗ = µ+ (1− µ)Ψ ∗
Taking the derivative of P∗ w.r.t. µ:
∂P∗
∂µ
= (1− µ)∂Ψ
∗
∂µ
+ (1− Ψ ∗)
The first term is negative, while the second is always positive. We can show that even in the
case of µ = 0 (that is, making the negative term as large as possible), the sum of the two is
still positive. To see this, we use some of the expressions derived earlier:
(1− Ψ ∗) = 1− ρ
[1 + µ(1− 2ρ)] ≥ −
(1− 2ρ)(1− ρ)
[1 + µ(1− 2ρ)]2 = −
∂Ψ ∗
∂µ
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that 1 ≥ −(1− 2ρ)(1− µ). Hence, ∂P∗
∂µ
≥ 0. We
now take the derivative of P∗ w.r.t. ρ:
∂P∗
∂ρ
= (1− µ)∂Ψ
∗
∂ρ
,
which is clearly positive, given that ∂Ψ∗
∂ρ
≥ 0.
Definition of different subgroups of workers
Father Same τ
Subgroup # Well–sorted as father Large Network Share
1 Yes Yes Yes mρµ
2 Yes Yes No mρ(1− µ)
3 Yes No Yes m(1− ρ)µ
4 Yes No No m(1− ρ)(1− µ)
5 No Yes Yes (1−m)ρµ
6 No Yes No (1−m)ρ(1− µ)
7 No No Yes (1−m)(1− ρ)µ
8 No No No (1−m)(1− ρ)(1− µ)
Table 14. Description of the different subgroups of workers.
Expression for m and P
m(m1, ...,m8) =
ρµm5 + ρ(1− µ)m6 + (1− ρ)µm7 + (1− ρ)(1− µ)m8
1 + ρµ(m5 −m1) + ρ(1− µ)(m6 −m2) + (1− ρ)µ(m7 −m3) + (1− ρ)(1− µ)(m8 −m4) .
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P(m,m1, ...,m8) = m
[
ρ(µm1 + (1− µ)m2) + (1− ρ)(µ(1−m3) + (1− µ)(1−m4))
]
(38)
+ (1−m)[ρ(µ(1−m5) + (1− µ)(1−m6)) + (1− ρ)(µm7 + (1− µ)m8)
]
.
∂WSP
∂m
∂m
∂mj
∣∣∣
~mSE
=
[
[p(θ)y(1 + a)− κθ](2ρ− 1)(1− µ)n+ p(θ)ya(2ρ− 1)µ(1 +N)
] ∂m
∂mj
∣∣∣
~mSE
> 0. (39)
Proposition 2: Depending on the parameter values, the SE allocation ~mSE does not necessarily coincide
with the efficient one.
• Under a > N1+N − N1+N κθp(θ)y (Condition a/N∗+) and a > n1−n − n1−n κθp(θ)y (Condition a/n∗∗+ ):
m∗,SP3 ,m
∗,SP
5 > 0; m
∗,SP
4 = m
∗,SP
6 = 1.
That is, the SP wants to achieve less mismatch than in the SE.
• Under a < N1+N − N1+N κθp(θ)y (Condition a/N∗−) and a < n1−n − n1−n κθp(θ)y (Condition a/n∗∗− ),
∃ρ¯ > 12 such that ∀ρ < ρ¯ : m∗,SP3 = m∗,SP5 = 0; m∗,SP4 ,m∗,SP6 < 1.
That is, the SP wants to achieve more mismatch than in the SE.
Proof. First notice that, under ~mSE = {1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1}, the reallocation effect is always strictly positive:
∂WSP
∂m
∂m
∂mj
∣∣∣
~mSE
=
[
[p(θ)y(1 + a)− κθ](2ρ− 1)(1− µ)n+ p(θ)ya(2ρ− 1)µ(1 +N)
] ∂m
∂mj
∣∣∣
~mSE
> 0. (40)
Intuitively, the strength of this effect depends on the size of ρ. The larger ρ is, the more scope the SP has to
sort workers according to productivity, so that fewer workers have a tradeoff in the next period. It can be
seen that as ρ→ 12 , ∂W
SP
∂m
∂m
∂mj
∣∣∣
~mSE
→ 0. When productive types are nearly independent across generations,
the SP can align productive advantage and networks to a very limited extent (in the limit, he cannot do so
at all).
Inspection of the inner effect, evaluated at the SE allocation, reveals that ∂W
SP
∂m1
, ∂W
SP
∂m2
, ∂W
SP
∂m7
, ∂W
SP
∂m8
>
0. This implies that m∗,SP1 = m
∗,SP
2 = m
∗,SP
7 = m
∗,SP
8 = 1. It remains to find the optimal values of m3,m4,
m5 and m6.
It is important to remember that under the SE allocation, the reallocation effect (RE) is positive.
The first statement of Proposition 2 follows from the fact that ∂W
SP
∂m3
∣∣∣
~mSE
, ∂W
SP
∂m5
∣∣∣
~mSE
> 0 under Condition
(a/N∗+), along with
∂WSP
∂m4
∣∣∣
~mSE
, ∂W
SP
∂m6
∣∣∣
~mSE
> 0 under Condition (a/n∗∗+ ).
The second statement of Proposition 2 follows from the fact that ∂W
SP
∂m3
∣∣∣
~mSE
, ∂W
SP
∂m5
∣∣∣
~mSE
< 0 under Condition
(a/N∗−), along with
∂WSP
∂m4
∣∣∣
~mSE
, ∂W
SP
∂m6
∣∣∣
~mSE
< 0 under Condition (a/n∗∗− ) and the fact that the RE → 0 as
ρ→ 12 .
Note that these are only sufficient conditions. Given that the RE is positive, there will be additional regions
of the parameter space in which the statements are true.
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Proposition 3
We focus on equilibria in which ηV (θ) ≥ (1 − β), so that the indirect effect (GE effect) of an increase in µ
(ρ) is negative (positive). We provide a sufficient condition for the direct effect of an increase in µ (ρ) to
also be negative (positive). The direct effect of µ is given by:
∂W
∂µ
= 2 [p(θ)(1 + γa)y − κθ] ∂U
∂µ
+ 2p(θ)ayU
∂γ
∂µ
Replacing ∂γ∂µ with the expression found in Lemma 3 and regrouping terms yields:
[
U2(1 + γa)β + a(1− Ψ)µ(1 +N)] ∂U
∂µ
≤ a
[
(1− Ψ)(1 +N)− µ(1 +N)∂Ψ
∂µ
]
Replacing ∂U∂µ = N +
∂Ψ
∂µ (1− µ)n− Ψn and defining A ≡ [U2(1 + γa)β + a(1− Ψ)µ(1 +N)], we get:
−a(1− Ψ)(1 +N) ≤ −aµ(1 +N)∂Ψ
∂µ
−A
[
(1− µ)n∂Ψ
∂µ
+ (Ψn−N)
]
It can easily be verified that (1− µ)n∂Ψ∂µ ≤ N − Ψn if the following condition is satisfied:
N
n
≤ (1− 2ρ)(1− ρ)(1− µ)n
[1 + µ(1− 2ρ)]2 +
ρ+ µ− 2ρµ
[1 + µ(1− 2ρ)]
Hence, dWdµ ≤ 0.
In the text we have already shown that ∂W∂ρ has to be non–negative. As a consequence,
dW
dρ ≥ 0, since it is
the sum of two positive components.
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Worker Flows
The evolution of the stock of unemployed and employed workers is the result of optimal relocation decisions,
age shocks and labor market shocks (creation of new matches and destruction of existing ones). Define
gkΩ(Ω˜) = P (Ω
′ = Ω|Ω˜) to be the probability measure that a worker of type Ω˜ with employment status k
changes to type Ω in the following period. This probability is defined over the multidimensional distribution
of Ω. In particular, it involves changes in: the temporary preference vectors (his own or his father’s),
occupation–specific human capital and networks stocks (his own or his father’s), father’s occupation or
employment status.
Define u′o,F (Ω) to be the subsequent period’s measure of unemployed fathers of type Ω in occupation
o:
u′o,F (Ω) =
∫
Ω
[
uˆo,F (Ω˜) (1−RUo,F (Ω˜)) (1− po,F (Ω˜)) gUΩ(Ω˜) (41)
+eˆo,F (Ω˜) (1−REo,F (Ω˜)) δ gEΩ(Ω˜)
]
dΩ˜
+
∑
o˜6=o
∫
Ω
[
uˆo˜,F (Ω˜)R
U
o˜,F (Ω˜) + eˆo˜,F (Ω˜)R
E
o˜,F (Ω˜)
]
·1{j∗F (Ω˜) = o} (1− po,F (Ω˜)) gUΩ(Ω˜) dΩ˜,
where uˆo,F = uo,F (1− ζ) + uo,S ζ, and eˆo,F = eo,F (1− ζ) + eo,S ζ. These are the measures of workers after
the age shock, that is they include fathers who did not die, as well as sons who became fathers.
Equation (41) is composed of four different terms: the first two refer respectively to unemployed workers
in occupation o who decided not to relocate and did not find a job, and employed workers in occupation o
who did not relocate and lost their job; the last two are (unemployed and employed) workers who decided
to relocate into occupation o but did not find a job in the previous period.
For employed fathers, e′o(Ω) is defined as:
e′o,F (Ω) =
∫
Ω
[
eˆo,F (Ω˜) (1−REo,F (Ω˜)) (1− δ) gEΩ(Ω˜) (42)
+uˆo,F (Ω˜) (1−RUo,F (Ω˜)) po,F (Ω˜) gUΩ(Ω˜)
]
dΩ˜
+
∑
o˜6=o
∫
Ω
[
uˆo˜,F (Ω˜)R
U
o˜,F (Ω˜) + eˆo˜,F (Ω˜)R
E
o˜,F (Ω˜)
]
·1{j∗F (Ω˜) = o} po,F (Ω˜) gUΩ(Ω˜) dΩ˜.
The stock of employed is made up of workers who were already employed in the previous period in the same
occupation and did not lose their job nor did they find it profitable to relocate, and the mass of unemployed
workers who did not want to relocate and found a vacancy, plus all workers who had just relocated into
occupation o and found a job.
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The distribution of employed sons, is exactly symmetric to that of the fathers:
e′o,S(Ω) =
∫
Ω
[
(1− ζ)eo,S(Ω˜) (1−REo,S(Ω˜)) (1− δ) gEΩ(Ω˜) (43)
+(1− ζ)uo,S(Ω˜) (1−RUo,S(Ω˜)) po,S(Ω˜) gUΩ(Ω˜)
]
dΩ˜
+
∑
o˜6=o
∫
Ω
[
(1− ζ)uo˜,S(Ω˜)RUo˜,S(Ω˜) + (1− ζ)eo˜,S(Ω˜)REo˜,S(Ω˜)
]
·1{j∗S(Ω˜) = o} po,S(Ω˜) gUΩ(Ω˜) dΩ˜.
Finally, the distribution of unemployed sons is as follows:
u′o,S(Ω) =
∫
Ω
[
(1− ζ)uo,S(Ω˜) (1−RUo,S(Ω˜)) (1− po,S(Ω˜)) gUΩ(Ω˜) (44)
+(1− ζ)eo,S(Ω˜) (1−REo,S(Ω˜)) δ gEΩ(Ω˜)
]
dΩ˜
+
∑
o˜6=o
∫
Ω
[
(1− ζ)uo˜,S(Ω˜)RUo˜,S(Ω˜) + (1− ζ)eo˜,S(Ω˜)REo˜,S(Ω˜)
]
·1{j∗S(Ω˜) = o} (1− po,S(Ω˜)) gUΩ(Ω˜) dΩ˜
+ζ
1{Ω ∈ ΩNB}∫
Ω
1{Ω ∈ ΩNB} ,
with the only difference being the last term, which represents the flow of newborns, randomly directed to
the subset ΩNB of the entire state space.
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Other Figures and Tables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Son is in: Occ. 1 Occ. 2 Occ. 3 Occ. 4 Occ. 5 Occ. 6 Occ. 7 Occ. 8 Occ. 9
Father is in:
Occ. 1 0.0335∗∗∗
(0.003)
Occ. 2 0.0365∗∗∗
(0.003)
Occ. 3 0.0550∗∗∗
(0.005)
Occ. 4 0.0411∗∗∗
(0.005)
Occ. 5 0.151∗∗∗
(0.004)
Occ. 6 0.0398∗∗∗
(0.005)
Occ. 7 0.0159∗∗∗
(0.006)
Occ. 8 0.127∗∗∗
(0.003)
Occ. 9 0.105∗∗∗
(0.006)
N 62114 62114 62114 62114 62114 62114 62114 62114 62114
R2 0.073 0.196 0.079 0.047 0.106 0.053 0.076 0.084 0.089
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15. Regressions of Occupational Choice (dummy that takes a value of 1 if the offspring is in a given occupation, 0
otherwise); coefficient for father in a given occupation (dummy variable, 0 if the father is in some other occupation),
standard errors. All models are linear probability models, and include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for
education, region of residence, smoking behavior, marital status, ethnicity and quarter. Occupational codes are as defined
in Table 2.1: 1) Managers & Administrators; 2) Professional; 3) Associate Professional; 4) Clerical & Secretarial; 5) Craft
& Related; 6) Personal & Protective Service; 7) Sales; 8) Plant & Machine; 9) Agriculture & Elementary. Source: BHPS
(1991–2008).
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Occ. code Occupational group Likelihood Ratio Occ. Share
11 Production Managers in Manuf., Construction 6.23 0.0133
12 Specialist Managers 2.03 0.0210
13 Office Managers 0.00 0.0129
14 Managers in Transport and Storing 4.69 0.0084
16 Managers in Farming 33.05 0.0084
17 Managers in Service Industry 1.92 0.0301
19 Managers and Administrators NEC 3.04 0.0083
21 Engineers and Technologists 4.79 0.0144
22 Health Professionals 0.00 0.0064
23 Teaching Professionals 1.67 0.0112
25 Business and Financial Professionals 12.19 0.0102
31 Draughtspersons 1.77 0.0109
32 Computer Analyst/Programmers 0.00 0.0301
34 Health Associate Professionals 10.66 0.0066
36 Business and Financial Associate Professionals 6.23 0.0186
37 Social Welfare Associate Professionals 0.00 0.0051
38 Literary, Artistic and Sports Professionals 3.01 0.0264
39 Associate Professionals and Technical Occ.s NEC 2.52 0.0056
40 Administrative/Clerical Officers 2.71 0.0088
41 Numerical Clerks and Cashiers 0.00 0.0380
42 Filing and Record Clerks 2.05 0.0188
43 Clerks 0.82 0.0285
44 Stores and Despatch Clerks 3.16 0.0276
50 Construction Trades 5.81 0.0424
51 Metal Machining 1.64 0.0363
52 Electrical/Electronic Trades 6.43 0.0541
53 Metal Forming, Welding and Related 2.57 0.0360
54 Vehicle Traders 5.78 0.0317
57 Woodworking Trades 7.81 0.0322
58 Food Preparation Trades 29.71 0.0103
59 Other Craft and Related Occupations NEC 0.50 0.0185
61 Security and Protective Service 5.08 0.0059
62 Catering Occupations 3.20 0.0268
71 Sales Representatives 1.72 0.0166
72 Sales Assistants and Check-out Operators 0.28 0.0534
80 Food, Drink and Tobacco Process Operatives 35.81 0.0086
82 Chemicals, Paper, Plastics Operatives 5.42 0.0120
84 Metal Working Process Operatives 3.82 0.0088
85 Assemblers/Lineworkers 5.16 0.0132
86 Other Routine Process Operatives 3.51 0.0148
87 Road Transport Operatives 4.54 0.0320
88 Other Transport and Machinery Operatives 7.25 0.0055
89 Plant and Machine Operatives NEC 4.09 0.0138
90 Other Occ.s in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 16.96 0.0108
92 Other Occ.s in Construction 11.78 0.0096
94 Other Occ.s in Communication 0.42 0.0080
95 Other Occ.s in Sales and Services 9.22 0.0336
99 Other Occ.s NEC 0.45 0.0120
Average (unweighted) 5.69
Average (weighted) 4.71
Table 16. Occupational Persistence (Likelihood Ratios), 2–digit level. The table presents the likelihood ratios for
occupations in which at least 0.5% of the workforce are employed, due to the limited size of the sample. Averages are taken
with respect to all occupations, including the ones not reported in the table. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
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Occupational sector Likelihood Ratio
Bottom 33% Mid 33% Top 33%
Managers & Administrators 1.49 0.82 1.51
Professional 2.93 2.61 2.35
Associate Professional & Technical 1.40 1.84 1.60
Clerical & Secretarial 1.43 1.45 1.01
Craft & Related 1.64 1.57 1.46
Personal & Protective Service 1.81 2.72 0.50
Sales 0.99 1.56 1.47
Plant & Machine 2.49 1.48 1.88
Agriculture & Elementary 3.02 2.31 2.72
Average (unweighted) 1.91 1.82 1.61
Average (weighted) 1.79 1.63 1.65
Table 17. Occupational Persistence Indexes, by Father’s Income (Likelihood Ratios). Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
Figure 11. Plot of Average Persistence Index (weighted average of occupation–specific likelihood ratios, by region) vs. Average
Regional Wage. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
154
Figure 12. Plot of Average Persistence Index (weighted average of occupation–specific likelihood ratios, by region) vs. Herfind-
ahl index of occupations (at the 1–digit level) . Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
Occupational sector Likelihood Ratio
(contemporaneous) <20 20-25 25-30 30+
Managers & Administrators 1.78 1.46 1.28 1.20
Professional 3.83 2.36 2.62 2.33
Associate Professional & Technical 2.05 0.91 1.86 2.27
Clerical & Secretarial 1.50 0.73 1.15 2.23
Craft & Related 1.32 1.48 1.73 1.68
Personal & Protective Service 1.19 1.53 2.69 0.61
Sales 1.55 1.45 0.98 1.49
Plant & Machine 1.27 2.07 2.06 1.89
Agriculture & Elementary 2.48 2.31 2.86 4.51
Average (unweighted) 1.88 1.59 1.91 2.03
Average (weighted) 1.62 1.49 1.83 1.92
Table 18. Occupational Persistence Indexes, by Son’s Age Group (Likelihood Ratios). Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
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Dependent Variable: Job–Finding Rate
(1) (2) (3)
POLS RE FE
Panel A
Father in same occupation (pii,t) 0.0481*** 0.0497** 0.0564**
(0.016) (0.020) (0.025)
Average in–sample JF 0.125 0.125 0.125
N 4098 4098 4098
R2 0.055 - 0.047
Number of pairs - 400 400
Panel B
Father in same occupation (pii,t) 0.0821*** 0.0793** 0.0882**
(0.025) (0.032) (0.039)
Average in–sample JF 0.115 0.115 0.115
N 2093 2093 2093
R2 0.084 - 0.074
Number of pairs - 212 212
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 19. Robustness Checks: Regressions of job–finding rate (transition from Unemployed to Employed); coefficient for
father in same occupation (dummy variable), standard errors and average job–finding rate in the regression sample. Model
1 is a pooled OLS regression, model 2 is a random effects GLS regression, and model 3 is a fixed effects regression. All models
include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for education, gender, region of residence, smoking behavior, marital
status, ethnicity, quarter and occupation of search/employment. In Panel A, we exclude the spells of self–employment from the
estimation. In Panel B, we exclude all the workers who report having been self–employed at least once in their lifetime. Source:
BHPS (1991–2008).
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Figure 13. Average marginal effect of pii,t (coefficient of Column 1 of Table 2.3), by age group. The red line is the average
marginal effect for the entire sample. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
Dependent Variable: Job–Finding Rate
(1) (2)
Father in same occupation (pii,t) 0.0404∗∗ 0.0437∗∗
(0.018) (0.018)
Father with high tenure (dummy: 1 if above average) (hti,t) -0.0266∗
(0.014)
Interaction term (pi∗i,thti,t) 0.0634
(0.039)
Log of father’s tenure in years (log (ti,t)) -0.00512
(0.006)
Interaction term (pi∗i,t log (ti,t)) 0.0207
(0.014)
N 4142 3726
R2 0.059 0.062
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 20. Robustness Checks: Regressions of job–finding rate (transition from Unemployed to Employed); coefficient for
father in same occupation (dummy variable), father with high tenure (dummy variable), father’s occ. tenure (log),
interaction terms and standard errors. Both models are pooled OLS regressions. All models include a third-degree polyno-
mial in age and dummies for education, gender, region of residence, smoking behavior, marital status, ethnicity, quarter and
occupation of search/employment. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
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Figure 14. Wage profiles by proportion of job spell with the father in the same occupation. In the upper graph, groups are
defined with respect to the entire job spell length. In the lower graph, groups are defined with respect to the start of the job
spell. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
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Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS RE POLS RE FE
Panel A
Share of time in occ. of father (qi) -0.134*** -0.155***
(0.016) (0.031)
Father in same occupation (pii,t) -0.073*** -0.032** -0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
N 6324 6324 4664 4664 4664
R2 0.617 - 0.602 - 0.639
Number of pairs - 908 - 833 833
Panel B
Share of time in occ. of father (qi) -0.0967*** -0.109***
(0.015) (0.029)
Father in same occupation (pii,t) -0.050*** -0.019 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
N 5664 5664 4159 4159 4159
R2 0.547 - 0.540 - 0.606
Number of pairs - 866 - 788 788
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 21. Robustness Checks: Regressions of Log Hourly Wage; coefficient for share of time spent in same occupation
as father (from 0 to 1), standard errors and father in same occupation (dummy variable). Models 1 and 3 are pooled OLS
regressions, models 2 and 4 are random effects GLS regressions, and model 5 is a fixed effects regression. All models include
a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for education and occupation, second–order polynomials in occupational tenure
and potential labor market experience, firm size, region of residence, smoking behavior, marital status, ethnicity and year.
Panel A excludes from the estimating sample all wage observations above percentile 99 or below percentile 1. Panel B excludes
from the estimating sample all wage observations above percentile 95 or below percentile 5. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
Dependent Variable: Occupational Persistence Rate
(1) (2)
Father’s log wage 0.0419∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016)
Log wage -0.0779∗∗∗
(0.017)
Avrage in–sample Persistence Rate 0.172 0.172
N 3467 3467
R2 0.134 0.139
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 22. Regressions of Occupational Persistence (being in the same occupation as the father); coefficient of father’s log
wage and log wage, standard errors and average job–finding rate in the regression sample. Both models are pooled OLS
regressions. All models include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for education, gender, region of residence,
smoking behavior, marital status, ethnicity, quarter, and occupation of search/employment. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
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Figure 15. Plot of Average Policy Function (Occupational Choice), for unemployed workers with comparative advantage and
preference in the same occupation as the father. Source: BHPS (1991–2008).
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Appendix of Third Chapter
Appendix A - The Data
Penn World Tables 7.1: this data is collected by the Center for International Comparisons at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania (CICUP). It provides PPP and national income accounts converted to international
prices for 189 countries for some of (or all) the years between 1950 and 2010.
GGDC 10–Sector Database: it is collected by the Growth and Development Center of the University of
Groningen. It provides a long–run internationally comparable series of persons employed and productivity
performance for 10 broad sectors of the economy (Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities, Construc-
tion, Trade Services, Transport Services, Business Services, Government Services and Personal Services).
The series are for 11 countries in Africa, 11 countries in Asia, 2 countries in the Middle East and North
Africa, and 9 in Latin-America. Data for the US and several European countries are also available. Value
added data are expressed in local currencies. The data span the period 1948–2012 but the sample period
depends on the specific country and series. We only consider the periods for which the employment data is
available. Overall, almost all of the countries are in our sample in the period 1960–2010. Table 24 summa-
rizes the countries and the sample periods used in our analysis.
World Income Inequality Database: it is collected by UNU–WIDER and provides several measures
of income inequality for both developed and developing countries. In addition to the Gini coefficient and
quintile and decile shares, survey means and medians along with the income shares of the richest 5% and
the poorest 5% are also available.
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Table 24. GGDC 10–Sector Database. Countries and Sample Periods.
Sub–Saharan Africa Asia
Country Sample Period Country Sample Period
Botswana 1964–2010 China 1952–2011
Ethiopia 1961–2010 Hong Kong 1974–2011
Ghana 1960–2010 India 1960–2010
Kenya 1969–2010 Indonesia 1961–2012
Malawi 1966–2010 Japan 1953–2012
Mauritius 1970–2010 Korea 1963–2011
Nigeria 1960–2011 Malaysia 1975–2011
Ghana 1960–2010 Philippines 1971–2012
Senegal 1970–2010 Singapore 1970–2011
South Africa 1960–2010 Taiwan 1963–2012
Tanzania 1960–2010 Thailand 1960–2011
Latin America Europe
Country Sample Period Country Sample Period
Argentina 1950–2011 Germany 1950–1991
Bolivia 1950–2010 Denmark 1948–2011
Brazil 1950–2011 Spain 1950–2011
Chile 1950–2012 France 1950–2011
Colombia 1950–2010 United Kingdom 1948–2011
Costa Rica 1950–2011 Italy 1951–2011
Mexico 1950–2012 Netherlands 1950–2011
Peru 1960–2011 Sweden 1950–2011
Venezuela 1950–2011
North Africa North America
Country Sample Period Country Sample Period
Egypt 1960–2012 United States 1950–2010
Morocco 1960–2012
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Appendix B - Additional Material
On TFP differentials as a source of Structural Change
In this section we explore whether existing theories of supply-driven structural change –that rely on produc-
tivity differentials across sectors in order to explain the reallocation of labor– can account for the observed
patterns. In particular, Ngai and Pissarides (2007) postulate a theory according to which, under an elas-
ticity of substitution smaller than 1, labor should flow into the sector that experiences the smallest TFP
growth. In order to test this theory, we construct measures of sectoral TFP exploiting data on value added
and employment at a disaggregated level16. Abstracting from capital as a production factor and assuming
a production function linear in labor, TFP is accordingly defined as output per labor unit (as shown in
Equation 45).
Yj,t = Aj,tLj,t =⇒ Aj,t = Yj,t
Lj,t
(45)
where Yj,t and Lj,t are respectively value added produced and employed labor force in sector j at time
t. Defining Xˆt as the growth rate of variable X at time t, the theory in Ngai and Pissarides (2007) implies
the following relationship:
Lˆj,t − Lˆi,t = (1− )(Aˆi,t − Aˆj,t) (46)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between goods, which is assumed to be constant. The consensus
in the empirical literature is that  < 1, therefore implying a negative relationship between (relatively
larger) TFP growth and (relatively larger) labor inflow17. When we have more than 2 sectors, very similar
relationships apply: those sectors experiencing a larger (than average) TFP growth are the ones shrinking in
terms of employment shares. In order to test these predictions, we first compute the sectoral TFP growth18,
then we aggregate it into the average TFP growth and eventually we compute the difference between the
two growth rates. This difference should negatively correlate with the labor inflow. Surprisingly, Figure 16
shows that the reallocation of labor across sectors does not strictly follow productivity dynamics as implied
by Ngai and Pissarides19. Even though the sign of the correlation in most of the cases tends to be negative as
suggested by the theory, coefficients are very small and often not statistically significant. Moreover, the large
dispersion of the observations in the scatter plots means that a supply-driven theory of structural change
would fall short at accounting for the patterns observed in the data. This suggests that when accounting for
structural change, at least part of the dynamics is explained by changes in the demand.
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Figure 16. The vertical axis measures the net inflow/outflow from a given sector. The horizontal axis measures the sectoral
TFP growth, relative to the average one, lagged 5 years. Observations are 5-year averages. The sectors are, respectively:
Agriculture, Manufacturing, Construction, Trade Services, Government Services, Personal Services. (Source: Penn World
Tables, 10SD).
Dependent Variable: Log GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Sample Top 50% Bottom 50% Bottom 33% Middle Top 33%
Agr. Emp. Share -3.190*** -2.312*** -5.218*** -2.331*** -2.731*** -5.417***
(0.060) (0.063) (0.080) (0.070) (0.106) (0.095)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1583 970 613 711 491 381
R2 0.648 0.590 0.877 0.615 0.579 0.898
Number of Countries 36 19 17 14 10 12
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 25. Linear Regression of log GDP per capita against agriculture employment share. The coefficient is estimated
separately for the whole sample (column 1) and for different parts of the distribution of countries by income inequality in the
period 1970-2010 (columns 2 to 6). Only observations with agriculture employment share of at least 0.1 are kept in the sample.
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Dependent Variable: Log GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agr. Emp. Share -5.419*** -4.325*** -3.571*** -4.288***
(0.079) (0.110) (0.099) (0.117)
Agr. Emp. Share*High–Inequality 3.068*** 2.895*** 2.160*** 2.724***
(0.102) (0.098) (0.100) (0.119)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes
Other controls No No Yes Yes
Controls for Nat. Resources No No Yes Yes
N 2099 2099 2099 1507
R2 0.747 0.776 0.849 0.820
Number of Countries 41 41 41 39
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 26. Estimated coefficients for agriculture employment share and interaction term with high–inequality dummy (being in
the top 50%). Controls include size of the country (total population), degree of openness, composition of GDP (consumption,
investment and public expenditure), dependence on natural resources.
Other Material
Appendix B - Proofs
Lemma 2
The first statement follows from the fact that the willingness to pay for a given good j is strictly decreasing in j,
together with the fact that technologies are the same across goods. To see this, take the derivative w.r.t. j of the
LHS of Equation 3.4. Now, suppose that some good j is not consumed in equilibrium but instead some good j′, with
j′ > j, is being consumed. The producer of j′ is necessarily making non-negative profits, and would do so a fortiori
for good j (for which the willingness to pay is higher). Then there is incentive for firms to produce and sell j.
The second statement follows from the fact that the willingness to pay for each given good j is increasing in the
income level. To prove it formally, assume that we are in BGP and suppose that NR ≤ NP . Then, it follows that
CRa > C
P
a must hold, the present value budget constraint of rich households would not be satisfied. From these two
inequalities it follows that C
R
a
NR
>
CPa
NP
. Now, evaluate equation 3.4 for both types of households for j = NP . For the
poor, it must be that the LHS is larger or equal to the RHS. Instead, for the rich it must be that the LHS is strictly
smaller than the RHS. Taking the ratio between equation 3.3 and equation 3.4 for each type of household, you get
the following two inequalities:
16The 10-Sector Database allows us to have data on 10 sectors of the economy: Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities,
Construction, Trade Services, Business Services, Government Services and Personal Services.
17Assuming a stationary population, these relationships apply also in relative terms (employment shares).
18We use 5-year windows.
19We only report the figures for a selection of sectors (all the others feature very similar dynamics), for all countries. We
have also investigated this relationship separately for high–inequality and low–inequality countries, and similar conclusions
can be drawn for both samples. Observations are 5-year averages, consistently with the long-run horizon of structural change
phenomenon.
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Table 27. Movements of Labor across the 10 Sectors. Cumulative total outflow, total inflow and net inflow by sector and by
Income Inequality group. Results are in percentage points of total employment.
Sector Statistics High Inequality Low Inequality
Tot. Outflow -38.30 -35.98
Agriculture Tot. Inflow 9.30 8.94
Net Inflow -29.01 -27.04
Tot. Outflow -3.06 -1.63
Mining Tot. Inflow 2.35 0.83
Net Inflow -0.71 -0.81
Tot. Outflow -11.22 -14.33
Manufacturing Tot. Inflow 11.13 11.55
Net Inflow -0.09 -2.78
Tot. Outflow -1.07 -0.65
Utilities Tot. Inflow 1.16 0.68
Net Inflow 0.09 0.03
Tot. Outflow -7.30 -5.65
Construction Tot. Inflow 10.61 7.89
Net Inflow 3.31 2.23
Tot. Outflow -6.53 -4.28
Trade Services Tot. Inflow 18.54 12.11
Net Inflow 12.00 7.83
Tot. Outflow -3.00 -2.59
Transport Services Tot. Inflow 5.69 3.48
Net Inflow 2.70 0.88
Tot. Outflow -2.07 -1.05
Business Services Tot. Inflow 7.54 8.86
Net Inflow 5.47 7.81
Tot. Outflow -3.07 -4.86
Government Services Tot. Inflow 7.05 13.07
Net Inflow 3.98 8.20
Tot. Outflow -8.83 -2.72
Personal Services Tot. Inflow 11.09 6.14
Net Inflow 2.26 3.42
Tot. Outflow -4.29 -3.86
All Services Tot. Inflow 21.69 29.01
Net Inflow 17.40 25.16
Lemma 3
Suppose not. Then there exists at least one good j such that Y Oj > 0 and Y Nj > 0. As implied by the FOC, under
free competition POj = ψ
O
χ
. Let us now consider PNj : it cannot be higher than POj , otherwise the monopolist would
attract no demand; it cannot be lower than POj , otherwise nobody would buy from the competitive fringe. The only
possibility is that POj = PNj . But in such a case, the monopolist would have an incentive to cut the price by  and
get the whole market. We conclude that this cannot be an equilibrium.
α
1− α
1
1− γ
NP (t)
CPa (t)
≤ 1
PNP (t)
(47)
α
1− α
1
1− γ
NR(t)
CRa (t)
>
1
PNP (t)
(48)
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Table 28. Average Yearly Labor Productivity Growth for the 10 Sectors, by Inequality Group.
Sector High-Inequality Low-Inequality
Agriculture 1.62 3.55
Mining 2.06 2.92
Manufacturing 1.88 3.52
Utilities 3.22 4.37
Construction -0.05 1.49
Trade Services -0.27 1.93
Transport Services 1.69 3.46
Business Services 0.97 2.08
Government Services 0.25 1.61
Personal Services 1.09 1.58
All Services 0.47 1.74
Combining equation 47 and equation 48, we get:
CPa (t)
NP (t)
≥ C
R
a (t)
NR(t)
(49)
which implies that C
P
a
NP
≥ CRa
NR
. This is in contradiction with C
R
a
NR
>
CPa
NP
, which was stated above. Hence, it must
be the case that NP < NR in a BGP. Now, given that both households face the same interest rate, the growth rate
of NP and NR will be the same in equilibrium. This implies that also along the transition, NP (t) < NR(t).
Equilibrium Characterization without Assumption UC
We need to distinguish two cases here: j∗(t) > NP (t) (Case 1) and j∗(t) ≤ NP (t) (Case 2). This is because
only producers that have adopted the modern technology (monopolists) behave strategically when setting the price.
Therefore, depending on whether monopolists have an incentive in cutting the price in order to enlarge their demand
(that is, whether they are all selling to the whole market or not), equilibrium prices will be different.
Lemma 11 (Equilibrium Pricing). Under Case 1 (j∗(t) > NP (t)), equilibrium prices are as follows:
Pj(t) =

ψO
χ
if j ≤ NP (t)
(
PNP (t)
ψO/χ
) 1
γ(
NP (t)
j
)γ
PNP (t) if NP (t)
(
PNP (t)
ψO/χ
) 1
γ
< j ≤ NP (t)
ψO
χ
if NP (t) < j ≤ NR(t)
(50)
where PNP (t) = [piψ
O + (1− pi)ψN ]/χ.
Under Case 2 (j∗(t) ≤ NP (t)) equilibrium prices are flat: Pj(t) = ψOχ ∀j.
Proof. Case 1. Under Case 1, a flat pricing profile cannot be an equilibrium. To see why, consider the producer of
the good NP + , with  small enough. By continuity of the willingness to pay of households, there exists a price
cut P small enough such that the producer of NP +  increases his profits by cutting his price to ψO/χ − P and
discretely increasing the quantity sold from pi to 1. In order to avoid this, in equilibrium the producer of NP will set
his price as to exactly make the producer of NP +  indifferent between his current profits and the ones he would
obtain by cutting the price. : 1(PNP (t) − ψN/χ) = pi(ψO − ψN )/χ. Now consider the producers on the left of NP .
They are also threatened by the potential price cut of the producer of NP + . At the same time, they have the
advantage that consumers strictly prefer their good relative to NP + . Making consumers indifferent between their
goods and the good of the producer who can potentially cut the price (that is, equalizing the MRS to the relative
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Figure 17. Equilibrium prices of differentiated goods. NP = 8, NR = 10, pi = 0.3, ψN = 0.8, ψO = 1.2, χ = 1, γ = 0.5.
price) yields the following: Pj = (NPj )
γPNP . Notice that according to this formula, Pj →∞ as j → 0. At some point,
for j small enough, this constraint will be less stringent than the threat of the competitive fringe. For this reason,
for an interval of goods, the monopolist’s price will be given by the limit price (same price that would be charged by
the competitive fringe).
Case 2. Under Case 2, all monopolists are already maximizing the quantity sold. There have no incentive whatsoever
to cut down the price, as they cannot attract additional consumers. At the same time, the competitive fringe is not
fixing strategically the price. As a consequence, all monopolists will fix the price at the highest possible level.
Under Case 1, the price is discontinuous at NP , with a discrete jump in order to prevent competitors on the
right of the hierarchy from cutting the price and attracting additional demand. On the left of NP , there is an interval
of producers who also have to adjust their price, in order to keep their customers. The more me move to the left, the
more urgent the good becomes to the households and therefore producers can charge higher prices. In any case, the
price cannot be higher than ψ
O
χ
, otherwise consumers would buy from the competitive fringe. Finally, prices on the
right of NP have to be equal to the maximum possible price, ψ
O
χ
, regardless of whether these goods are produced by
a monopolist (until j∗) or by the competitive fringe (after j∗).
Under Case 2, instead, the pricing is simply flat, given that no monopolist has an incentive to reduce the price, as
they are already selling to the entire population.
In the following, denote jˆ(t) = NP (t)
(
PNP
(t)
ψO/χ
) 1
γ . This is the last good for which the pricing is affected by
potential price cuts of other producers. From the previous Lemma it follows that per-period operating profits are
decreasing over j.
Corollary 12. Under Case 1, profits have the following shape:
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Πj(t) =

ψO−ψN
χ
if j ≤ jˆ(t)[(
NP (t)
j
)γ
PNP (t)− ψ
N
χ
]
if jˆ < j ≤ NP
ψO−ψN
χ
pi if NP (t) < j ≤ NR(t)
(51)
Under Case 2 instead, profits are a step-function:
Πj(t) =

ψO−ψN
χ
if j ≤ NP
ψO−ψN
χ
pi if NP (t) < j ≤ NR(t)
(52)
Under Case 1, both the price and the quantity change over j. Let us look at NP : for that good, the quantity
has just discretely increased (from pi to 1), while the price has dropped discontinuously. The price drop is such that
it exactly offsets the increase in the quantity. From the point onwards, as we move to the left, the quantity stays
constant but the price increases continuously, until jˆ.
Under Case 2, the price is always constant, and the only thing we notice is the market size effect, which discretely
increases the profits at NP .
Figure 18. Equilibrium profits for differentiated goods. NP = 8, NR = 10, pi = 0.3, ψN = 0.8, ψO = 1.2, χ = 1, γ = 0.5.
Using equilibrium profits, we can write an expression for the value of innovation in each single good market. It
corresponds to the infinite stream of discounted profits accruing from the technological adoption. The expression for
Vj(t) reads as follows:
Vj(t) =

ψO−ψN
χ
∫∞
t
e−R(s,t)ds if j ≤ jˆ(t)∫∞
t
(
Pj(s)− ψNχ
)
e−R(s,t)ds if jˆ(t) < j ≤ NP (t)∫ t+∆Mj (t)
t
(
ψO−ψN
χ
pi
)
e−R(s,t)ds+
∫∞
t+∆Mj (t)
(
(Pj(s)− ψNχ )
)
e−R(s,t)ds if NP (t) < j ≤ NR(t)
(53)
where ∆Mj (t) is the waiting time for market j to become a mass market. That is, NP (t+∆Mj (t)) = j.
Notice that under Case 2, the expression for Vj(t) simplify to the following:
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Vj(t) =

ψO−ψN
χ
∫∞
t
e−R(s,t)ds if j ≤ NP (t)
ψO−ψN
χ
[∫ t+∆Mj (t)
t pie
−R(s,t)ds+
∫∞
t+∆Mj (t)
e−R(s,t)ds
]
if NP (t) < j ≤ NR(t)
(54)
Lemma 13. Innovation Values Vj(t) is a continuous and decreasing function of j, ∀t. The unique equilibrium in
which ∃ j | Y Oj > 0 and ∃ j′ | Y ′Nj > 0 (there is neither no adoption nor full adoption of modern technologies) must
be such that j∗ ≥ NP (Case 1 or a knife-edge condition of Case 2).
Proof. The continuity and monotonicity will be proven for Equation 53, as Equation 56 can be seen as a specific
case of the former. Trivially, the function is constant in j in the first interval. Moreover, notice that as j → jˆ,
Pj(s) → ψO/χ . Therefore, the function is continuous at j = jˆ. Finally, notice that as j → NP , ∆Mj → 0. This
proves the continuity of the function. The monotonicity follows from the following. In the first interval, the function
is constant and therefore monotonic. In the second interval, the price is a strictly decreasing function of j, as it follows
from the equilibrium pricing. Last, in the third interval, price, quantity and ∆Mj are changing over j. ∆Mj → 0 as
j → NP from the right. This implies that more and more weight is given to the second integral, rather than the
first one. Notice that the argument of the second integral (profits arising from selling to a mass market) is always
larger than the argument of the first integral, as Corollary 12 shows. Therefore, the value of innovation is strictly
decreasing in the third interval.
Technology Adoption Equilibrium: under Case 2, given the shape of the value of innovation, the only equilibrium
is such that F = (ψO−ψN )/χ ∫∞
t
e−R(s,t)ds, and in that case j∗ = NP . Instead, under Case 1, the interval of possible
equilibria is the following: j∗ ∈ (NP , NR]. Given that Vj(t) is strictly decreasing in that region and the fixed cost of
adoption is a constant, the equilibrium must be unique.
Lemma 14 (Optimal Consumption of Differentiated Goods). In equilibrium, Equation 3.4 must hold with equality
for both types of households.
Proof. Consider rich households, first. The pricing function for the last goods they consume is flat. That is, an
additional good could be produced and sold at ψO/χ. If the consumption choice is optimal, it must be the case that
they value the additional good less than ψO/χ. Given that the willingness to pay decays in a continuous fashion over
j, then for the last consumed j the FOC must hold with equality.
Now turn to poor households. If we are in Case 2, the same argument as for the rich applies. Instead, if we are in
Case 1, the willingness to pay for good NP cannot be higher than ψO/χ, otherwise the poor would just consume more
varieties. Similarly, it cannot be higher than PNP , otherwise there would be incentives for the producer of NP + 
(for  small enough) to cut his price. At the same time, it cannot be lower than PNP , as long as households are
optimizing their consumption choice. We conclude that it must be equal to PNP .
Balanced Growth Path
The rest of the analysis focuses on a Balanced Growth Path equilibrium, in which all variables grow at a constant
rate. From equation 3.22 it is clear that when the consumption growth rate is constant (gc(t) = gc ∀ t), the interest
rate will also be constant: r(t) = r ∀ t.
In a balanced growth path, the value of technological adoptions has a closed form. First, notice that in such a path it
is possible to solve exlicitely for the waiting time ∆Mj (t). NP (t)egc∆
M
j (t) = j implies that ∆Mj (t) =
log
(
j
NP (t)
)
gc
, where
gc is the constant growth rate of NP . The waiting time is increasing in the distance between NP (the frontier of mass
goods) and j, and decreasing in the rate of growth of such frontier. Second, substituting the fixed interest rate into
equation 53, and plugging in the expression for the equilibrium prices from equation 50, it is now possible to solve the
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integrals. Notice that in the interval j ∈ [jˆ(t), NP (t)], the price of good j starts at the level
(
NP (t)
j
)γ
PNP and then
grows at the constant rate gγ, until jˆ reaches j. At that point, the producer is not constrained by the competition of
the other monopolists anymore and can charge the maximum price (ψO/χ). In order to compute the infinite stream
of profits, we first need to define the waiting time for a good (that is already a mass good) to be sold at the highest
price. Let us define ∆Cj (t) as the time that has to elapse from time t for good j to be sold at the highest price. It
is defined such that jˆ(t+∆Cj (t)) = j. Given that jˆ grows at the constant rate g, we can solve for the waiting time:
∆Cj (t) =
log
(
j
jˆ(t)
)
g
.
Technological adoption has the following value, under Case 1:
Vj(t) =

ψO−ψN
χ
1
r
if j ≤ jˆ(t)
e
−r∆Cj (t)+gγ∆Cj (t)−1
gγ−r
[
PNP
(
NP (t)
j
)γ]
+ e
−r∆Cj (t)−1
−r
−ψN
χ
+ e
−r∆Cj (t)
r
ψO−ψN
χ
if jˆ(t) < j ≤ NP (t)
e
−r∆Mj (t)−1
−r
(
ψO−ψN
χ
)
pi + e
−r(∆Mj (t)+∆Cj (t))+gγ∆Cj (t)−e−r∆
M
j (t)
gγ−r (PNP )+
+ e
−r(∆Mj (t)+∆Cj (t))−e−r∆
M
j (t)
−r
(
−ψN
χ
)
+ e
−r(∆Mj (t)+∆Cj (t))
r
(
ψO−ψN
χ
)
if NP (t) < j ≤ NR(t)
(55)
In the interval [0, jˆ], technological adoption yields lifetime profits from a market of size 1, selling at the highest
price. Between jˆ and NP , the value of technological adoption corresponds to the profits coming from selling to a
market of size 1, at a price that is changing over time for a period of time equal to ∆Cj (t) (the first term), after
which the price stays constant at the high level. Finally, technological adoption in the interval [NP , NR] yields profits
coming from selling to a market of size pi for a period of time equal to ∆Mj (t) (the first term), after which the quantity
sold jumps to 1 and the price suddenly drops, starting to increase thereafter. After some time ∆Cj (t) + ∆Mj (t), the
price will have reached the highest level (last term). Notice that marginal costs are always constant and equal to ψ
N
χ
.
Instead, under Case 2, the expression simplifies further to:
Vj(t) =

ψO−ψN
χ
1
r
if j ≤ NP (t)
ψO−ψN
χ
(
pi 1−e
−r∆Mj (t)
r
+ e
−r∆Mj (t)
r
)
if NP (t) < j ≤ NR(t)
(56)
As it is clear, there is no change in price in this case. The quantity sold starts at pi, for those goods between
NP and NR, and then jumps to 1 after a period of time ∆Mj (t).
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Figure 19. Value of Technological Adoption for differentiated goods. NP = 8, NR = 10, pi = 0.3, ψN = 0.8, ψO = 1.2, χ = 1,
γ = 0.5, r = 0.05, gc = 0.11.
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